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    The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)


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    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  orthodoxymoron on Thu Apr 10, 2014 6:52 pm

    Thank-you magamud. I had my own extended encounter with a Mystery Man aka The Ancient Egyptian Deity!! What's interesting about that clip, is that when we first met -- and it became clear that I wasn't dealing with just another human -- I told them that they might not really be "here"!! They seemed startled -- but they didn't deny it!! What I meant was that they might've been operating a Hybrid-Android Avatar from a Spaceship or a Deep Underground Military Base (Hundreds or Thousands of Miles Away)!! I talked to them on the phone dozens of times -- and one time they told me the conversation was being monitored (and I assumed recorded)!! They asked me a series of questions (which included theology). Sometimes their personality seemed to change (as if someone else was speaking through them)!! Sometimes, if I said something particularly controversial -- they would repeat what I just said (as if to make sure this was duly noted by those monitoring our conversation)!! I got the distinct impression I was dealing with an Ancient-Friend turned Rebellious-Enemy. I felt as if I wasn't supposed to be here -- doing what I'm doing -- and that I had somehow screwed things up for them. OR -- that I had somehow hung myself, and given them a surprise opportunity to really kick my @$$!! Perhaps I had invited them with my internet activities. They also seemed to indicate that my participation at the Crystal Cathedral had changed things significantly. Once, as we discussed relativity and quantum-physics, I disagreed with them, and they retorted "Do You Wish to Challenge Me??" Long ago, I knew a child who reacted to a challenge by stating "You Doubt My Word?" What if we went to school together?? I haven't lied about my experiences -- although I might've exaggerated or been mistaken. I've related some of what was said in a mostly neutral manner. I haven't tried to attack or promote the AED. I still don't know who they really were or who they represented. I will continue to be cool and neutral regarding the whole thing. Once, when I was hiking, I spoke with a strange man -- and later encountered a woman with a dog -- who said "there's a man on the other side of the ravine who's meditating!" I wondered if the meditating-man was manifesting the woman and the dog?! I think I spoke to the AED in more than one form (male and female). I might be crazy and/or mistaken -- but I'm not lying. I've mostly indirectly used my extended encounter with the AED to enhance this thread (for better or worse) -- and I've tried not to sensationalize my experience. I made no non-disclosure agreement with them -- but they requested that I not be too direct. I continue to think that I was somehow set-up for something bad in this incarnation. I keep thinking that I might have something in common with Dr. Who in the Trial of a Time Lord!! Notice that Dr. Who and his Mother were not evil characters!! They were misrepresented and deceived. I have speculated that Dr. Who might be a Lilith character!! I have further speculated that his mother might be an Anna character (from V). I continue to think that the Creator and Administrator of Earth and Humanity got demoted and exiled in antiquity -- with a harsh ruler taking their place. I have further suspected that this harsh ruler went rogue at some point. Try combining Trial of a Time Lord -- with The Changeling!! As usual, I speak in obscurities and generalities (in a crazy context) so as to make you have to do a lot of digging to really understand what I'm talking about!! A casual observer would never "get it"! It's a bit like "plausible-deniability"!! BTW -- the AED preferred E = hf rather than E = mc2. Please remember that this thread is highly contrarian and speculative -- but I don't just make up crazy stuff. This is mostly the "Propose a Hypothesis" part of the Scientific Method. This is just the beginning...

    "What Are We Gonna Do Now??!!"

    "When in Danger!! When in Doubt!! Run in Circles!! Scream and Shout!!"

    Last edited by orthodoxymoron on Thu Feb 11, 2016 8:24 am; edited 3 times in total

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    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  magamud on Fri Apr 11, 2014 10:42 am

    The only real technology is nature. I suspect as we use entertainment for voyeurism to process our unconscious, other worlds use us, in the same way. Since our species cannot see, it is used like a hub for other species to play out their unconscious. They keep it unconscious, because it is believed this will forgo their responsibility. This is of course a great fallacy and what experience, evolution and awareness is all about.

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    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  orthodoxymoron on Fri Apr 11, 2014 12:51 pm

    Thank-you magamud. What you wrote gets at the heart of a theory of mine. "The only real technology is nature. I suspect as we use entertainment for voyeurism to process our unconscious, other worlds use us, in the same way. Since our species cannot see, it is used like a hub for other species to play out their unconscious. They keep it unconscious, because it is believed this will forgo their responsibility. This is of course a great fallacy and what experience, evolution and awareness is all about." What if Earth-Humanity is a Fallen and Sinful Illegal-Creation in Lockdown?? What if the confusion, misery, and forbidden-pleasures of this dark world have somehow developed the souls in this solar-system in good and bad ways -- with the net-change being in the positive direction?? But what if the rest of the universe has been corrupted by watching this Theater of the Universe aka Theater of the Absurd?? "By beholding we become changed." What if Earth-Humanity has been a desperate and dangerous experiment -- designed to accelerate the evolution of the universe?? I have suggested the possibility of a very Ancient, Traditional, and Violent Other-Than-Human Universe -- with Earth-Humanity being a "Fly in the Ointment." I continue to feel as if I am in profound conflict with Divinity, Humanity, and Myself -- regardless of whether I wish to be, or not. I have been hinting at a very structured and organized responsible-democracy under the guidance of a benevolent minimalist-theocracy aka The United States of the Solar System. One would probably have to study this concept for decades to really "get it". I don't think I "get" my own internet posting. It might really require 122 years to properly analyze and implement such a concept. If it were presently dumped upon this solar system -- things might REALLY go to hell. I am extremely apprehensive regarding Disclosure-Events, Regime-Changes, and Apocalyptic-Salvation. The Revolutionary-Evolution of this Solar-System might get unimaginably nasty. If there were an all-out Solar-System Final-Jihad -- there might be nothing left -- nothing but one big asteroid-belt mixed with space-dust -- and I wish I were kidding. I've been told that we've done better than expected -- that things have worked-out well for humanity -- but that things continue to worsen -- and that I don't want to know what deals and treaties exist at the highest levels of this solar system. I've been told that humanity should never have been created -- and that we need to start over. I've been told that a Leader of Humanity will fail -- which will be followed by an extermination. I've heard that God was (and is?) prepared to start-over (regarding humanity) rather than change the way they govern the universe. Physicality and Governance seem to be the Key-Issues. Consider the concepts of Absolute-Ethics and Absolute-Obedience relative to Human-Nature, Divine-Sovereignty, and Responsible-Freedom. Consider reading the Bible (from cover to cover -- straight-through) in the context of Science-Fiction. Once again -- I'm not out to screw anyone or anything. I simply wish for things to work out well for all-concerned. Here is one more study-list (with scripture preferably in the KJV):

    1. Patriarchs and Prophets by Ellen White.
    2. Isaiah.
    3. Matthew.
    4. Job.
    5. Mark.
    6. Psalms.
    7. Luke.
    8. Proverbs.
    9. John.
    10. Ecclesiastes.
    11. Acts.
    12. The Desire of Ages by Ellen White.
    13. The 1928 Book of Common Prayer (and Liturgy).
    14. The Music of J.S. Bach.
    15. The Gods of Eden by William Bramley.
    16. The Federalist Papers (with US Constitution).
    17. Astronomy Textbooks.
    18. Science Fiction.

    All of this has as much to do with mental and spiritual conditioning as it has to do with any perception or conviction regarding absolute truth. Continue to focus upon Ethics, Law, Law-Enforcement, Governance, Spirituality, Physicality, Business, and Church-State Issues.

    Last edited by orthodoxymoron on Thu Feb 11, 2016 8:26 am; edited 6 times in total

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    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  orthodoxymoron on Fri Apr 11, 2014 7:56 pm

    Please remember that this thread is all about mental and spiritual conditioning -- using a wide variety of sources and techniques -- without any claims to originality or exclusive-truth. This thread will really jerk you around -- and jerk your chain!! In reality, this is probably more of a study-guide for ME than anyone else. I doubt that anyone really takes my 'work' seriously -- especially when I joke and swear!! I think I've got some Galactic-Relatives who are VERY concerned and disgusted with me. Just a hunch. What they need to remember is that I am working within a particular context -- and I am attempting to influence a very select audience. Please keep that in mind. This thread does NOT reflect my True-Self. I just wish to make it clear that I understand and respect the concepts of Absolute-Ethics, Absolute-Law, Absolute-Power, and Absolute-Obedience (if and only if there are Absolutely No Flaws, Inconsistencies, or Shortcomings). Absolute-Power and Absolute-Obedience seem to apply most appropriately to Highly Militaristic Situations. An Idealistic United States of the Solar System might contain a very limited and restrained application of these Absolute-Terms. Once again, the way this solar system is governed might (of necessity) be in a manner which harmonizes with the way the rest of the universe is governed. At what point does God cease to be God -- and Man commences being God?? But really, did God give Man dominion over Earth in the beginning?? According to scripture -- that didn't last very long -- did it?? If a Bad-God replaces a Good-God, should the Bad-God be worshiped, praised, and unquestioningly obeyed?? How might a civilization determine if they have a Good-God or a Bad-God?? I'm sorry if this steps on toes -- but these are unimaginably important questions. Gilles Deleuze continued:

    4. Collaboration with Guattari

    Following his work in the philosophy of difference, Deleuze meets Guattari in the aftermath of May 1968. These famous “events,” which have marked French culture and politics ever since, brought together students and workers, to the befuddlement of the established guardians of the revolution, the French Communist Party. Days of general strikes and standoffs with the police led the French President Charles de Gaulle to call a general election. De Gaulle's call for a parliamentary solution to the crisis was backed by the Communists, who were evidently as scared of any revolution from below—which by definition would lack the party discipline they so craved—as were the official holders of State power, to whose position they aspired. The worker-student movement eventually collapsed, leaving memories of non-scripted social interactions and revealing the investments of the Party, lampooned thereafter as “bureaucrats of the revolution,” in Foucault's words in his Preface to the English translation of Anti-Oedipus. The French Communist Party's agreement with De Gaulle to allow a parliamentary solution to the social crisis was a glaring example of the horizon of identity (the desire that someone be in control of a central State bureaucracy) that allowed an opposition (of the Gaullists and the Communists as rivals for control of the State) to shackle difference. The government response to May 1968 changed French academic life in two ways. First, institutionally, by the creation of Paris VIII (Vincennes) where Deleuze taught; and second, in the direction of the philosophy of difference, which became explicitly political post-1968. It became, in fact, a politics of philosophy dedicated to exposing the historical force relations producing identity in all its ontological and epistemological forms. In other words, the philosophy of difference now set out to show how the unified objects of the world, the unified subjects who know and hence control them, the unified bodies of knowledge that codify this knowledge, and the unified institution of philosophy that polices the whole affair, are products of historical, political forces in combat with other forces.

    In purely philosophical terms, the works with Guattari naturalize the still-Kantian framework of Difference and Repetition. By the time of Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari explicitly thematize that the syntheses they investigate are fully material syntheses, syntheses of nature in geological as well as biological, social, and psychological registers (Welchman 2009). Not just organic syntheses, but inorganic ones as well, are “spatio-temporal dynamisms.” With this full naturalization of syntheses, the question of panpsychism is brought into full relief (Protevi 2011), since material syntheses are as much syntheses of experience as they are syntheses of things, as we see in the title of Chapter 3 of A Thousand Plateaus: “The Geology of Morals: Who does the earth think it is?”

    4.1 Anti-Oedipus

    In considering Anti-Oedipus we should first discuss its performative effect, which attempts to “force us to think,” that is, to fight against a tendency to cliché. Reading Anti-Oedipus can indeed be shocking experience. First, we find a bizarre collection of sources; for example, the schizophrenic ranting of Antonin Artaud provides one of the basic concepts of the work, the “body without organs.” Second is the book's vulgarity, as in the infamous opening lines about the unconscious (the Id): “It is at work everywhere, functioning smoothly at times, at other times in fits and starts. It breathes, it heats, it eats. It shits and Ooopsey [Ça chie, ça baise]. What a mistake to have ever said the id” (7 / 1). A third performative effect is humor, as in the mocking of Melanie Klein's analysis of children: “Say it's Oedipus, or I'll slap you upside the head [sinon t'auras un gifle]” (54 / 45; trans. modified). There are many more passages like this; it's safe to say very few philosophy books contain as many jokes, puns, and double entendres as Anti-Oedipus. A fourth element is the gleeful coarseness of the polemics. Among many other examples, thinkers of the signifier are associated with the lap dogs of tyrants, members of the French Communist Party are said to have fascist libidinal investments, and Freud is described as a “masked Al Capone.” All in all, the performative effect of reading Anti-Oedipus is unforgettable.

    Passing to the conceptual structure of the book, the key term of Anti-Oedipus is “desiring-production,” which crisscrosses Marx and Freud, putting desire in the eco-social realm of production and production in the unconscious realm of desire. Rather than attempting to synthesize Marx and Freud in the usual way, that is, by a reductionist strategy that either (1) operates in favor of Freud, by positing that the libidinal investment of social figures and patterns requires sublimating an original investment in family figures and patterns, or (2) operates in favor of Marx by positing neuroses and psychoses as mere super-structural by-products of unjust social structures, Deleuze and Guattari will call desiring-production a “universal primary process” underlying the seemingly separate natural, social and psychological realms. Desiring-production is thus not anthropocentric; it is the very heart of the world. Besides its universal scope, we need to realize two things about desiring-production right away: (1) there is no subject that lies behind the production, that performs the production; and (2) the “desire” in desiring-production is not oriented to making up a lack, but is purely positive. Desiring-production is autonomous, self-constituting, and creative: it is the natura naturans of Spinoza or the will-to-power of Nietzsche.

    Anti-Oedipus is, along with its conceptual and terminological innovation, a work of grand ambitions: among them, (1) an eco-social theory of production, encompassing both sides of the nature/culture split, which functions as an ontology of change, transformation, or “becoming”; (2) a “universal history” of social formations—the “savage” or tribal, the “barbarian” or imperial, and the capitalist—which functions as a synthetic social science; (3) and to clear the ground for these functions, a critique of the received versions of Marx and Freud—and the attempts to synthesize them by analogizing their realms of application. In pursuing its ambitions, Anti-Oedipus has the virtues and the faults of the tour de force: unimagined connections between disparate elements are made possible, but at the cost of a somewhat strained conceptual scheme.

    Anti-Oedipus identifies two primary registers of desiring-production, the natural or “metaphysical” and the social or “historical.” They are related in the following way: natural desiring-production is that which social machines repress, but also that which is revealed in capitalism, at the end of history (a contingent history, that is, one that avoids dialectical laws of history). Capitalism sets free desiring-production even as it attempts to rein it in with the institution of private property and the familial or “Oedipal” patterning of desire; schizophrenics are propelled by the charge of desiring-production thus set free but fail at the limits capitalist society proposes, thus providing a clue to the workings of desiring-production.

    It's important at the start to realize that Deleuze and Guattari do not advocate schizophrenia as a “lifestyle” or as the model for a political program. The schizophrenic, as a clinical entity, is the result of the interruption or the blocking of the process of desiring-production, its having been taken out of nature and society and restricted to the body of an individual where it spins in the void rather than make the connections that constitute reality. Desiring-production does not connect “with” reality, as in escaping a subjective prison to touch the objective, but it makes reality, it is the Real, in a twisting of the Lacanian sense of the term. In Lacan, the real is produced as an illusory and retrojected remainder to a signifying system; for Deleuze and Guattari, the Real is reality itself in its process of self-making. The schizophrenic is a sick person in need of help, but schizophrenia is an avenue into the unconscious, the unconscious not of an individual, but the “transcendental unconscious,” an unconscious that is social, historical, and natural all at once.

    In studying the schizophrenic process, Deleuze and Guattari posit that in both the natural and social registers desiring-production is composed of three syntheses, the connective, disjunctive, and conjunctive; the syntheses perform three functions: production, recording, and enjoyment. We can associate production with the physiological, recording with the semiotic, and enjoyment with the psychological registers. While it is important to catch the Kantian resonance of “synthesis,” it is equally important to note, in keeping with the post-structuralist angle we discussed above, that there is no subject performing the syntheses; instead, subjects are themselves one of the products of the syntheses. The syntheses have no underlying subject; they just are the immanent process of desiring-production. Positing a subject behind the syntheses would be a transcendent use of the syntheses. Here we see another reference to the Kantian principle of immanence. Deleuze and Guattari propose to study the immanent use of the synthesis in a “materialist psychoanalysis,” or “schizoanalysis”; by contrast, psychoanalysis is transcendent use of the syntheses, producing five “paralogisms” or “transcendental illusions,” all of which involve assigning the characteristics of the extensive properties of actual products to the intensive production process, or, to put it in the terms of the philosophy of difference, all the paralogisms subordinate differential processes to identities derived from products.

    According to the “universal history” undertaken in Anti-Oedipus, social life has three forms of “socius,” the social body that takes credit for production: the earth for the tribe, the body of the despot for the empire, and capital for capitalism. According to Deleuze and Guattari's reading of the anthropological literature, tribal societies mark bodies in initiation ceremonies, so that the products of an organ are traced to a clan, which is mythically traced to the earth or, more precisely, one of its enchanted regions, which function as the organs on the full body of the earth. Material flows are thus “territorialized,” that is, traced onto the earth, which is credited as the source of all production. The signs in tribal inscription are not signifiers: they do not map onto a voice, but enact a “savage triangle forming … a theater of cruelty that implies the triple independence of the articulated voice, the graphic hand and the appreciative eye” (189). Empires overcode these tribal meaning codes, tracing production back to the despot, the divine father of his people. Material flows in despotic empires are thus “deterritorialized” (they are no longer credited to the earth), and then immediately “reterritorialized” on the body of the despot, who assumes credit for all production. When tribal signs are overcoded, the signifier is formed as a “deterritorialized sign” allowing for communication between the conquered and the conquerors. Signifiers are a “flattening” or “bi-univocalization”: two chains are lined up, one to one, the written and the spoken (205–6; cf. Derrida's notion of “phonocentrism”). The body of the despot as imperial socius means that workers are the “hands” of the emperor, spies are his “eyes,” and so on.

    Capitalism is the radical decoding and deterritorialization of the material flows that previous social machines had zealously coded on the earth or the body of the despot. Production is credited to the “body” of capital, but this form of recording works by the substitution of an “axiomatic” for a code: in this context an “axiomatic” means a set of simple principles for the quantitative calculation of the difference between flows (of deterritorialized labor and capital) rather than elaborate rules for the qualitative judgments that map flows onto the socius. Capitalism's command is utterly simple: connect deterritorialized flows of labor and capital and extract a surplus from that connection. Thus capitalism sets loose an enormous productive charge—connect those flows! Faster, faster!—the surpluses of which the institutions of private property try to register as belonging to individuals. Now those individuals are primarily social (as figures of capitalist or laborer) and only secondarily private (family members). Whereas organs of bodies were socially marked in previous regimes (as belonging to the clan and earth, or as belonging to the emperor, as in the jus primae noctis), body organs are privatized under capitalism and attached to persons as members of the family. In Deleuze and Guattari's terms, capitalism's decoded flows are reterritorialized on “persons,” that is, on family members as figures in the Oedipal triangle.

    4.2 A Thousand Plateaus

    Three differences between this work and its predecessor are immediately apparent. First, A Thousand Plateaus has a much wider range of registers than Anti-Oedipus: cosmic, geologic, evolutionary, developmental, ethological, anthropological, mythological, historical, economic, political, literary, musical, and even more. Second, the results of the paralogisms of Anti-Oedipus become “strata” in A Thousand Plateaus: the organism (the unification and totalization of the connective synthesis of production, or the physiological register), the signifying totality or signifiance, which we can perhaps render as “signifier-ness” (the flattening or “bi-univocalizing” of the disjunctive synthesis of recording, the semiotic register), and the subject (the reification of the conjunctive synthesis of consummation, the psychological register). Finally, while Anti-Oedipus has a classical conceptual architecture, that is, chapters that develop a single argument, A Thousand Plateaus is written as a “rhizome,” that is, as allowing immediate connections between any of its points. Because of this rhizomatic structure, a traditional summary of the “theses” and arguments of A Thousand Plateaus is either downright impossible, or at best, would be much too complex to attempt in an encyclopedia article. We will therefore have to limit ourselves to the following remarks.

    In fourteen plateaus, or planes of intensity—productive connections between immanently arrayed material systems without reference to an external governing source—Deleuze and Guattari develop a new materialism in which a politicized philosophy of difference joins forces with the sciences explored in Difference and Repetition. A Thousand Plateaus is a book of strange new questions: “Who Does the Earth Think It Is?,” “How Do You make Yourself a Body Without Organs?,” “How does the war-machine ward off the apparatus of capture of the State?” and so on. To over-simplify, Deleuze and Guattari take up the insights of dynamical systems theory, which explores the various thresholds at which material systems self-organize (that is, reduce their degrees of freedom, as in our previous example of convection currents). Deleuze and Guattari then extend the notion of self-organizing material systems—those with no need of transcendent organizing agents such as gods, leaders, capital, or subjects—to the social, linguistic, political-economic, and psychological realms. The resultant “rhizome” or de-centered network that is A Thousand Plateaus provides hints for experimentation with the more and more de-regulated flows of energy and matter, ideas and actions—and the attendant attempts at binding them—that make up the contemporary world.

    A Thousand Plateaus maintains the tripartite ontological scheme of all of Deleuze's work, but, as the title indicates, with geological terms of reference. Deleuze and Guattari call the virtual “the Earth,” the intensive is called “consistency,” and the actual is called “the system of the strata.” As the latter term indicates, one of the foci of their investigations is the tendency of some systems to head toward congealment or stratification. More precisely put, any concrete system is composed of intensive processes tending toward the (virtual) plane of consistency and/or toward (actual) stratification. We can say that all that exists is the intensive, tending towards the limits of virtuality and actuality; these last two ontological registers do not “exist,” but they do “insist,” to use one of Deleuze's terms. Nothing ever instantiates the sheer frozen stasis of the actual nor the sheer differential dispersion of the virtual; rather, natural or worldly processes are always and only actualizations, that is, they are processes of actualization structured by virtual multiplicities and heading toward an actual state they never quite attain. More precisely, systems also contain tendencies moving in the other direction, toward virtuality; systems are more or less stable sets of processes moving in different directions, toward actuality and toward virtuality. In still other words, Deleuze and Guattari are process philosophers; neither the structures of such processes nor their completed products merit the same ontological status as processes themselves. With this perspective, Deleuze and Guattari offer a detailed and complex “open system” which is extraordinarily rich and complex. A useful way into it is to follow the concepts of coding, stratification and territorialization. They are related in the following manner. Coding is the process of ordering matter as it is drawn into a body; by contrast, stratification is the process of creating hierarchal bodies, while territorialization is the ordering of those bodies in “assemblages,” that is to say, an emergent unity joining together heterogeneous bodies in a “consistency.”

    These concepts, and several other networks of concepts considerations of space preclude us from considering, are put to work in addressing the following topics. After a discussion of the notion of “rhizome” in the first chapter (or “plateau” as they call it), Deleuze and Guattari quickly dismiss psychoanalysis in the second. In the third chapter they discuss the process of stratification in physical, organic, and social strata, with special attention to questions in population genetics, where speciation can be thought to stratify or channel the flow of genes. In chapters 4 and 5 they intervene in debates in linguistics in favor of pragmatics, that is to say, highlighting the “incorporeal transformations” (labels that prompt a different form of action to be applied to a body: “I now pronounce you man and wife”) that socially sanctioned “order words” bring about (Deleuze and Guattari also refer to speech act theory in this regard). They also lay out the theory of “territories” or sets of environmentally embedded triggers of self-organizing processes, and the concomitant processes of deterritorialization (breaking of habits) and reterritorialization (formation of habits). Chapters 6 and 7 discuss methods of experimenting with the strata in which we found ourselves. Chapter 6 deals with the organic stratum or the “organism”; the notorious term of art “Body without Organs” can be at least partially glossed as the reservoir of potentials for different patterns of bodily affect. Chapter 7 deals with the intersection of signifiance (“signifier-ness”) and subjectification in “faciality”; the face arrests the drift of signification by tying meaning to the expressive gestures of a subject. Chapters 8 and 9 deal with the social organizing practices they name “lines” and “segments”; of particular interest here is their treatment of fascism. Chapter 10 returns to the question of intensive experimentation, now discussed in terms of “becoming,” in which (at least) two systems come together to form an emergent system or “assemblage.” Chapter 11 discusses the “refrain” or rhythm as a means of escaping from and forming new territories, or even existing in a process of continual deterritorialization, what they call “consistency.” Chapters 12 and 13 discuss the relation of the “war machine” and the State; the former is a form of social organization that fosters creativity (it “reterritorializes on deterritorialization itself”), while the latter is an “apparatus of capture” living vampirically off of labor (here Deleuze and Guattari's basically Marxist perspective is apparent). Finally, Chapter 14 discusses types of social constitution of space, primarily the “smooth” space of war machines and the “striated” space of States.

    4.3 What is Philosophy?

    After a long period in which each pursued his own interests, Deleuze and Guattari published a last collaboration in 1991, What Is Philosophy? In answering their title question, Deleuze and Guattari seek to place philosophy in relation to science and art, all three being modes of thought, with no subordination among them. Thought, in all its modes, struggles with chaos against opinion. Philosophy is the creation or construction of concepts; a concept is an intensive multiplicity, inscribed on a plane of immanence, and peopled by “conceptual personae” which operate the conceptual machinery. A conceptual persona is not a subject, for thinking is not subjective, but takes place in the relationship of territory and earth. Science creates functions on a plane of reference. Art creates “a bloc of sensation, that is to say, a compound of percepts and affects” (WP, 164).

    We will deal with Deleuze and the arts in some detail below. In discussing What is Philosophy?, let us concentrate on the treatment of the relation of philosophy and science. We should remember at the outset that the nomad or minor science evoked in A Thousand Plateaus is not the Royal or major science that makes up the entirety of what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘science’ in What is Philosophy?. The motives for this conflation are unclear; in the eyes of some, this change considerably weakens the value of the latter work. Be that as it may, in What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari vigorously deny that philosophy is needed to help science think about its own presuppositions (“no one needs philosophy to reflect on anything” [WP 6]). Instead, they emphasize the complementary nature of the two. First, they point out a number of similarities between philosophy and science: both are approaches to “chaos” that attempt to bring order to it, both are creative modes of thought, and both are complementary to each other, as well as to a third mode of creative thought, art. Beyond these similarities, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between philosophy as the creation of concepts on a plane of immanence and science as the creation of functions on a plane of reference. Both relate to the virtual, the differential field of potential transformations of material systems, but in different ways. Philosophy gives consistency to the virtual, mapping the forces composing a system as pure potentials, what the system is capable of. Meanwhile, science gives it reference, determining the conditions by which systems behave the way they actually do. Philosophy is the “counter-effectuation of the event,” abstracting an event or change of pattern from bodies and states of affairs and thereby laying out the transformative potentials inherent in things, the roads not taken that coexist as compossibles or as inclusive disjunctions (differentiation, in the terms of Difference and Repetition), while science tracks the actualization of the virtual, explaining why this one road was chosen in a divergent series or exclusive disjunction (differenciation, according to Difference and Repetition). Functions predict the behavior of constituted systems, laying out their patterns and predicting change based on causal chains, while concepts “speak the event” (WP 21), mapping out the multiplicity structuring the possible patterns of behavior of a system—and the points at which the system can change its habits and develop new ones. For Deleuze and Guattari in What is Philosophy?, then, science deals with properties of constituted things, while philosophy deals with the constitution of events. Roughly speaking, philosophy explores the plane of immanence composed of constellations of constitutive forces that can be abstracted from bodies and states of affairs. It thus maps the range of connections a thing is capable of, its “becomings” or “affects.” Science, on the other hand, explores the concretization of these forces into bodies and states of affairs, tracking the behavior of things in relation to already constituted things in a certain delimited region of space and time (the “plane of reference”). How do concepts relate to functions? Just as there is a “concept of concept” there are also “concepts of functions,” but these are purely philosophical creations “without the least scientific value” (WP 117). Thus concrete concepts like that of “deterritorialization” are philosophical concepts, not scientific functions, even though they might resonate with, or echo, scientific functions. Nor are they metaphors, as Deleuze and Guattari repeatedly insist:

    Of course, we realize the dangers of citing scientific propositions outside their own sphere. It is the danger of arbitrary metaphor or of forced application. But perhaps these dangers are averted if we restrict ourselves to taking from scientific operators a particular conceptualizable character which itself refers to non?scientific areas, and converges with science without applying it or making it a metaphor (Deleuze 1989: 129).

    Deleuze and Guattari's refusal to recognize that their work contains metaphors is due to their struggle against the “imperialism” of the signifying regime, a major theme in both Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus: not every relation between different intellectual fields can be grasped by the most common notions of “metaphor,” reliant as they are on the notion of a transfer of sense from primary to secondary signification.

    5. Deleuze and the Arts

    Kant had dissociated aesthetics into two halves: the theory of sensibility as the form of possible experience (the “Transcendental Aesthetic” of the Critique of Pure Reason), and the theory of art as a reflection on real experience (the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” in the Critique of Judgment). In Deleuze's work, these two halves of aesthetics are reunited: if the most general aim of art is to “produce a sensation,” then the genetic principles of sensation are at the same time the principles of composition for works of art; conversely, it is works of art that are best capable of revealing these conditions of sensibility. Deleuze therefore writes on the arts not as a critic but as a philosopher, and his books and essays on the various arts—including the cinema (Cinema I and II), literature (Essays Critical and Clinical), and painting (Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation)—must be read as philosophical explorations of this transcendental domain of sensibility. The cinema, for instance, produces images that move, and that move in time, and it is these two aspects of film that Deleuze set out to analyze in The Movement-Image and The Time-Image: “What exactly does the cinema show us about space and time that the other arts don't show?” Deleuze thus describes his two-volume Cinema as “a book of logic, a logic of the cinema” that sets out “to isolate certain cinematographic concepts,” concepts which are specific to the cinema, but which can only be formed philosophically. Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation likewise creates a series of philosophical concepts, each of which relates to a particular aspect of Bacon's paintings, but which also find a place in “a general logic of sensation.” In general, Deleuze will locate the conditions of sensibility in an intensive conception of space and a virtual conception of time, which are necessarily actualized in a plurality of spaces and a complex rhythm of times (for instance, in the non-extended spaces and non-linear times of modern mathematics and physics).

    For Deleuze, the task of art is to produce “signs” that will push us out of our habits of perception into the conditions of creation. When we perceive via the re-cognition of the properties of substances, we see with a stale eye pre-loaded with clichés; we order the world in what Deleuze calls “representation.” In this regard, Deleuze cites Francis Bacon: we're after an artwork that produces an effect on the nervous system, not on the brain. What he means by this figure of speech is that in an art encounter we are forced to experience the “being of the sensible.” We get something that we cannot re-cognize, something that is “imperceptible”—it doesn't fit the hylomorphic production model of perception in which sense data, the “matter” or hyle of sensation, is ordered by submission to conceptual form. Art however cannot be re-cognized, but can only be sensed; in other words, art splits perceptual processing, forbidding the move to conceptual ordering. This is exactly what Kant in the Third Critique called reflective judgment: when the concept is not immediately given in the presentation of art. With art we reach “sensation,” or the “being of the sensible,” the sentiendum.

    Deleuze talks about this effect of sensation as the “transcendent exercise” of the faculty of sensibility; here we could refer to the third chapter of Difference and Repetition, where Deleuze lays out a non-Kantian “differential theory of the faculties.” In this remarkable theory, intensity is “difference in itself,” that which carries the faculties to their limits. The faculties are linked in order; here we see what Deleuze calls the privilege of sensibility as origin of knowledge—the “truth of empiricism.” In the differential theory of the faculties, sensibility, imagination, memory, and thought all “communicate a violence” from one to the other. With sensibility, pure difference in intensity is grasped immediately in the encounter as the sentiendum; with imagination, the disparity in the phantasm is that which can only be imagined. With memory, in turn, the memorandum is the dissimilar in the pure form of time, or the immemorial of transcendent memory. With thought, a fractured self is constrained to think “difference in itself” in Ideas. Thus the “free form of difference” moves each faculty and communicates its violence to the next. You have to be forced to think, starting with an art encounter in which intensity is transmitted in signs or sensation. Rather than a “common sense” in which all the faculties agree in recognizing the “same” object, we find in this communicated violence a “discordant harmony” (compare the Kantian sublime) that tears apart the subject (here we find the notion of “cruelty” Deleuze picks up from Artaud).

    6. The Reception of Deleuze

    The writings of Deleuze have provoked a large literature of explication and introduction in both French and English; more recently, works in German, Italian, and other European languages have appeared. There have also been noteworthy critiques. Rather than attempt a complete survey of the voluminous secondary literature, we will concentrate on a few of the major critiques.

    6.1 The feminist critique

    An early wave of criticism was directed in the 1980s at Deleuze's collaborations with Guattari by feminists such as Alice Jardine and Luce Irigaray. Jardine 1985 criticized the concept of “becoming-woman” in A Thousand Plateaus, which Deleuze and Guattari position as the first step towards a de-subjectivizing “becoming-indiscernible.” Jardine argued that Deleuze and Guattari's claim that even women must undergo a “becoming-woman” amounts to a threat to the hard-fought victories of concrete feminist struggle that allowed women to claim a subjectivity in the first place. According to Grosz 1994's survey of the early feminist critiques, Irigaray argued that the use of “becoming-woman” as a figure of change incumbent upon all, including men, amounts to a masculinist and desexualizing appropriation of feminist struggle. In the 1990s and now into the 2000s, a number of feminists associated with the “corporeal feminism” movement have attempted positive connections with Deleuze in the name of an open and experimental attitude toward bodily potentials, in both the singular and political registers, as in the phrase “body politic.” See among others Braidotti 1994 and 2002; Gatens 1996; Grosz 1994 and 1995; Olkowski 1999; Lorraine 1999; and the essays in Buchanan and Colebrook 2002.

    6.2 The Badiouan critique

    One of the most important criticisms of Deleuze was put forth in Badiou 1997. Badiou claimed, contrary to the dominant perception, that Deleuze is not so much a philosopher of the multiple as of the One. Conducted in the highly technical idiom for which he is known, Badiou criticizes Deleuze for a certain vitalism, which in Badiou's eyes falls short of the axiomatic austerity demanded of philosophy. Whereas Badiou merely ignored the collaborative works with Guattai, Zizek 2003 conducts a polemic against the Guattari collaborations in favor of a Deleuzean logic of Being characterized as an “immaterial affect generated by interacting bodies as a sterile surface of pure Becoming” (as in Logic of Sense). A third critical work in this vein is Hallward 2005. For Hallward, the singular logic of Deleuze's thought is analogous to the tradition of theophantic thinkers, whereby the divine spark of creation is entombed in creatures; the task of the creature is to redeem that divine spark from its creatural prison. But this redemption is not annihilation; Deleuze's philosophy is not that of Lacanian-Zizekian “renunciation-extinction.”

    In response to the Badiouan critique, we can note that one of the most promising leads for future research in discussing the relation of Badiou and Deleuze is to concentrate on the type of mathematics each thinker prefers. Rather than accepting Badiou's characterization of Deleuze as a thinker of reality in biological term (as opposed to Badiou's mathematical orientation), we should see Deleuze as proposing a “problematic” version of mathematics, versus Badiou's axiomatic conception. This tack has been taken by Smith 2003.

    6.3 The “Science Wars” critique

    Deleuze was one of the targets of the polemic in Sokal and Bricmont 1999. As much of their chapter on Deleuze consists of exasperated exclamations of incomprehension, it is hard to say what it is that Sokal and Bricmont think they have accomplished. One thing is clear though: Deleuze was perfectly aware of the finitist revolution in the history of the differential calculus, despite Sokal and Bricmont's intimations otherwise. He writes in Difference and Repetition, “it is a mistake to tie the value of the symbol dx to the existence of infinitesimals; but it is also a mistake to refuse it any ontological or gnoseological value in the name of a refusal of the latter. In fact, there is a treasure buried within the old so-called barbaric or pre-scientific interpretations of the differential calculus, which must be separated from its infinitesimal matrix. A great deal of heart and a great deal of truly philosophical naivety is needed in order to take the symbol dx seriously …” (170). It seems obvious here that Deleuze's treatment of early forms of the differential calculus is not meant as an intervention into the history of mathematics, or an attempt at a philosophy of mathematics, but as an investigation seeking to form a properly philosophical concept of difference by means of extracting certain forms of thought from what he clearly labels as antiquated mathematical methods. (For positive views of Deleuze's use of mathematics as provocations for the formation of his philosophical concepts, see the essays in Duffy 2006.)

    Another and perhaps more effective response to Sokal and Bricmont would be to point to the positive work done on Deleuze and science. Massumi 1992 and DeLanda 2003 attempt to show that Deleuze's epistemology and ontology can be brought together with the results of contemporary dynamical systems theory (popularly known as “chaos” and “complexity” theory). Bell 2006 follows up on this work. Protevi 2001 looks at the accompanying notions of hylomorphism and self-organization in the history of philosophy; Bonta and Protevi 2004 treat Deleuze and dynamic systems theory with regard to its potentials for geographical work. For other issues on Deleuze and science, see the essays in Marks 2006. Finally, Ansell Pearson 1999 brought attention to Deleuze and biology; see also Toscano 2006 in this regard.


    Primary Literature

    Works by Deleuze
    (1953) Empirisme et subjectivité (Paris: PUF); tr. as Empiricism and Subjectivity, by Constantin Boundas, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.
    (1956) “La Conception de la différence chez Bergson,” Etudes bergsoniennes 4 (1956): 77–112; tr. as “Bergson's Conception of Difference,” by Melissa McMahon, in John Mullarkey (ed.), The New Bergson, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999.
    (1962) Nietzsche et la philosophie (Paris: PUF); tr. as Nietzsche and Philosophy, by Hugh Tomlinson, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983.
    (1963) La philosophie critique de Kant (Paris: PUF); tr. as The Critical Philosophy of Kant, by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984.
    (1966) Le Bergsonisme (Paris: PUF); tr. as Bergsonism, by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, New York: Zone Books, 1988.
    (1967) Présentation de Sacher-Masoch (Paris: Minuit); tr. as Masochism: An Interpretation of Coldness and Cruelty, by Jean McNeil, New York: G. Braziller, 1971.
    (1968) Différence et répétition (Paris: PUF); tr. as Difference and Repetition, by Paul Patton, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
    (1968) Spinoza et le problème de l'expres​sion(Paris: Minuit); tr. as Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, by Martin Joughin, New York: Zone Books, 1990.
    (1969) Logique du sens (Paris: Minuit); tr. as The Logic of Sense, by Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.
    (1972) “A quoi reconnaît-on le structuralisme?” in Francois Châtelet, ed., Histoire de la philosophie, tome 8: Le XXe siècle (Paris: Hachette, 1972): 299–335; tr. as “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?” in Desert Islands, New York: Semiotexte, 2003.
    (1964 [1970, 1976]) Proust et les signes (Paris: PUF); tr. (of 1976 ed) as Proust and Signs: The Complete Text, by Richard Howard, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003.
    (1977) Dialogues (avec Claire Parnet) (Paris: Flammarion); tr. as Dialogues, by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.
    (1981 [1970]) Spinoza: Philosophie pratique; (Paris: PUF); tr. as Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, by Robert Hurley, San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988.
    (1981) Francis Bacon: Logique de la sensation (Paris: Editions de la différence); tr. as Francis Bacon: Logic of Sensation, by Daniel W. Smith, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.
    (1983) Cinéma I: l'Image-Mouvement (Paris: Minuit); tr. as Cinema I: The Movement-Image, tr. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.
    (1985) Cinéma II: l'Image-temps (Paris: Minuit); tr. as Cinema II: The Time-Image, by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.
    (1986) Foucault (Paris: Minuit); tr. as Foucault, Sean Hand, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988.
    (1988) Le Pli: Leibniz et le Baroque (Paris: Minuit); tr. as The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, by Tom Conley, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.
    (1990) Pourparlers (Paris: Minuit); tr. as Negotiations, by Martin Joughin, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.
    (1993) Critique et clinique (Paris: Minuit); tr. as Essays Critical and Clinical, by Daniel Smith and Michael Greco, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.
    (1995) “L'immanence: une vie,” Philosophie 47 (septembre 1), 3–7; tr. as “Immanence: A Life” in Two Regimes of Madness, New York: Semiotexte, 2006.
    (2002) L'Île déserte et autres textes: textes et entretiens 1953–1974, ed. David Lapoujade (Paris: Minuit, 2002); tr. as Desert Islands and Other Texts (1953–1974), by Mike Taormina, New York: Semiotexte, 2003.
    (2003) Deux régimes de fous: textes et entretiens 1975–1995, ed. David Lapoujade (Paris: Minuit); tr. as Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975–1995, New York: Semiotexte, 2006.

    Works by Deleuze with Félix Guattari
    (1972) L'Anti-Oedipe (Paris: Minuit); tr. as Anti-Oedipus, by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane, New York: Viking, 1977; reprint University of Minnesota Press, 1983.
    (1975) Kafka: pour une littérature mineure (Paris: Minuit); tr. as Kafka: For a Minor Literature, by Dana Polan, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.
    (1980) Mille plateaux (Paris: Minuit); tr. as A Thousand Plateaus, by Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.
    (1991) Qu'est-ce que la philosophie? (Paris: Minuit); tr. as What is Philosophy?, by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.

    Secondary Literature
    Alliez, Eric (ed.), 1998. Gilles Deleuze: une vie philosophique, Paris: Synthélabo.
    –––, 2004. Signature of the World: What is Deleuze and Guattari's Philosophy?, Eliot Ross Albert (trans.), London: Continuum.
    Ansell Pearson, Keith (ed.), 1997. Deleuze and Philosophy: The Difference Engineer, London: Routledge.
    –––, 1999. Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze, London: Routledge.
    Antonioli, Manola, 1999. Deleuze et l'histoire de la philosophie, Paris: Kimé.
    –––, 2003. Géophilosophie de Deleuze et Guattari, Paris: L'Harmattan.
    Badiou, Alain, 2000. Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, Louise Burchill (trans.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
    Beistegui, Miguel de, 2004. Truth and Genesis: Philosophy as Differential Ontology, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
    –––, 2010. Immanence: Deleuze and Philosophy, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
    Bell, Jeffrey, 2006. Philosophy at the Edge of Chaos: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Difference, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
    –––, 2009. Deleuze's Hume: Philosophy, Culture, and the Scottish Enlightenment, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
    Bergen, Veronique, 2003. L'Ontologie de Gilles Deleuze, Paris: L'Harmattan.
    Bogue, Ronald, 1989. Deleuze and Guattari, New York: Routledge.
    –––, 2003. Deleuze on Cinema, New York: Routledge.
    –––, 2003. Deleuze on Literature, New York: Routledge.
    –––, 2003. Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts, New York: Routledge.
    Bonta, Mark, and John Protevi, 2004. Deleuze and Geophilosophy: A Guide and Glossary, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
    Boundas, Constantin, 2011. Gilles Deleuze: The Intensive Reduction, London: Continuum.
    ––– (ed.), 2006. Deleuze and Philosophy, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
    –––, and Dorothea Olkowski (eds.), 1994. Gilles Deleuze and the Theatre of Philosophy, New York: Routledge.
    Braidotti, Rosi, 1994. “Toward a New Nomadism: Feminist Deleuzian Tracks; or, Metaphysics and Metabolism,” in Boundas and Olkowski (eds.) 1994, pp. 159–186.
    –––, 2002. Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming, Cambridge: Polity.
    Broadhurst, Joan (ed.), 1992. Deleuze and the Transcendental Unconscious, in PLI: Warwick Journal of Philosophy (Volume 4).
    Brusseau, James, 1998. Isolated Experiences: Gilles Deleuze and the Solitudes of Reversed Platonism, Albany: SUNY Press.
    Bryant, Levi, 2008. Difference and Givenness: Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of Immanence, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
    Bryden, Mary (ed.), 2002. Deleuze and Religion, London: Routledge.
    Buchanan, Ian, 2000. Deleuzism: A Metacommentary, Durham: Duke University Press.
    –––, 2008. Deleuze and Guattari's 'Anti-Oedipus': A Reader's Guide, London: Continuum.
    –––, and Claire Colebrook (eds.), 2000. Deleuze and Feminist Theory, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
    Colebrook, Claire, 2001. Gilles Deleuze (Routledge Critical Thinkers). New York: Routledge.
    –––, 2010. Deleuze and the Meaning of Life, London: Continuum.
    Colman, Felicity, 2011. Deleuze and Cinema: The Film Concepts, London: Berg.
    DeLanda, Manuel, 2003. Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, London: Continuum.
    Dosse, François, 2010. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives, trans. Deborah Glassman. New York: Columbia University Press.
    Due, Reidar, 2007. Deleuze, Cambridge: Polity Press.
    Duffy, Simon (ed.), 2006. Intensive Mathematics: The Logic of Difference, Manchester: Clinamen Press.
    –––. 2006. The Logic of Expression: Quality, Quantity and Intensity in Spinoza, Hegel and Deleuze, London: Ashgate.
    Faulkner, Keith, 2007. The Force of Time: An Introduction to Deleuze through Proust, Lanham MD: University Press of America.
    Flaxman, Gregory, 2000. The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
    –––, 2011. Gilles Deleuze and the Fabulation of Philosophy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
    Gaffney, Peter (ed.), 2010. The Force of the Virtual: Deleuze, Science, and Philosophy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
    Gatens, Moira, 1996. “Through a Spinozist Lens: Ethology, Difference, Power,” in Patton 1996, pp. 162–187.
    Genosko, Gary, 2002. Félix Guattari: An Aberrant Introduction, London: Continuum.
    Goodchild, Philip, 1997. Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction to the Politics of Desire, Thousand Oaks: Sage.
    Grosz, Elizabeth, 1994. “A Thousand Tiny Sexes,” in Boundas and Olkowski (eds.) 1994, pp. 187–210.
    –––, 1995. Space, Time, and Perversion: Essays on the Politics of Bodies, New York: Routledge.
    Gualandi, Alberto, 1998. Deleuze, Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
    Hallward, Peter, 2006. Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation, London: Verso.
    Hardt, Michael, 1993. Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
    Holland, Eugene, 1999. Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis, New York: Routledge.
    Hughes, Joe, 2009. Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Reader's Guide, London: Continuum.
    –––, 2009. Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation, London: Continuum.
    –––, 2012. Philosophy After Deleuze, London: Continuum.
    Jardine, Alice, 1986. Gynesis: Configurations of Woman and Modernity, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
    Kaufman, Eleanor, 2012. Deleuze, the Dark Precursor: Dialectic, Structure, Being, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
    –––, and Jon Roffe (eds.), 2009. Deleuze's Philosophical Lineage, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
    Kaufman, Eleanor, and Jon Heller (eds.), 1998. Deleuze & Guattari: New Mappings in Philosophy, Politics and Culture, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
    Kerslake, Christian, 2007. Deleuze and the Unconscious, London: Continuum.
    Khalfa, Jean (ed.), 2003. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, London: Continuum.
    Lambert, Gregg, 2002. The Non-Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, London: Continuum.
    –––, 2012. In Search of a New Image of Thought: Gilles Deleuze and Philosophical Expressionism, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
    Lampert, Jay, 2006. Deleuze and Guattari's Philosophy of History, London: Continuum.
    Lecercle, Jean-Jacques, 1985. Philosophy through the Looking Glass, Chicago: Open Court.
    –––, 2002. Deleuze and Language, London: Palgrave Macmillan).
    Lefebvre, Alexandre, 2008. The Image of Law: Deleuze, Bergson, Spinoza, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
    Lorraine, Tamsin, 1999. Irigaray and Deleuze: Experiments in Visceral Philosophy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
    Marks, John, 1998. Gilles Deleuze: Vitalism and Multiplicity, Pluto Press: London.
    ––– (ed.), 2006. Deleuze and Science, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
    Martin, Jean-Clet, 1993. Variations: La philosophie de Gilles Deleuze, Paris: Payot & Rivages.
    Massumi, Brian, 1992. A user's guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
    May, Todd, 2005. Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Mengue, Phillipe, 1994. Gilles Deleuze ou le système du multiple, Paris: Kimé
    –––, 2003. Deleuze et la question de la démocratie, Paris: L'Harmattan.
    Moulard-Leonard, Valentine. 2009. Deleuze-Bergson Encounters: Transcendental Experience and the Thought of the Virtual, Albany NY: SUNY Press.
    Murphy, Timothy S., 1992. “The Philosophy (of the Theatre) of Cruelty in Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition,” in Broadhurst 1992, pp. 105–135.
    Olkowski, Dorothea, 1999. Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation, Berkeley: University of California Press.
    –––, 2007. The Universal (In the Realm of the Sensible): Beyond Continental Philosophy, New York: Columbia University Press.
    O'Sullivan, Simon, 2006. Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari: Thought Beyond Representation, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
    Patton, Paul (ed.), 1996. Deleuze: A Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell.
    –––, 1999. Deleuze and the Political, London: Routledge.
    –––, 2010. Deleuzian Concepts: Philosophy, Colonization, Politics, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
    Patton, Paul, and John Protevi (eds.), 2003. Between Deleuze and Derrida, London: Continuum.
    Pisters, Patricia, 2012. The Neuro-Image: A Deleuzian Film-Philosophy of Digital Culture, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
    Protevi, John, 2001. Political Physics: Deleuze, Derrida, and the Body Politic, London: Athlone.
    –––, 2011. “Mind in Life, Mind in Process: Toward a New Transcendental Aesthetic and a New Question of Panpsychism.” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18(5–6): 94–116.
    –––, 2013. Life, War, Earth: Deleuze and the Sciences, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
    Rajchman, John, 2000. The Deleuze Connections, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
    Ramey, Joshua, 2012. The Hermetic Deleuze: Philosophy and Spiritual Ordeal, Durham NC: Duke University Press.
    Reynolds, Jack, 2011. Chronopathologies: Time and Politics in Deleuze, Derrida, Analytic Philosophy, and Phenomenology, Lanham MD: Lexington Books.
    Rodowick, David, 1997. Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, Durham: Duke University Press.
    Roffe, Jon, 2012. Badiou's Deleuze, Montreal: McGill Queen's University Press.
    Rolli, Marc, 2003. Gilles Deleuze: Philosophie des transzendentalen Empirismus, Vienna: Thuria & Kant.
    Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1991 [1937]. The Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness, New York: Hill and Wang.
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    –––, 2009. Deleuze. L'empirisme transcendental, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
    Schaub, Mirjam, 2003. Gilles Deleuze im Wunderland: Zeit als Ereignisphilosophie, Munich: Wilhelm Fink.
    –––, 2003. Gilles Deleuze im Kino: Das Sichtbare und das Sagbare, Munich: Wilhelm Fink.
    Shaviro, Steven, 2009. Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and Aesthetics, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
    Simont, Juliette, 1997. Essai sur la quantité, la qualité, la relation chez Kant, Hegel, Deleuze: Les “fleurs noires” de la logique philosophique, Paris: L'Harmattan.
    Sokal, Alan and Jean Bricmont, 1999. Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science, New York: Picador.
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    Last edited by orthodoxymoron on Thu Feb 11, 2016 8:53 am; edited 1 time in total

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    Join date : 2010-09-28

    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  orthodoxymoron on Sat Apr 12, 2014 6:51 pm

    Has anyone thought about the King and Queen of Babylon in terms of Lucifer and the Whore of Babylon?? Sounds like some punk rock group!! Lucifer supposedly refers to the King of Babylon in Isaiah 14 -- and the Whore of Babylon is a major prophetic figure. I don't know why I even bother with these posts. It seems that only magamud regularly posts anything on this thread -- and then in a rather mysterious and cryptic manner. This is a solitary workout for me -- sort of like masturbation, I suppose!! Who is the God of This World -- historically and presently?? Again, I theorize a Deposed and Exiled Benevolent Solar System Administrator in Antiquity -- replaced with a Malevolent Solar System Administrator -- for legitimate or illegitimate reasons. I continue to think in terms of Michael and Gabriel as Archangelic-Administrators. What if Michael and Gabriel are Lilith and Eve?? What if male and female are largely irrelevant when considering the angelic?? What if Genesis is more allegory and parable than strict history?? Does Humanity have Reptilian Roots -- or is that just a load of bullshit?? I truly have no idea. I've simply been modeling some contrarian and longshot theories within this thread. Once again, it is extremely difficult to verify and substantiate anything historical -- especially regarding antiquity and the otherworldly. If there really is a God of This World -- I suspect that they wish to keep doing what they're doing OR that they might use a New-Guy as a Fall-Guy -- and then jump back in the saddle once the smoke clears!! Is this world prepared to responsibly and honestly consider how things REALLY work in this solar system?? I think that some of you need to really agonize over what I've presented in this thread -- regardless of whether it reflects reality, or not. Consider this as being a vehicle for arriving at the truth -- rather than being the truth. I don't consider this to be the truth. I think my theories work to a frightening degree -- but I have no idea if they're anywhere close to being the way things really are. Once again, if I had the truth, and I could prove it -- I'd probably be dead. How could I make a convincing attempt at confusion without invoking Ayn Rand??!!

    Ayn Rand

    First published Tue Jun 8, 2010; substantive revision Thu Jul 5, 2012

    Ayn Rand (1905–1982) was a philosopher and a novelist who outlined a comprehensive philosophy, including an epistemology and a theory of art, in her novels and essays. Early in her career she also wrote short stories, plays, and screenplays. Rand's first and most autobiographical novel, We the Living (1936), set in the Soviet Union, was published only after many rejections, owing to widespread sympathy for the Soviet “experiment” among the intellectuals of the day. We the Living was quickly followed by the dystopian novel, Anthem (1938), written as “a kind of rest” from work on her next major novel, The Fountainhead (1943). The Fountainhead, also published after many rejections because of its individualism, and largely panned by critics, soon became a best-seller by word of mouth. The Fountainhead brought Rand international fame, and Atlas Shrugged (1957) sealed this fame. By 1958, Rand's novels, increasingly philosophical, had won her ideas a sufficiently devoted following for her to form, in association with psychologist Nathaniel Branden (with whom she later broke), an official “Objectivist” philosophical movement, complete with journals and lecture courses. We the Living and The Fountainhead have been made into movies, as has Part I of a projected trilogy of Atlas Shrugged.

    In Rand's own words, her first and greatest love, her “life purpose,” was “the creation of the kind of world … that represents human perfection,” while her interest in philosophical knowledge was “only” for the sake of this purpose (Journal entry for 4 May 1946; in 1997, p. 479).[1] Nevertheless, her interest in philosophical knowledge continued long after she had created this world in her magnum opus, Atlas Shrugged, her last work of fiction. In essays and lectures, Rand developed her conception of metaphysical realism, rationality, ethical egoism (rational self-interest), individual rights, laissez-faire capitalism, and art, and applied her philosophy to social issues. The libertarian political movement, though largely disowned by Rand, drew—and draws—great inspiration from her moral defense of the minimal state, that is, the state whose only raison d'être is protection of individual rights. For all her popularity, however, only a few professional philosophers have taken her work seriously. As a result, most of the serious philosophical work on Rand has appeared in non-academic, non-peer-reviewed, journals, or in books, and the bibliography reflects this fact. We discuss the main reasons for her rejection by most professional philosophers in the next section. Our discussion of Rand's philosophical views, especially her moral-political views, draws not only from her non-fiction, but also her fiction, since her views cannot be accurately interpreted or evaluated without doing so.

    •1. Life and Work
    •2. Metaphysics and Epistemology◦2.1 General Approach
    ◦2.2 Perception
    ◦2.3 Theory of Concepts
    ◦2.4 Existence, Identity, and Consciousness
    ◦2.5 Metaphysics of Human Nature

    •3. Ethics◦3.1 What is Ethics, and Why do we need It?
    ◦3.2 Survival as the Ultimate Value
    ◦3.3 Survival Qua Man as the Ultimate Value
    ◦3.4 Happiness as the Ultimate Value
    ◦3.5 Virtues, Vices, and Egoism
    ◦3.6 Altruism

    •4. Social-Political Philosophy◦4.1 Rights, Capitalism, and the Trader Principle
    ◦4.2 Feminism

    •5. Aesthetics
    •Bibliography◦Works by Rand
    ◦Works by Others

    •Academic Tools
    •Other Internet Resources
    •Related Entries


    1. Life and Work

    Ayn Rand was born Alissa Zinovievna Rosenbaum, to a bourgeois Jewish family in St. Petersburg, Russia, on 2 February 1905. A witness to the Russian Revolution and civil war, Rand opposed both the Communists and the Tsarists. She majored in history, but the social science program in which she was enrolled at Petrograd State University included philosophy, law, and philology. Her teachers emphasized—as she herself later did—the importance of developing systematic connections among different areas of thought (Sciabarra 1995). Rand's formal philosophical education included ancient philosophy (especially Plato and Aristotle), logic, philosophical psychology, Marxism-Leninism, and non-Marxist political thought. But she was evidently also exposed to Hegelian and Nietzschean ideas, which blossomed during this period (known as the Russian Silver Age), and read a great deal of Friedrich Nietzsche on her own. After graduating from Petrograd State University in 1924, an interest in screenwriting led her to enroll in the State Institute for Cinematography. On the literary side, she studied the great Russian novelists and poets, but fell in love with Victor Hugo, to whose influence she owes the “Romantic Realism” of her novels.

    In 1925 Rand succeeded in obtaining permission to visit relatives in the United States; hating the Soviet system, she left with no intention of returning. After six months with relatives in Chicago, she made her way to Hollywood where, on her second day, a fortuitous encounter with Cecil B. DeMille led to a job as a script reader, and later as a screenplay writer. The next week she had another fortuitous encounter, this time with the actor Frank O'Connor, whom she married in 1929. She was married to him till his death in 1979. She adopted the pen name Ayn Rand to (it is thought) protect her family back in Russia, although she also told the New York Evening Post in 1936 that “Rand” was an abbreviation of her Russian surname.

    Rand and her husband moved permanently to New York City in 1951, where she became involved with, and was influenced by, the circle of mostly New-York-based intellectuals involved in the revival of classical liberalism, such as the economic journalist Henry Hazlitt, the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises, and the Canadian-American novelist, literary critic, and political philosopher Isabel Paterson. Rand also studied, and was a great admirer of, the Lockean philosophy of the American founding. Rand lived and worked in New York City until her death in 1982.

    Rand holds that philosophy, like all forms of knowledge and achievement, is important only because it is necessary for living a good human life and creating a world conducive to living such a life. Philosophy supplies the most fundamental cognitive and normative abstractions which, respectively, identify and evaluate what is. Everyone, according to Rand, needs a philosophy and is guided by at least an implicit one (1982a, ch. 1). Her novels express her belief that if our philosophy is more or less correct, our lives will be more or less successful, if our philosophy is wildly off the mark, our lives will be disastrous. Philosophy thus has an urgent, practical importance. But unlike Marx, her philosophical and political antipode, Rand thinks that social change has to start with a moral revolution within each individual and the spread of the right ideas and ideals through rational discourse and the inspiration of art.

    Rand's ideal human being appears, in varying degrees of development, in all her novels; her ideal world appears in Atlas Shrugged. Her novels feature striking, complex plots with subtle psychological explorations of her characters' emotions and thoughts, and philosophical reflections that rarely lose sight of the dramatic context. Like many famous Russian novelists, especially Dostoevsky, whom she recognized as a great psychologist, Rand also uses long speeches to lay out her philosophy, a device that has both its supporters and its detractors. She described Atlas Shrugged as a “stunt novel” and a murder mystery—the murder of the human soul by a collectivist culture. By “soul,” however, she meant not an immortal substance that survives the death of the body—she is not a dualist in any aspect of her philosophy—but the mind, or the human spirit that celebrates life on this earth. The novel shows what happens when “the men of mind”—the “prime movers,” the producers—go on strike. It also shows how the wrong epistemology can lead to train wrecks, how the wrong metaphysics can lead to the wrong ethics and thus to disastrous personal choices and a disastrous political and economic system, and how the right philosophy is needed for the rebirth of the soul and the rebuilding of the world. Her protagonists are not knights on white steeds rescuing damsels in distress, or swordsmen who can fight off a dozen enemies single-handed, but men and women in the mid-century industrial America of steel mills, skyscrapers, and glimmering highways: women who run transcontinental railroads and men who revolutionize architecture or (long before clean energy became a cause célèbre) build a motor powered by static electricity to produce limitless, clean energy. In many people's eyes, her novels are inspiring because they bring moral perfection down to earth. They see her moral exemplars as people of unbreached integrity, with colorful and remarkable lives, made more remarkable by their philosophical depth. This estimate is not, of course, shared by all: many readers find her characters wooden, her writing stilted, and her ethical and political views misguided.

    Rand paid tribute to Aristotle, whom she considered the greatest of all philosophers, in the titles she gave to the three Parts of Atlas Shrugged (Non-Contradiction, Either-Or, A is A) and to one of the chapters (The Immovable Movers). While she differed sharply from Nietzsche on many issues, including rationality, free will, and individual rights, his influence is evident in her provocative, often aphoristic, point-counterpoint writing style, as well as in her “transvaluation” of traditional values and her powerful affirmation of life and joy and the spirit of youth. In the Introduction to the 25th Anniversary edition of The Fountainhead, she stated that the novel's sense of life is best conveyed by a quotation from Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil: “The noble soul has reverence for itself”. (For The Fountainhead's partly sympathetic and partly critical engagement with Nietzsche's ideas, see Hunt 2006.)

    After publishing Atlas Shrugged in 1957 Rand devoted herself to non-fiction—albeit non-fiction liberally peppered with quotations from her heroes' speeches. She wrote polemical, philosophical essays, often in response to questions by fans of Atlas Shrugged and The Fountainhead; lectured on college campuses; and gave radio and television interviews. Her views of past and contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, however, seem to have been based largely on summaries of philosophers' works and conversations with a few philosophers and with her young acolytes, themselves students of philosophy. Unfortunately, this did not stop her from commenting dismissively, and often contemptuously, on other philosophers' works. Contemporary philosophers, by and large, returned the compliment by dismissing her work contemptuously, often on the basis of hearsay or cursory reading. A common source of misunderstanding is Rand's use of “selfishness” to mean rational self-interest rather than “pursuit of one's own interests at the cost of others' interests,” and “altruism” to entail abject self-sacrifice rather than “other-regard”. But there are also other barriers to an academic study of Rand's work: most of her non-fiction is written for the general public, and lacks the self-critical, detailed style of analytic philosophy; understanding her views requires reading her fiction, but her fiction is not to everyone's taste; she developed many of her views in lectures and essays and letters written in response to questions sent by her readers, but never took the time to defend them against possible objections or to reconcile them with the views expressed in her novels; and finally, her polemical style, often contemptuous tone, and the dogmatism and cult-like behavior of many of her fans suggest that her work is not worth taking seriously.[2] Last but not least, her advocacy of a minimal state with the sole function of protecting negative individual rights is contrary to the welfare statism of most academics. For all this, however, in recent years academic appreciation of Rand's work has increased, and many philosophers now recognize it as often original, containing insights that sometimes anticipate later academic work.

    Rand states that her philosophy, “in essence, is the concept of man as a heroic being, with his own happiness as the moral purpose of his life, with productive achievement as his noblest activity, and reason as his only absolute” (Rand 1957, Afterword). Capitalism, “the unknown ideal,” is the only political-economic system compatible with this philosophy because it is the only system based on respect for human beings as ends in themselves.

    Fundamental to Rand's outlook—so fundamental that she derives the name of her philosophical system, “Objectivism,” from it—is a trichotomy among three categories: the intrinsic, the subjective, and the objective. (Rand 1990a, 52–54; Rand 1965, 13–23) An intrinsic phenomenon is one whose nature depends wholly on factors external to the mind; a subjective phenomenon is one whose nature depends wholly on the mind; and an objective phenomenon is defined, variously, as that which depends on the relation between a living entity's nature (including the nature of its mind) and its environment, or as that which depends on the relation between a properly functioning (rational) mind and extramental reality. Commentators are divided over the best way to interpret Rand's views on this issue.

    Rand holds that there is a widespread tendency to ignore the third category or to assimilate it to the second, thus setting up a false dichotomy between the intrinsic and the subjective. On Rand's view, many of the fundamental questions of philosophy, from the existence of universals to the nature of value, involve fruitless debates over the false alternative “intrinsic or subjective?” in cases where the phenomenon in question is neither intrinsic nor subjective, but rather objective.

    2. Metaphysics and Epistemology

    2.1 General Approach

    If ethics is the branch of philosophy concerned with practice, then in a sense all of Rand's philosophy is ethics, for Rand stresses “the supremacy of actual living over all other considerations,” and insists that philosophy needs to be “brought up to the realm of actual living”—adding “I say intentionally brought up to it, not down” (Journal entry for 15 May 1934, p. 72; in Rand 1997, p. 73). Consequently, Rand regularly concerns herself with the practical implications and social relevance not only of moral and political philosophy, but likewise of the seemingly more arcane strata of metaphysics and epistemology—as when she identifies errors in concept-formation as one of the roots of racism, or mind-body dualism as a root of the dichotomy between economic and personal freedom. This approach likewise reflects Rand's emphasis on integrating each piece of information into the total context of one's knowledge, and her consequent hostility to compartmentalization.

    Rand's conviction of the vital practical importance of abstract theory may help to explain the passionately polemical nature of her philosophical writing, which some readers find inspiring and others hyperbolic and off-putting—though Rand's admiration for Nietzsche, as well as her having been educated in a Marxist-Leninist atmosphere, may also play a role. Rand also tended—perhaps owing in part to the same two influences—to regard philosophical errors as revelatory of the psychological flaws of their authors.

    2.2 Perception

    For Rand, all knowledge is derived from perception, and a judgment can be “validated” (Rand's term for establishing an idea's basis in reality) only by tracing it to its foundations at the perceptual level. In this sense Rand counts as a kind of empiricist. But she rejects the traditional rationalist/empiricist dichotomy, taking it to embody a false alternative: rationalism holds that we can deduce knowledge from concepts acquired without the help of perception, whereas empiricism holds that we can gain propositional knowledge from experience without the help of concepts. For Rand, neither is possible: while the senses provide the raw material of knowledge, conceptual processing is needed to establish knowable propositions. (Whether Rand's characterization of rationalists and empiricists is fair is debatable.)

    For Rand the acquisition of knowledge is a process of differentiation and integration—of discriminating among objects of awareness on the basis of their differences, and then uniting the discriminated phenomena into a cognitively graspable whole. The process begins at the perceptual level (Rand accepts the existence of a pre-perceptual form of consciousness which she calls sensation, but does not assign it much of a role in her theory), when entities are differentiated from their surroundings and integrated as unified wholes.

    The primary objects of perception—and the basic building blocks of Rand's ontology as well—are entities. Attributes and actions are secondary; they make sense only as actions and attributes of entities. This does not mean, however, that entities are bare substrata underlying their attributes. There is no such thing as existence other than as some definite thing with a specific identity; identity is the form that existence takes. Hence an entity just is the totality of its attributes.

    Rand distinguishes two senses of “entity” (1990a, 268–74). In the narrow sense, an entity is an object whose unity is independent of our consciousness. Rand compares entities in this sense to Aristotelian primary substances (though without endorsing the details of Aristotle's hylomorphism), and regards them as the basic ontological constituents of reality. In the broader sense, an entity is anything we choose to consider apart from its surroundings, even if it has no more unity than what we give it in so considering it—as when we attend either to parts of entities or to groups of entities. Entities in the narrow sense have their entity status metaphysically, and presumably intrinsically, i.e., as explained above, apart from their relationship to our consciousness (though this is a matter of debate in Rand scholarship: Jilk 2003; Bissell 2007). Entities in the broad sense may have their entity status only epistemologically, that is, only in relation to consciousness. Their status as existents, however, remains metaphysical. That is, they really exist apart from our manner of considering them, even if they do not exist as entities apart from our manner of considering them.

    While Rand sometimes refers to the evidence of the senses as “data,” she does not regard the deliverances of the senses as “sense-data” understood as features of our subjective experience; the data of the senses, for her, are genuine extramental entities and their attributes. Our perceptual faculties place us in direct contact with reality. In this sense Rand's theory of perception is a version of direct realism, holding that the objects of perception are extramental entities (rather than, say, subjective experiences on the basis of which we infer entities as their causes).

    The validity of sense-perception is not susceptible of proof, because it is presupposed by all proof, since proof just is a matter of adducing sensory evidence. Nor can its validity be denied or questioned, since the very conceptual tools one would have to use to do this are derived from sensory data and so presuppose their validity. Hence perceptual error is not strictly possible, though it is possible to misinterpret perceptual evidence—and phenomena that many would regard as perceptual illusions are instead identified by Rand either as correct perceptions misinterpreted (e.g., optical illusions) or as non-perceptions mistaken for perceptions (e.g., dreams and hallucinations).

    The formation of concepts and beliefs upon this sensory basis, by contrast, is a volitional process that is quite definitely capable of being subject to error. Rand accepts sensory data as a basic, unquestionable, pre-conceptual starting-point of all knowledge, and so in that sense embraces a version of the epistemologically “Given.” Rand's “Given,” however, are extramental entities and their attributes, not propositional judgments about them; all propositional judgments are products of the volitional, conceptual level of consciousness and so are potentially fallible.

    Rand rejects the view that some perceptions are of the qualities of objects as they are independently of us (primary qualities), whereas others (secondary qualities) are caused by the primary qualities, and are entirely in the mind (Rand 1990a, 279ff ). Instead, she distinguishes between the content of a perception and its form; when we perceive an object as, e.g., square and red, what we perceive are its intrinsic features in a certain form, a form that is determined by the nature of the object, the nature of our perceptual organs, and the environment. Thus, we perceive the object's shape as square, and the reflectance properties of its surface as red; both are the result of the interaction of our perceptual organs with what is out there. Neither squareness nor redness belong either to the object apart from our mode of perception, or to our mode of perception apart from the object in its environment. Hence, these attributes are neither intrinsic nor subjective but relational and objective (Kelley 1986; Peikoff 1991).

    Thus while Rand is a direct realist in the sense explained above, she is not a naive realist in the sense of regarding all perceived attributes as enjoying equal extramental status. It is possible for us to misidentify features of a perception's form as belonging to its content (and presumably vice versa). But Rand does not regard this fact as impugning the reliability of the senses, since the judgment that a particular feature belongs to a perception's content rather than its form is not contributed by the perception itself but is a volitionally, fallibly formed conceptual response to that perception.

    Nor is the existence of features belonging to the form rather than the content of perception indicative of any flaw in our perceptual faculties. On the contrary, every process must have some definite nature and occur by some definite means; thus it is inevitable, on Rand's view, that the way objects appear to us should depend on the nature of our perceptual organs. The fact that the form of our knowledge is partly determined by the means by which it is acquired does not invalidate its status as knowledge. To assume otherwise would be, in effect, to conclude that “you can know nothing, because you know it by means of something”—that you are “blind … because you have eyes, and deaf … because you have ears” (1997, p. 655). Nor, again, should the discovery that attributes like color are not intrinsic features of entities be taken to imply their subjectivity. Inasmuch as such attributes depend not on consciousness alone but rather on the relationship between consciousness and its objects, they are neither intrinsic nor subjective, but rather objective. (Thus an entity can exist intrinsically even if some of its attributes exist only objectively.)

    Rand rejects Kant's idea of innate conceptual categories on the grounds that it confuses the form of thought with the object and content of thought, thus cutting us off from reality (IOE, Ch. Cool. Some critics, however, see Rand's own distinction as strikingly reminiscent of Kant (Walsh 2000). Other charges raised against Rand's epistemology include: making the reliability of perception vacuous (since nothing counts as perception unless it's accurate); assuming a foundationalist approach that conflates the perceptual process by which judgments are formed with the way in which they are to be justified; and leaving it unclear how judgments with propositional structure can be validated by sensory data lacking such structure (Dipert 1987; Long 2000). On the positive side, several philosophers have developed Rand's theory of perception in a way that successfully engages with problems in contemporary analytic epistemology (Kelley 1986; Ghate 2012; Salmieri 2012).

    2.3 Theory of Concepts

    The process of differentiation and integration that begins at the perceptual level continues at the level of concept-formation, as we selectively attend to certain attributes of an entity, discriminate it from entities lacking those attributes, and mentally group it together with entities that share the attributes. This makes it possible to treat entities as units, that is, as members of a group (Rand 1990a; Kelley 1984; Kelley and Krueger 1984; Peikoff 1991). An entity's status as a unit is not intrinsic, since the basis of its status is our mental process of differentiation and integration. But neither is its status subjective, the process is based on actually existing similarities and differences; rather, its status is objective. Consequently, Rand rejects as a false dichotomy the debate between realists and nominalists over the nature of universals. (“Realism,” as a theory about universals, is to be distinguished from the kind of perceptual realism that Rand accepts.) Rand identifies universals with concepts, understood as attributes of consciousness, and so repudiates the intrinsicism of the realists; for Rand, the problem of universals belongs to epistemology, not to metaphysics. But because she takes concepts to be objective in her sense, Rand likewise distinguishes her theory from nominalism, which she interprets as a subjectivist approach to universals.

    Attributes can also be regarded as units. This makes possible the process of measurement, which involves relating perceptible attribute-units to larger or smaller quantities, including those too large or too small to perceive, thus permitting the expansion of our knowledge beyond the perceptual level. Measurement is here understood broadly, as covering ordinal as well as cardinal relationships, and thus applies to all concepts, not just narrowly quantitative ones. Concepts expand the range of our knowledge by reducing the number of units with which we must deal.

    Rand holds a “measurement-omission” theory of abstraction; that is, she regards concept-formation as a matter of grouping items together on the basis of a commensurable characteristic while omitting the specific measurements (e.g., grouping red objects together while omitting specific shades of red). Such abstraction does not falsify its objects, as in omitting specific measurements we do not claim that they do not exist, we merely fail to specify them. The similarities on the basis of which we form our earliest concepts are perceptually identified; more sophisticated concepts involve conceptually identified similarities.

    The extramental attributes on the basis of which we form our concepts are presumably intended by Rand to be particulars, not universals (since otherwise she would be a traditional realist). But Rand says little about the metaphysical status of the “similarity” or “sameness” that we identify among such attribute-particulars. Theories of universals traditionally seek to account both for generic identity across specific difference (e.g., how redness applies to two distinct shades of red), and specific identity across numerical difference (e.g., how a specific shade of red applies to two particulars of that shade). Rand's theory of measurement-omission seems primarily intended to address the former issue, and she has little to say about the latter. Rand's insistence that everything in reality is particular has been taken by critics as undermining the possibility of the mind-independent similarities needed to ground the objectivity of concepts (for how can two objects be similar if there's nothing real that they share in common?). But it is possible that Rand would regard similarities as themselves being relational property-particulars or tropes, rather than universals, so that the canine-similarity between Fido and Lassie would be a different particular from the canine-similarity between Lassie and Snoopy.

    Abstractions, once formed, are “open-ended,” applying not just to the specific concretes from which they were formed but to all concretes of the same kind. The characteristics on the basis of which items are conceptually grouped should be essential, that is, explanatorily fundamental; but since Rand regards explanation as an epistemological rather than a metaphysical category, essences are objective, not intrinsic. These essential characteristics determine the definition of the concept; however, the meaning of a concept lies not in its definition but in its referents, where membership in the class of referents is determined not by anything like Fregean “sense,” but rather by a prospective member's fundamental similarities (whether as yet known or unknown) to the original concretes on which the concept is based. The test of whether to include a new instance under a concept is ultimately not whether it fits the existing definition but whether it is of the same kind as the instances already established. Definitions are context-relative and can change in response to new discoveries without requiring a change in the concept itself; thus continuity of reference can be preserved across revision in definitions. Hence Rand rejects the analytic-synthetic distinction; that is, she denies any significant difference in metaphysical or modal status, as well as in means of being known, between those characteristics of a class that are and those that are not mentioned in the definition. Despite various differences, Rand's overall discussion of reference obviously bears intriguing similarities to the realist theories of reference developed by Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam during the 1970s, although Rand developed her ideas independently, their earliest statement appearing in the 1966–1967 issues of her periodical The Objectivist.

    Critics have objected that Rand offers no argument against the possibility that some concepts may have their referents determined by the definition (Browne 2000; Long 2005a, 2005b). Rand describes the meaning of “capitalism,” for example, as “full, pure, uncontrolled, unregulated laissez-faire” (1964a, p. 33). Since Rand does not regard such as a system as ever having existed, it's hard to see how the concept of “capitalism” could have been formed on the basis of its referents (what referents?). If instead Rand's definition of “capitalism” serves as the criterion to determine what would count as a referent, then some statements will be “true by definition” after all, thereby potentially resurrecting the analytic-synthetic distinction.

    Concepts (or attempts at concepts) that group their purported referents according to non-essential or inconsistent characteristics, or otherwise embody mistaken presuppositions—such as “extremism,” which implicitly treats any consistent or thoroughgoing conviction as bad, regardless of its content—are invalid and cannot be rationally used. In Rand's view, such “anti-concepts” or “package deals” are frequently employed as an ideological strategy to hinder people's ability to grasp politically inconvenient concepts. (It's worth noting that Rand's novella Anthem (1938), about a collectivist society that deliberately distorts the use of language in order to prevent the development of individualist thinking—replacing all uses of “I” with “we,” for example—predates by over a decade George Orwell's use of a similar idea in Nineteen Eighty-Four.) Judgments that deny their own conceptual presuppositions are likewise invalid. The possibility that all of our experience is a dream, for example, is rejected as what Rand calls a “stolen concept” fallacy, since possession of the concept “dream” presupposes the ability to distinguish dreaming from waking. This is because genuine possession of a concept requires both the ability to derive an abstraction from concretes and the ability to go on to apply it to new concretes; if all our experience were a dream, the concept of waking could neither be derived from nor applied to any concretes. Those who claim to have grasped a concept but are unable to recognize instances of it “have not performed either part of the cycle: neither the abstraction nor the translating of the abstraction into the concrete.” As with an electric circuit, “no part of it can be of any use, until and unless the cycle is completed” (Journal entry for 4 May 1946, in 1997, p. 481).

    Thus many people who appear to be operating at the conceptual level may not in fact be fully doing so. Rand appeals to this “anti-conceptual mentality”—the result of laziness or miseducation—to explain the prevalence of thoughtless social conformity, since those who have not mastered higher abstractions are compelled to navigate the social world by imitating the concrete behavior of other people. In other words, for an anti-conceptual mentality a concept like “justice” would simply refer to the concrete practices that people in a given society engage in when they use the term, thereby forestalling the possibility of any critical reflection on the actual justice of those practices (1982a, ch. 4; 1999a, ch. 3).

    2.4 Existence, Identity, and Consciousness

    Epistemologically, the most important concepts are those Rand identifies as axiomatic concepts. (Axioms themselves are secondary, being propositional expressions of the corresponding concepts, which themselves are non-propositional.) The three axiomatic concepts to which Rand devotes the most attention are existence, identity, and consciousness. These three, she tells us, are implicit in all knowledge, and cannot be rejected without being relied upon in the course of the attempted rejection. Unlike ordinary concepts, they are not susceptible of definition (except ostensively), because there are no more basic concepts in terms of which they could be defined. Nor are the axioms that express them susceptible of proof, since they are presupposed by all proof (Rand 1990a; Peikoff 1991).

    The concept of existence identifies as basic and unquestionable the fact that something exists; to ask for a cause or explanation of there being something rather than nothing is to misunderstand the place of existence in the hierarchy of concepts. (This is one of Rand's reasons for rejecting the idea of a divine creator as the cause of the universe; though it is a matter of dispute whether this objection works if such a creator is merely supposed to be responsible for the existence of everything other than itself.) Rand's expression of this concept in propositional form, as the axiom that “existence exists,” is intended not as the mere tautological observation that “whatever exists, exists,” but rather as a recognition that something does indeed exist.

    The concept of identity identifies the fact that everything that exists is some kind of thing or other—that it has a specific, non-contradictory nature. This concept—which Rand often expresses in propositional form as the Law of Identity, “A is A”—has as a corollary the principle of causality: since everything has a specific nature, a thing can act only in ways consistent with that nature.

    Finally, the concept of consciousness identifies the fact that consciousness exists; Rand agrees with the Cartesian view that one cannot coherently deny the existence of one's own consciousness. Unlike Descartes, however, Rand denies the “prior certainty of consciousness,” i.e., the idea that we can be aware of the contents of our own minds without knowing whether any extramental reality corresponds to them; for Rand, there can be no content without an external reality. Rand regards consciousness as inherently relational: to be conscious is to be conscious of something beyond one's own consciousness, and of one's consciousness itself only secondarily.

    Existence has primacy over consciousness both epistemologically and metaphysically (with the latter explaining the former): epistemologically, because consciousness has to be aware of a distinct object before it can be aware of itself; metaphysically, because consciousness is a response to its objects and so cannot precede them—thus ruling out metaphysical theories like theism and idealism that, in Rand's view, make existence dependent on consciousness.

    From the fact that consciousness—both perceptual and conceptual—is an active and causally complex process, it does not follow that it is creative or distortive with regard to its objects. To suppose otherwise, Rand holds—to demand that consciousness, in order to be in contact with reality, must be purely passive and not involve any sort of processing—is to object to consciousness on the absurd grounds that it has a specific identity and employs specific means, and thus, once again, to regard us as blind because we have eyes and deaf because we have ears.

    According to Rand, as we've seen, our senses cannot deceive us; and in forming conceptual judgments on the basis of sensory evidence, we can be deceived only if we allow ourselves to fall into inattention or evasion. Hence certainty is always available to us. But while Rand takes knowledge to require certainty, she distinguishes certainty from infallibility or inerrancy: a judgment can be certain, within a given context of available knowledge, even if it needs to be revised in the light of new information. Peikoff interprets Rand to hold that, so long as a contextual qualifier is understood to be implicit in one's judgments at each stage (e.g., “So far as can be determined in the light of present knowledge …”), the revised judgments need not contradict the original ones (Peikoff 1991). But this is a problematic notion, and Rand herself never makes any statement to this effect.

    Rand rejects both dogmatism (asserting knowledge or demanding assent in the absence of contextually sufficient evidence) and skepticism (denying knowledge, or demanding the withholding of assent, in the presence of contextually sufficient evidence). Mysticism—in the sense of claims to a non-rational, non-sensory mode of knowledge—is likewise rejected as a form of dogmatism. The application of logic—the “art of non-contradictory identification”—to sensory data should be the sole ultimate determinant of belief.

    2.5 Metaphysics of Human Nature

    Rand's conception of the role of metaphysics is fairly minimalist; its task is the investigation of the most general features of existence as such—of “being qua being,” in Aristotle's phrase. Hence a great deal of traditionally metaphysical inquiry into the specific characteristics of the universe and its constituents she regards as properly the province of the special sciences rather than philosophy. Moreover, consistent with her conviction that many of the central issues of philosophy turn on phenomena that are properly to be understood as objective rather than intrinsic, she tends to assign a broader role to epistemology than to metaphysics. For Rand, metaphysics tells us that entities have definite natures, epistemology tells us how to investigate those natures, and the special sciences then do the actual investigating.

    Nevertheless, Rand does take a stand on a number of metaphysical questions more specific than the priority of existence to consciousness or of entities to attributes. For example, Rand denies the possibility of actualized infinities (as opposed to potential infinities, in the Aristotelian sense of processes that can be continued indefinitely), on the grounds that the axiom of identity requires every magnitude to be of some definite measurable extent. On the other hand, Rand maintains that given the character of existence as basic and unquestionable, it makes no sense to think of reality as a whole coming into or going out of existence; the universe is a fundamental fact that cannot be created or destroyed but has always existed. It's not clear whether Rand holds that the universe is infinitely old (a position that would seem to sit oddly with her denial of actualized infinities—though of course Aristotle held the same combination of views), or only that it was not preceded by a temporal period of nothingness (a potentially distinct claim if one holds, as Rand does, that the passage of time requires change).

    But most of Rand's more specific metaphysical theses have to do with the nature of one particular type of entities—human beings. Rand regards human beings, and indeed living organisms generally, as teleologically ordered systems, though her teleology takes a naturalized form that makes no essential reference to purposiveness; her point is simply that organisms depend for their existence on the successful carrying out—conscious or otherwise—of self-maintenance activities, and so are necessarily organized around the goal of furthering their life functions. Rand rejects both substance dualism and reductive materialism, holding that a human being is an integrated unit of mind and body, a unified entity, with mental characteristics neither separable from nor fully explicable in terms of physical ones. (Whether Rand's position is best identified as property dualism, nonreductive physicalism, or neither is unclear.)

    Consciousness is not epiphenomenal, but rather is causally efficacious—or, perhaps more precisely, human beings are causally efficacious in virtue, inter alia, of possessing consciousness; we know this on the basis of direct experience. Moreover, while perception is automatic, at the conceptual level the operation of consciousness is free from causal necessitation. The reality of incompatibilist free will is axiomatic, since the conceptual tools needed to question its reality presuppose our volitional command over our thought-processes, and in particular, our ability to raise or lower our level of mental alertness—inasmuch as our ability to judge whether we are reasoning correctly presupposes that our thinking is not directed by factors beyond our knowledge and control (N. Branden 1971).[3]

    Free choices are not uncaused, since for Rand actions (in general, not just human actions) are caused not by prior events but by the natures of the entities involved. There is even a sense in which free choices are necessitated—namely, it is necessary that human beings, given their nature as conscious rational beings, make free choices, though it is not necessary that they choose this rather than that.

    Beyond the realm of human choice, however, Rand regards all facts and events as necessary and “metaphysically given.” Rand seems to consider this position a corollary of the primacy of existence, though it is unclear, given Rand's exception for human choice, why there could not also be entities whose nature was such as to behave probabilistically, as postulated by many interpretations of quantum physics. (By contrast, the distinct view that a quantum particle's present state is merely probabilistic clashes much more obviously with the primacy of existence.)

    Last edited by orthodoxymoron on Thu Feb 11, 2016 8:55 am; edited 1 time in total

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    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  orthodoxymoron on Sat Apr 12, 2014 7:39 pm

    I think I might post a lot of images and text -- without doing much writing of my own. I said I was stopping -- and perhaps just posting the work of others might be a way around my self-imposed 'rules'. Has anyone considered the possibility of Unselfish-Selfishness??!! What Would Ayn Rand Say?? There's more substance to that term than you might think!! In other words -- Understanding and Appreciating Everyone and Everything -- While Competing Without Ceasing With Positive Response Ability!! Once again, I'm more intent on changing myself, than I am interesting in changing you!! Here's more Ayn Rand:

    3. Ethics

    3.1 What is Ethics, and Why do we need It?

    Ethics “is a code of values to guide man's choices and actions—the choices and actions that determine the purpose and the course of his life” (1961b, p. 13). Before we can decide which code of values we should accept, we need to ask why we need a code of values at all. Rand claims that no philosopher before her has provided a scientific answer to this question, and so none has provided a satisfactory ethics.

    Rand starts by describing value or “the good,” in classical fashion, as the object of pursuit: “that which one acts to gain and/or keep” (1961b, p. 16). Thus, the concept of value presupposes the concept of “an entity capable of acting to achieve a goal in the face of an alternative”—and the basic alternative facing any living entity is life or death (p. 16). It is the conditional nature of life that gives rise to values, not just human values, but values as such. As she puts it: “Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action” (p. 18). Survival is the organism's ultimate value, the “final goal or end to which all [its] lesser goals are the means,” and the standard of all its other values: “that which furthers its life is the good, that which threatens it is the evil” (pp. 16–17). The same, suitably modified, applies to human beings. Life is the standard and goal of all genuine human values, in the sense that all of them — from food to philosophy to fine art to ethics—must be explained and justified as requirements of human survival. “Ethics is an objective, metaphysical necessity of man's survival” (p. 24). Thus, “[t]he standard of value of the Objectivist ethics … is man's life, or: that which is required for man's survival qua man” (p. 25), that is, “the terms, methods, conditions and goals required for the survival of a rational being through the whole of his lifespan—in all those aspects of existence which are open to his choice” (p. 27). To choose to live is to accept one's “own life” as one's “ethical purpose.”

    Rand's metaphysical arguments make two points central to her axiology and ethics. (1) Values are not just a human phenomenon but a phenomenon of life: life necessitates value. Thus, values are neither intrinsic properties of things, nor subjective, neither free-floating Platonic entities, nor mere matters of desire or preference, culture or time. Rather, values are relational or objective, dependent on the nature of the valuing entity and the nature of its environment. (2) An entity's values are determined by its objective life-needs, the requirements of survival for entities of its kind, and ethics is a requirement of human survival.

    Rand seeks to bolster this claim by arguing that the concept of value entails the concept of life: “epistemologically, the concept of ‘value’ is genetically dependent upon and derived from the antecedent concept of ‘life’” (1961b, p. 18). She supports it by asking us “to imagine an immortal, indestructible robot, an entity which moves and acts, but which cannot be affected by anything, which cannot be changed in any respect, which cannot be damaged, injured or destroyed” (p. 16). Such an entity, she concludes, cannot have values.

    Critics raise two objections to this argument. (i) It begs the question by assuming what is at issue, namely, that a non-living entity cannot be harmed (Nozick 1971). Unlike the robot of this example, real robots can be damaged or destroyed, not only by external events, but also by a failure to perform their functions well, that is, by their own actions or inactions. Hence they can, quite straightforwardly, be said to have values. [4] (ii) Even if one were to accept that the concept of value entails the concept of life, one could consistently regard one's survival as a means to a certain kind of life: a life of dedication to the greater glory of God, the common good, the environment, and so on (Mack 1984).

    Rand's naturalism, and her rejection of intrinsicism and subjectivism in favor of objectivism, anticipate recent naturalisms and echo Aristotle's argument, against both the Platonist and the subjectivist, that “the good” must always be good-for-something. Her conception of the function of morality is notable both for its affinity to, and its difference from, Thomas Hobbes' conception: like Hobbes, Rand sees morality as a necessary means to long-term survival, but unlike Hobbes, she does not see morality as requiring a contract or even as a fundamentally social affair. The need for morality, according to Rand, is dictated by our nature as creatures that must think and produce to survive; hence we would need morality even on a desert island. There is, however, no duty to survive; morality is based on a hypothetical imperative: if you choose to live, then you must value your own long-term survival as an ultimate end, and morality as a necessary means to it. (The much-debated question of whether the choice to live is a moral choice (Mack 1984, 2003; Long 2000; Rasmussen 2002) or a pre-moral one (Peikoff 1991; Gotthelf 1999; Smith 2000, 2006), and the implications of either position for the objectivity of Rand's Objectivist ethics must, unfortunately, be left undiscussed.) If asked why the choice to live commits you to your own long-term survival rather than some other ultimate end (such as, for example, the greatest happiness of the greatest number (Nozick 1971), or becoming worthy of eternal life in heaven), the answer is: because any other ultimate end, if consistently adhered to, would lead to death.

    Rand's ethics is thus firmly teleological, this-worldly, and foundationalist. Virtue is “the act by which one gains/and or keeps” values in light of a recognition of certain facts (1961b, pp. 27, 28); it “is not an end in itself … not its own reward” (1957, p. 939). A fact central to a “scientific” ethics is that reason is the chief indispensable human tool of survival, and we exercise reason by choice. Hence rationality is the fundamental moral virtue, a virtue implicated in all the other virtues, including productiveness (Section 3.4 below).

    Rand is widely credited by Objectivists (Peikoff 1991; Binswanger 1990, 1992; Kelley & Thomas 1999 (Other Internet Resources); Gotthelf 1999; Smith 2000, 2006) with having solved the is-ought problem by showing that the requirements of long-term survival as a rational being determine the content of morality, and so anyone who chooses to live ought to be moral (1961b, p. 19). But if the choice to live is itself a moral choice, in the sense that we ought to choose to live, then the argument proceeds from an ought to an ought, not from an is to an ought. On the other hand, if the choice to live is a non-moral choice (an idea that's had to reconcile with Rand's general view that all significant choices are moral choices), then suicide can never be wrong, even if it is done for cowardly, irresponsible, or unjust reasons, a view that seems incoherent.

    Relatedly, how should we understand the idea of survival as a rational being—the life “proper to a rational being” (p. 27). Is survival as a rational being a necessary means to literal, long-term survival? Or is such survival itself the ultimate goal, something to be created and preserved for its own sake? Again, what are we to make of the many passages in which Rand states that the ultimate goal is one's own happiness?

    Rand herself thought that she had only one, consistent metaethical view: the ultimate goal is the individual's own survival; the only way to survive long-term, i.e., over a complete life-span, is to live by the standard of man's life as a rational being, which means: to live morally; and happiness is the psychological “result, reward and concomitant” (p. 32) of living thus. Many of Rand's commentators follow her in holding that there is only one consistent view, while disagreeing on the right interpretation of it (Den Uyl & Rasmussen 1978, 1984b; Machan 1984, 2000; Peikoff 1991; Bidinotto 1994; Hunt 1999; Kelley & Thomas 1999 (Other Internet Resources); Gotthelf 1999; Smith 2000, 2006). Others (Mack 1984; Badhwar 1999, 2001; Long 2000) argue that Rand's writings actually allow of three, or at least two, mutually incompatible views of the ultimate goal, and our task is to see which of these is the dominant or most plausible view. The three views are: survival, survival qua rational being, and happiness in the ancient Aristotelian sense of flourishing or eudaimonia. In the rest of Section 3, we will present the textual evidence for each of these views of the final goal, and the common objections to them, in turn.

    3.2 Survival as the Ultimate Value

    The survivalist view holds that just as literal survival is the ultimate value for other living entities, so it is for human beings (Kelley & Thomas 1999; Gotthelf 1999; Smith 2000). Survival is the source and final goal of all the actions of an entity, that which gives point to all its other values. For human beings, happiness, intellectual and artistic pursuits and rationality/morality are all means to survival. The vicious can “achieve their goals [only] for the range of a moment,” as evidenced by “any criminal or any dictatorship” (1961b, p. 26). Even those whose vice consists of imitating others rather than looting them live a precarious existence because they are likely to follow any destroyer who promises to be their savior (p. 25).

    “Non-survivalists” make the following objections:
    1. The biological premise that survival is the ultimate goal of all living things is mistaken. Animals of many species risk their own death for the sake of reproduction, or for protecting their young or even their group. But even if survival were the ultimate goal of other species, it need not be ours.
    2. Even if our own survival needs were the source of all our values, it would not follow that survival must be the ultimate psychological and moral goal to which all our other values are merely necessary means. The genesis of x does not logically determine the ultimate goal of x.
    3. The survivalist view that turns happiness into a mere means to survival entails, quite implausibly, that a long, unhappy life is better than a somewhat shorter but happy life, and just as good as a long and happy one.
    4. Many dictators, including the Pharaohs of the past and the Stalins and Maos of the 20th century, have survived by making elaborate plans to preserve their lives and their power by using a combination of terror, myth, and bribery. So have many common criminals. So even if morality enhances our chances of survival, it cannot be necessary for survival.
    5. Under some circumstances, such as in a dictatorial system, acting morally decreases our chances of survival, a point that Rand herself convincingly dramatizes in We the Living and Anthem.
    6. Rand is right to point out (as was Hobbes) that if everyone or most people were to start preying on each other, then no one would survive for long—literally, and that generations of predators would end up destroying or driving away the producers, and thus destroying themselves (Anthem and Atlas Shrugged). But survivalism rests on an illicit move from what the generic “man” (alone in the world) must do to survive to what particular men (in a society of producers) need to do.
    7. A survivalist ethics can support, at best, a bare-bones Hobbesian morality, not a virtue ethics. If Rand's virtues were necessary for survival, the human species would have perished a long time ago, instead of expanding exponentially. Her rich and challenging picture of human life and virtue in her novels points to a richer and more challenging conception of the final end than mere survival.
    8. Many of Rand's heroes, from Kira (We the Living) to Prometheus (Anthem) to John Galt (Atlas Shrugged), risk their lives for the sake of the values that make their lives worth living.
    9. Rand herself sometimes acknowledges that evil people can survive by free-riding (“hitch-hiking,” as she calls it) on rational, productive people:
    “If some men attempt to survive by means of brute force or fraud … it still remains true that their survival is made possible only by their victims, only by the men who choose to think and to produce the goods which they, the looters, are seizing” (1961b, p. 25).

    10. Rand often says that the final end is survival proper to a human being (1961b, p. 26), or that the final end is happiness (1961b, pp. 27, 30). Neither can be reduced to survival.

    3.3 Survival Qua Man as the Ultimate Value

    Just as the standard of value is survival qua human being, so the ultimate goal is one's own survival qua human being. To accept this standard and goal is to accept (i) the three cardinal values of reason, purpose (or purposiveness) and self-esteem as not only “the means to” but also “the realization of one's ultimate value, one's own life” (1961b, p. 27), and (ii) the three “corresponding virtues” of rationality, productiveness, and pride. These values are means to one's life insofar as they further one's life as a rational being, and they realize it insofar as they express the value we place on our lives.

    What it means to value survival qua human being turns on the relationship of the three cardinal values to the three virtues. Rand often states that virtue is only a means to value. But when she explains how the three cardinal values “correspond” to their three virtues, she does not provide a means-end analysis (Badhwar 1999, 2001). Thus, she says:

    “Productive work is the central purpose of a rational man's life, the central value that integrates and determines the hierarchy of all his other values. Reason is the source, the precondition of his productive work—pride is the result.”

    The virtue of productiveness becomes the central example of purpose (one of the three cardinal values), reason (another cardinal value) becomes its source, and the virtue of pride becomes its result. Rand also defines rationality, which is “the basic virtue,” in terms of “the recognition and acceptance of reason as one's only source of knowledge … and one's only guide to action” (p. 28). By this definition, being rational means valuing reason in thought, word, and deed, and realizing reason in one's life means being rational: the virtue and the value entail each other.

    This point generalizes to all the virtues and values. Further, since the (cardinal) values are both “the means to” and “the realization of one's ultimate value” (p. 27), it follows that the (cardinal) virtues are also both the means to and the realization of one's ultimate value: long-term survival qua human being. On this interpretation, to survive qua human being is none other than to lead a virtuous life in which one has realized one's potential.

    Both survivalists and eudaimonists, however, point out that this conception of the final end contradicts Rand's oft-repeated claim that “Virtue is not an end in itself.…” In addition, eudaimonists make the following objections:
    1. Since even a long, virtuous life need not be a happy one, positing it as the final end contradicts Rand's related claim that “Life is the reward of virtue—and happiness is the goal and reward of life” (1957, p. 939).
    2. It contradicts Rand's conception of the final end in her novels, where happiness is proclaimed as “the purpose, the sanction and the meaning of life” (1957, p. 674).

    Eudaimonists hold that the dominant and/or more plausible view expressed in Rand's writings is that happiness is the ultimate value, where happiness is understood as a state that necessarily involves virtue, but is not identical with virtue (Den Uyl & Rasmussen 1978, 1984b; Machan 1984, 2000; Mack 1984; Badhwar 1999, 2001; Hunt 1999; Long 2000).

    3.4 Happiness as the Ultimate Value

    Happiness is the existentially and psychologically “successful state of life” (1961b, p. 27). As an emotion it is not simply a positive subjective state, as on some contemporary views, but an emotion that meets certain normative standards: “a state of non-contradictory joy—a joy without penalty or guilt,” achievable only by “the man who desires nothing but rational goals, seeks nothing but rational values and finds his joy in nothing but rational actions” (p. 32). Happiness is also a form of life-affirmation: “the feeling of one's blessing upon the whole of the earth, the feeling of being in love with the fact that one exists and in this kind of world” (1957, pp. 105–6). Thus, happiness is an objectively worthwhile and emotionally positive state.

    Rand holds that the pursuit of happiness is inseparable from the activity of maintaining one's life through the rational pursuit of rational goals (1961b, pp. 29, 32). A virtuous life is, thus, essential to happiness. It is also a shield against soul-wracking unhappiness. Just as even great misfortunes don't throw Aristotle's virtuous individual into misery, they don't throw Rand's heroes into misery. Even at the worst of times, the virtuous individual's pain “only goes down to a certain point” (1943, p. 344), never touching the core of her being: the self-esteem that consists of the conviction that she is worthy and capable of happiness.[5]

    In keeping with their richer conception of the final end, Rand's novels also employ a richer conception of virtue as an integrated intellectual-emotional character trait to think, feel, and act in certain ways, rather than simply as an act in light of a recognition of certain facts (Badhwar 1999, 2001). Her characters reveal their souls not only in what they say or do, notice or fail to notice, focus on or evade, but in their cognitive, emotional, and action dispositions, their style of being in the world. Their actions show not only an intellectual commitment to the right but a wholehearted “love of rectitude” (1957, p. 512).

    This basically Aristotelian view of virtue goes hand-in-hand with a basically Aristotelian view of emotions. Rand rejects the reason-emotion dichotomy as stemming, ultimately, from a false mind-body dichotomy. Emotions are neither raw feelings nor inherently irrational but automatized value-judgments: “estimates of that which furthers man's values or threatens them … lightning calculators giving him the sum of his profit or loss” (1961b, p. 27). Emotions provide instant guidance when circumstances do not permit reasoning everything out anew. But our emotions are only as good as our reason, because they are “programmed” by our reason. Hence they can only be corrected by conscious reasoning, and in a conflict between reason and emotions, one must always side with the former.[6]

    Eudaimonists argue that Rand's vision of a virtuous and happy life in her novels can be understood only as a form of eudaimonism, even if she often makes statements inconsistent with this vision. But eudaimonism faces the following objections:
    1. In defining happiness partly in terms of virtue, eudaimonism employs an unconvincing conception of happiness.
    2. Given its conception of happiness, eudaimonism cannot, without circularity, regard happiness as the standard of virtue, but neither does it have any other standard on offer.
    3. In addition, a naturalistic eudaimonism must show a connection between our survival needs and our values and virtues.

    3.5 Virtues, Vices, and Egoism

    The chief Objectivist virtues are rationality, integrity, honesty (with self and others), justice, independence, productiveness, and pride. Rationality, “one's total commitment … to the maintenance of a full mental focus in all issues, in all choices … to the fullest perception of reality within one's power” (1961b, p. 28), is the basic virtue of which the other virtues are aspects or derivatives. The virtues are thus united or reciprocal. Each virtue is defined partly in terms of a recognition and whole-hearted commitment to some fact or facts, a commitment understood by the agent to be indispensable for gaining, maintaining, or expressing her ultimate value. For example, integrity is “the recognition of the fact that you cannot fake your consciousness” (1957, p. 936), a recognition that is expressed in loyalty to one's rational values and convictions, especially in the face of social pressures to surrender them (1961b, p. 28; 1964a, pp. 52, 80); honesty is “the recognition of the fact that you cannot fake existence,” a recognition that is expressed in truthfulness in thought and speech (1957, pp. 936–37); and justice is “the recognition of the fact that you cannot fake the character of men as you cannot fake the character of nature, … that every man must be judged for what he is and treated accordingly…” (1957, p. 937).

    Conspicuous by their absence from Rand's list of the cardinal virtues are the “virtues of benevolence”, such as kindness, charity, generosity, and forgiveness. Rand states that charity is not a major virtue or moral duty (1964b); likewise, presumably, kindness, generosity, and forgiveness. Whether, and how much, one should help others depends on their place in one's rationally defined hierarchy of values, and on the particular circumstances (whether they are worthy of help, what the likely consequences are of helping them, and so on). The greater their value vis-à-vis one's rational self-interest, the greater the help that one should be willing to give, ceteris paribus. What is never morally appropriate is making sacrifices, that is, surrendering something of value to oneself for the sake of something of less or no value to oneself. Thus, it can never be moral to knowingly risk one's life for a stranger (unless, of course, one's life is no longer worth living) or to court unhappiness for the happiness of another, whether stranger or friend.

    One might ask why charity etc. are not just as major virtues when they do meet all the conditions of appropriateness: the recipient is worthy of help, one can afford to help, it is in one's rational self-interest (or not contrary to it) to help, and so on. Perhaps Rand thinks that they are “minor” virtues because all the conditions for exercising them are only sometimes met. But this idea is debatable. A deeper reason for her relegation of kindness etc. to the status of minor virtues, however, might be her conception of people as essentially agents rather than patients, doers rather than receivers, self-sufficient rather than dependent. Nevertheless, Rand's view of the unity of the virtues dictates that, even if we do not need to act on these virtues at all times, they are just as important to possess as the other virtues. Moreover, in keeping with her emphasis on the importance of goodwill towards others and “the benevolent universe premise,” Rand's heroes are often extraordinarily (and almost always appropriately) kind and generous, not only to those they love but also to mere acquaintances, and even sometimes adversaries (Badhwar 1993b). Striking examples include, from The Fountainhead, Howard Roark's unsought-for attempt to give hope and courage to Steven Mallory, the gifted young sculptor whose failure to get work has driven him to the verge of a spiritual and physical collapse; Roark's unreproachful help to his erstwhile adversary, Peter Keating, when Keating falls on hard times; and from Atlas Shrugged, Dagny's support to a heart-broken and despairing Cheryl Taggart who, in the past, has treated Dagny with scorn; and Hank Rearden's generosity towards his exploitative family before he realizes their exploitativeness.[7] By contrast, Rand's villains lack genuine goodwill towards others and, thus, lack true kindness or generosity.

    Just as rationality, a focus on reality, is at the heart of every virtue, so irrationality, evasion of reality (including self-deception), is at the heart of every vice. Rand's villains are all master evaders motivated by a desire for power, social status, fame, or unearned wealth, and resentment of the good. They are “second-handers”—people whose primary relationship is to other people rather than to reality. Between the virtuous and the vicious are the “innocently wrong,” people who adopt wrong moral principles or make wrong choices, not through evasion but through an error of judgment (Rand does not explicitly recognize any moral category other than virtue, vice, and moral error, although her novels portray characters that do not easily fit into any of these categories). Hank Rearden, in Atlas Shrugged, is the great innocent living under a burden of unearned guilt because of his mistaken sense of honor and his charity towards a family interested only in manipulating and using him. Cheryl Taggart is killed by the too-sudden revelation that the man she loved and admired as the embodiment of her ideals is a fraud—and that the world is full of such frauds.

    As already indicated, Rand justifies virtue in both instrumental and non-instrumental terms, though without distinguishing between them. The instrumental arguments show the existential and psychological rewards of virtue and costs of vice. Virtue creates a sense of inner harmony and enables mutually beneficial interactions with others. Evasiveness, by contrast, traps one in a “tangled web” of rationalizations and pretenses. The evader who deceives others is either eventually caught, or lives in fear of being caught, becoming dependent on others' unconsciousness. He is “a fool,” says a character in Atlas Shrugged, “whose source of values is the fools he succeeds in fooling” (1957, p. 945). There is also a psychological reason why evasiveness is contrary to the evader's self-interest: Rand holds, like Sartre, that no evasion is completely successful, because the truth constantly threatens to resurface. Hence, the evader's “diseased soul” is in a state of constant inner conflict and anxiety as he tries to suppress his awareness of uncomfortable truths while maintaining his hold on others. His lack of integrity and of esteem for reality results in a lack of self-love or self-esteem and, indeed, of a solid self. (It is noteworthy, however, that her portrayal of Gail Wynand in The Fountainhead is closer to Aristotle's portrayal of the vicious man in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics as someone who is “unconscious of his vice,” than to her own stated view of the evader.)

    These views are familiar from the history of philosophy, but many readers find their expression in Rand's novels to be of unusual psychological depth, subtlety, and conviction. Nevertheless, the views are subject to the well-known objection that the complexity and variability of human psychology and society allow only “for the most part” generalizations about the existential and psychological benefits of virtue or costs of vice. Thus, it is possible for a small injustice to lead to great rewards, especially since others are willing to shrug off or forgive occasional transgressions. It is also possible for poor introspection, forgetfulness, or self-acceptance to allow one to evade something without any need for supporting evasions or damage to one's self-esteem. Again, even if every wrongdoing carries psychological costs, they might sometimes be outweighed by the long-term costs of doing the right thing (as Rand herself suggests in her portrayal of the embittered Henry Cameron and Stephen Mallory in The Fountainhead).

    The non-instrumentalist justification of virtue in Rand's novels is largely immune to these objections (though subject to the objections noted in 3.4 above). To compromise morally is, necessarily, to compromise one's own happiness, because no existential loss can compare to the loss of moral integrity. Rectitude is partly constitutive of genuine happiness because it expresses the right relationship to reality: to existence, to oneself, and to others. For the same reason, it is partly constitutive of a self worth loving, an ideally human or rational self. Like Plato and Aristotle, Rand argues that virtue necessarily creates inner harmony and certitude. Any value gained at the price of rectitude is only the simulacrum of genuine value. In a variety of conceptually interconnected ways, then, virtuous individuals are necessarily better off than those willing to take moral short-cuts. In its structure and much of its content, Rand's ethical egoism is thus of a piece with the egoism of ancient eudaimonistic theories.

    An objection often levied against egoistic theories is that they give the wrong reason for acting in other-regarding ways: justly, kindly, etc. My act is not really just if I give you your due because it is good for me rather than because you deserve it; it is not really charitable if I help you for my own benefit rather than yours. A common reply is that the egoist's justification is egoistic but not her motivation, a reply that itself invites the charge of moral “schizophrenia”. Rand does not explicitly address the “wrong-reason” objection, but the non-instrumentalist strand in her theory implies that the objection itself is mistaken, because giving you what you deserve/merit is partly constitutive of my rational interests; there is no conflict between your rational interests and mine (cf. 1964a, pp. 57–65).

    3.6 Altruism

    Rand regards goodwill towards others, or a generalized benevolence, as an offshoot of proper self-love, with no independent source in human nature. There is only one alternative to being rationally self-interested: sacrificing one's proper interests, either for the sake of other people (which she equates with altruism) or for the sake of the supernatural (which she calls mysticism) (1982a, ch. 7). Kant's ethics is a secularized mysticism insofar as it rests on categorical commands and duty for duty's sake, which is to say: regardless of any earthly desire or interest (1970). The altruistic ethics equates right action with self-sacrifice for the sake of others' good and immorality with “selfishness,” while saying nothing about the standard of the good (“Introduction,” 1964a, iii; 1974). It thus fails to answer the prior question of what code of values we should follow and why, and provides no motivation to be moral other than guilt over “selfishness”. When taken to its logical conclusion, altruism does not simply tell us that it is “selfish” to pursue our own desires, but also that it is “selfish to uphold… [our own] convictions, … [that we] must sacrifice them to the convictions of others” (Rand 1957, 943; Galt's Speech, Rand 1961a, 142). In foreign policy, altruism is used to justify and gain support for America's interventionism in other countries. Altruism is also the reason why so many sympathize with, or even praise, bloody dictatorships that proudly proclaim that the sacrifice of the individual is a necessary and noble means to the goal of the collective good (Rand 1967).

    As a moral code, altruism is impractical, because its requirements are contrary to the requirements of life and happiness, both the agent's and other people's. As such, it is also profoundly immoral. Like Kant's deontology, altruism leaves us without any moral guidance in our everyday lives and gives morality a bad name.

    What, then, is the psychological explanation for the widespread equation of altruism with morality? Rand suggests various explanations reminiscent of Nietzsche's analysis of the psychology of altruism. The theorists and preachers of altruism are motivated largely by a desire to control and manipulate others by playing on their guilt. Those who accept their teachings typically do so either because of guilt over their own superior achievements, or because, lacking any “intellectual integrity, love of truth…or a passionate dedication to an idea,” they have nothing much worth saving, and so do not mind sacrificing it (“Selfishness Without a Self,” 1973b; 1982a). Some altruists are altruists because their mentalities are still frozen in a tribal past when survival required the sacrifice of some for the sake of others (1973b).

    Rand's defense of “selfishness” and rejection of altruism are part of the reason both for her popularity with the general reader, and her unpopularity with philosophers and other intellectuals, although some would no doubt agree with her rejection of abject self-sacrifice and her recognition of proper concern with the self as moral (Falk 1963; Gilligan 1982; Hampton 1993; Badhwar 1993a). The general reader who responds positively to Rand's work finds, for the first time, a moral justification for pursuing a life of her or his own and a liberation from “unearned guilt”. The philosopher who responds negatively to her work finds many biased and simplistic interpretations of philosophers and philosophical doctrines, including her claim that she is the first to consistently defend a morality of rational self-interest, all other philosophers having defended either altruism or mysticism (Pojman 1995). Her critics also challenge her equation of altruism with abject self-sacrifice (Rachels 2000, Flew 1984), and her claim (explained below) that there is no conflict between people's rational interests (Flew 1984). An adequate interpretation of her views, however, requires attention both to the fact that, in the absence of special obligations created by bonds of love, contract, or family, she regards others' needs as making no claim on us, and to the fact that she is an compromising defender of justice, honesty, and respect for others as ends in themselves.

    Last edited by orthodoxymoron on Thu Feb 11, 2016 9:05 am; edited 1 time in total

    Posts : 7999
    Join date : 2010-09-28

    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  orthodoxymoron on Sat Apr 12, 2014 7:57 pm

    If one fails to understand a genius -- does that mean the genius is crazy?? We Want the God We Want -- don't we?? If God doesn't meet our high and exacting standards -- we want another God -- don't we?? Is that what happened in the Garden of Eden?? Have we been paying a very high price (quite literally) ever since?? What if the Real God might seem Crazy to us?? What if the False God gives us what we want -- and tells us what we wish to hear -- while taking what we have?? Will the Corrupt Rule the Stupid for All Eternity?? More Ayn Rand:

    4. Social-Political Philosophy

    4.1 Rights, Capitalism, and the Trader Principle

    Rand's moral society is a society of independent individuals who respect each other's natural rights to life, liberty, and property, and who trade value for value, materially and spiritually. They live, in her words, by “the trader principle”. Individual (natural) rights and the trader principle are both dictated by the fact that, as rational, independent beings, we need to think and act for our “proper survival” (1961b, p. 31). Both are required by respect for individuals as ends in themselves, not mere means to others' ends.

    The concept of rights, says Rand, “provides a logical transition from the principles guiding an individual's actions to the principles guiding his relationship with others… Individual rights are the means of subordinating society to moral law” (1963b, p. 108). These natural rights are basically rights to action, not to things or outcomes, and can be violated only through the initiation of force or fraud. Hence, all natural rights are negative, that is, claims on others' non-interference, and not claims on them to provide one with certain goods or outcomes.[8] The fundamental right is the right to life: the right to take the actions necessary for sustaining the life proper to a human being. All other rights follow from this right. Thus, the right to liberty is the right to act (including to write and speak) on one's judgment; the right to the pursuit of happiness is the right to pursue goals for one's own fulfillment; the right to property is “the right to gain, to keep, to use and to dispose of material values” (1963b, p.94). Like the mind-body dichotomy, the common dichotomy between “human rights” and the right to property is a false one, because to own one's life is to own one's actions and their fruits (1962b, p. 91).[9] As there is a causal and logical connection between the virtues, so there is between rights: a government that violates one right violates others. Thus, for example, in violating the right to freedom of expression by banning “obscene” speech on TV, the government violates the property right of the owners of the TV station to use their property as they see fit.

    Rand argues that the only just social-political system, the only system compatible with our rational nature, is capitalism (1965, 1967), that is, “laissez-faire capitalism—with a separation of state and economics, in the same way and for the same reasons as the separation of state and church” (1961b, 1964a). Her conception of capitalism is, thus, more radical than the mainstream conception, and her defense of it significantly different both from the utilitarian defenses given by most economists, and the religious defenses given by many conservatives (Den Uyl & Rasmussen 1984c; Machan 1984). She regards laissez-faire capitalism as “the only [social] system that bans force from social relationships” domestically and abroad, because the trader and the warrior are antagonists (Rand 1966a). In Atlas Shrugged, she distinguishes between the few business people who earn their money through honest effort, without seeking favors from the government, and the vast majority who are members of “the aristocracy of pull,” and get rich only through such favors, a situation that she thinks prevails, and has always prevailed, in the real world (Rand 1964c). She holds, much like Marx did, that for a short period in the nineteenth-century America came closer to a laissez-faire system than any other society before or since, but that capitalism remains an unknown ideal. Some critics charge, however, that Rand does not always recognize the aristocrats of pull in the real world (Rothbard 1968; Johnson 2006 in Other Internet Resources).

    In response to the criticism that unregulated, laissez-faire capitalism would lead to a concentration of power in a few hands and undermine equality of opportunity, Rand argues that we need the rule of law, a well-defined system of property rights, and freedom of contract. She regards state regulation of the market as responsible for corrupting both state and market institutions, just as in the past political regulation of religion corrupted both state and religious institutions. In both cases, regulation created or creates the opportunity for the trading of favors between politicians and religious leaders, or politicians and businessmen.

    Rand holds that there is no conflict between one person's rational interests and another's, hence that respecting other people's rights is perfectly compatible with advancing or preserving one's own interests. Critics, however, object that if my ultimate value, whether this be my survival or my happiness, is related to respect for rights as goal to means, then this last claim is simply false (Mack 1984; Flew 1984 ). For under perfectly realistic scenarios, my ultimate value can require me to violate your right to life or property. The most that Rand can show, on an instrumentalist justification of respect for rights, is that there is no conflict between rights, not that there is no conflict between rational interests. In her justification of rights we see the same unresolved tension between the instrumentalist strand and the deontic strand as we do in her justification of morality in general (Mack 1984).

    Rand defines government as “an institution that holds the exclusive power to enforce certain rules of social conduct in a given geographical area” (1963a, p. 125). A proper government is “the means of placing the retaliatory use of physical force under objective control—i.e., under objectively defined law” (1963b, p. 128). Such a government is minimal, limited to protecting us from criminals and foreign aggressors, and enforcing individual rights and contracts, with the help of the armed forces, police, and objectively defined civil and criminal laws and courts. Accordingly, the government may use force only in retaliation. A government that tries to enforce the brother's keeper principle—“from each according to his ability, to each according to his need”; or that drafts citizens into the armed services or “public service”; or that tries to make them more virtuous, educated, well-mannered, healthy, or wealthy, violates rights. Statism in all its forms, from unlimited democracy to a mixed economy to dictatorship, is at odds with our status as independent, rational beings, as ends in ourselves. Statism also destroys ability and fails to fulfill anyone's needs for long, because “[t]o deal with men by force is as impractical as to deal with nature by persuasion” (1973a, p. 32). The fountainhead of all progress is the human mind, and the mind does not function well when forced.

    In Atlas Shrugged Rand depicts her utopia, Galt's Gulch, as an anarchist society: a “voluntary association of men held together by nothing but every man's self-interest,” without any formal organization (1957, p. 690). There is a judge to arbitrate disagreements, but there has never been any need for arbitration. In “The Nature of Government,” however, Rand rejects anarchism as irrational and unworkable because, she says, it is incompatible with a single, objective system of law and, thus, with rights and peaceful cooperation (1963a). Anarchist critics, such as Roy Childs (1969) and Murray Rothbard (1978), have questioned whether a territorial monopoly (a government), as opposed to, e.g., a competitive market of security providers, is necessary to provide an effective legal system (cf. Long and Machan 2009).

    The trader principle states that a voluntary, mutually beneficial exchange between independent equals is the only basis for a mutually respectful and rational relationship (1961b, p. 31). It is also the only basis for a peaceful relationship among countries: “the trader and the warrior have been fundamental antagonists throughout history” (1966a, p. 38).

    The trader principle applies to emotional relationships as well. To love or admire someone is to “pay” him for the pleasure one derives from his virtues (1961b, p. 31)—or, Rand might say in the case of love for a small child, from his personality. It would seem, however, that the trade between parent and child is unequal, given that the child receives both pleasure and material support from the parent. And it is unclear how the trader principle applies at all when a severe disability renders a beloved child or spouse a source of pain rather than pleasure.

    4.2 Feminism

    If feminism is the view that women are, and ought to be recognized as, men's intellectual, moral, sexual, and political equals, then the Objectivist philosophy of human nature is inherently feminist, since it applies equally to all human beings, regardless of gender (or race) (N. Branden 1999). Decades before it was considered acceptable for women to lack “maternal instincts” or pursue careers, Rand created heroines who lack the first and pursue the second, free of guilt or self-doubt.[10] Kira (We the Living) wants to be an engineer, and Dagny (Atlas Shrugged) runs Taggart Transcontinental, the largest and most successful transcontinental railroad in the country. None of Rand's heroines sacrifices her interests, intellect, or principles for the man or men in her life. One literary critic argues that Dagny is the first, and perhaps only, epic heroine in Western literature because of the grandness of her vision, her courage and integrity, her unusual abilities, and her national importance (Michalson 1999). Rand's depiction of her heroines' enjoyment of sex and their freedom from all merely conventional norms about sex anticipates the sexual liberation movement of the 20th century by at least 30 years. In all three novels, it is the heroine who has the power to choose which of the men who love, admire, and desire her (and only her) she will have. Rand was also an ardent champion of a woman's right to control her own reproductive choices (1968a, 1981).

    Her relationship to the feminist movement, however, was more complex. Although she praised Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique, mainstream feminism's collectivism and emphasis on women as victims later led her to reject feminism as such. Many theorists argue that Rand's work, especially Atlas Shrugged, upholds important feminist ideals, even as it succumbs to some anti-feminist tendencies that contradict her individualistic ethics (e.g., Gladstein 1978, 1999; B. Branden 1999; Presley 1999; Sheaffer 1999; Taylor 1999). Many others regard her and her work as plainly anti-feminist, with Susan Brownmiller even calling her “a traitor to her own sex” (Brownmiller 1975). One criticism takes aim at the individualism of Rand's ethics and politics, which rejects any special government help for women or discrimination against men (e.g., Harrison 1978, 1999). Another objects that Rand has internalized a masculine conception of human nature and virtue, and then created her ideal woman in light of this conception (Brownmiller 1975; Glennon 1979). This may be responsible for Rand's puzzling (and offensive) view that the essence of femininity is to hero-worship (not men, but) masculinity, while insisting (as her novels depict) that women and men are inherently equal and that the ideal romantic relationship is between moral and intellectual equals (1968b; cf. Brown 1999). At least as offensive to many are the violent sex scenes in her novels, especially the infamous scene in The Fountainhead that many regard as rape, where Howard Roark has sex with Dominique in spite of her resistance.

    Those who reject the charge of rape argue that in the 1940s and 50s, when Rand wrote her novels, it would have been seen as rough sex rather than non-consensual sex (McElroy 1999; Sheaffer 1999).That Rand herself thought of this scene as consensual is shown a few pages later, when she writes: “They had been united in an understanding beyond the violence, beyond the deliberate obscenity of his action” (1943, p. 218). And in letters to disturbed readers in 1946 and 1965, she denied that the scene is “actual rape” which, she stated, is “a dreadful crime,” a “vicious action and a violation of a woman's rights” (Rand 1995a). On the other hand, she also depicts Dominique exultantly telling herself that she's been raped. McElroy wonders if having her heroine call it rape is just another instance of Rand's desire to provoke and shock the reader (McElroy 1999), as when she uses “selfishness” to mean “rational self-interest”.

    5. Aesthetics

    Rand holds that our actions need guidance by a vision of the fundamental nature of the universe and of the efficacy of human thought and activity—a vision that can be grasped directly rather than requiring the conscious repetition of long chains of abstract reasoning. The chief function of art is to meet this psychological need by expressing abstract conceptual values and metaphysical truths in concrete perceptible form. Art, according to Rand, constitutes a selective, stylized re-creation of reality, with the principle of selection being the artist's “sense of life,” a set of implicit “metaphysical value-judgments,” i.e., judgments about what is fundamentally significant about the world and our place in it. (There is controversy among Rand scholars as to whether what is re-created in art is certain elements of reality or reality as a whole, i.e., a “microcosm,” as well as how and whether the concept of re-creation applies to apparently non-representational forms of art: Torres and Kamhi 2000; Bissell 2004.) Both the artist's creative work and the audience's emotional responses to it are driven by their senses of life, that is, the worldviews they have “formed by a process of emotional generalization … a subconscious counterpart of a process of abstraction” (1966b, p. 27). The role of art in sustaining us psychologically by providing a concretization of our most fundamental values is a frequent theme in Rand's fiction as well, especially The Fountainhead.[11]

    While art can be used to convey information or to advocate a position, such functions are secondary to its chief task: providing an object whose mere contemplation brings spiritual fulfillment. Hence Rand does not regard her own novels primarily as vehicles for her philosophy, though of course they are that inter alia. Given her own worldview, Rand favors literature with a strong plot as a way of expressing purposeful human action in a world of causal regularity, and stories involving value-conflicts as a way of expressing the importance of free choice; hence her preference for romantic (as opposed to, e.g., naturalistic) literature. But Rand holds that it is possible to evaluate an artwork's aesthetic value simply in terms of its success in conveying a concretization of the artist's sense of life, whether or not one shares the values and judgments so conveyed.


    Works by Rand
    1943, The Fountainhead, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
    1953, Anthem (1st ed. 1938), Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers.
    1957, Atlas Shrugged, New York: Random House.
    1959, We the Living (1st ed. 1936), New York: Macmillan.
    1961a, For the New Intellectual: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, New York: New American Library.
    1961b, “The Objectivist Ethics,” in Rand 1964a, pp. 13–39. [Rand 1961b available online]
    1962a, “The ‘Conflicts’ of Men's Interests,” Objectvist Newsletter (August), Rand 1982b, reprinted in Rand 1964a, pp. 57–65.
    1962b, “The Monument Builders,” Objectivist Newsletter (December), Rand 1982b, reprinted in Rand 1964a, pp. 100–107.
    1963a, “The Nature of Government,” Objectivist Newsletter (December), Rand 1982b, reprinted in Rand 1964a, pp. 125–134, and Rand 1967, pp. 329–337. [Rand 1963a available online]
    1963b, “Man's Rights,” Objectivist Newsletter (April), Rand 1982b, reprinted in Rand 1964a, pp. 108–117, and Rand 1967, pp. 320–328. [Rand 1963b available online]
    1963c, “Collectivized ‘Rights’,” Objectivist Newsletter (June), reprinted in Rand 1982b, reprinted in Rand 1964a, pp. 118–124.
    1964a, The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism, New York: New American Library. Contains Rand's main statement of her ethics originally delivered as a lecture, and essays by Rand and Nathaniel Branden published in The Objectivist Newsletter (Rand 1982b) between 1961 and 1964.
    1964b, “Playboy Interview: Ayn Rand,” by Alvin Toffler, Playboy (March), 35–43.
    1964c. “Is Atlas Shrugging?” Originally delivered as a lecture, published in 1967, pp. 150–66.
    1965, “What Is Capitalism?,” Objectivist Newsletter (November-December), Rand 1982b; reprinted in Rand 1967, pp. 11–34.
    1966a, “The Roots of War,” Objectivist (June), 1982c; reprinted in Rand 1967, pp. 35–43.
    1966b, “Philosophy and Sense of Life,” Rand 1975, pp. 25–33.
    1967, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal. New York: New American Library.
    1967. “Faith and Force: Destroyers of the Modern World,” in Rand 1982a, pp. 70–92.
    1968a, “Of Living Death,” The Objectivist (September-November), Rand 1982c; reprinted in Rand 1990b, pp. 46–63.
    1968b, “On a Woman President,” in Rand 1990b, pp. 267–270.
    1970, “Causality Versus Duty” in Rand 1982a, pp. 95–101.
    1971a, The New Left: The Anti-Industrial Revolution, New York: New American Library.
    1971b, Night of January 16th (1st ed. 1968), New York: Plume.
    1973a, “The Metaphysical Versus the Man-Made,” Ayn Rand Letter 2.12–13 (Rand 1979); reprinted in Rand 1982a, pp. 23–34.
    1973b, “Selfishness Without a Self,” in Rand 1982a, pp. 46–51.
    1974, “Moral Inflation,” Ayn Rand Letter 3.12–14 (Rand 1979).
    1975, The Romantic Manifesto: A Philosophy of Literature: Second Revised Edition (1st ed. 1969), New York: New American Library.
    1979, The Ayn Rand Letter (original pub. 1971–1976), Palo Alto, CA: Palo Alto Book Service.
    1981, “The Age of Mediocrity,” Objectivist Forum (Binswanger 1993) 2.3: 1–11.
    1982a, Philosophy: Who Needs It, New York: Bobbs-Merrill.
    1982b, The Objectivist Newsletter (original pub. 1962–1966), Palo Alto, CA: Palo Alto Book Service.
    1982c. The Objectivist (original pub. 1966–1971), Palo Alto, CA: Palo Alto Book Service.
    1986, The Ayn Rand Lexicon: Objectivism from A to Z, H. Binswanger (ed.), New York: Meridian.
    1990a, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology [IOE], expanded second edition, H. Binswanger and L. Peikoff (eds.), New York: Meridian; 1st edition, 1979.
    1990b, The Voice of Reason: Essays in Objectivist Thought, L. Peikoff (ed.), New York: Meridian.
    1995a, Letters of Ayn Rand, M. Berliner (ed.), New York: Plume.
    1995b, Ayn Rand's Marginalia: Her Critical Comments on the Writings of Over 20 Authors, Robert Mayhew (ed.), New Milford, Conn.: Second Renaissance.
    1997, Journals of Ayn Rand, D. Harriman (ed.), New York: Plume.
    1998, The Ayn Rand Column, 2nd ed. (original pub. 1962), P. Schwartz (ed.), New Milford, Conn.: Second Renaissance.
    1999a, Return of the Primitive: The Anti-Industrial Revolution (ed. P. Schwartz), New York: Meridian, 1999.
    1999b, The Ayn Rand Reader, G. Hull and L. Peikoff, New York: Plume.
    2000, The Art of Fiction: A Guide for Writers and Readers, T. Boeckmann (ed.), New York: Plume, 2000.
    2001, The Art of Nonfiction: A Guide for Writers and Readers, R. Mayhew, New York: Plume, 2001.
    2005a, The Early Ayn Rand: Revised Edition: A Selection from Her Unpublished Fiction (1st ed. 1984), L. Peikoff (ed.), New York: New American Library.
    2005b, Ayn Rand Answers: The Best of Her Q & A, Robert Mayhew (ed.), New York: New American Library.
    2009, Objectively Speaking: Ayn Rand Interviewed, Podritske, M., and Schwartz, P. (eds.), Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

    Works by Others
    Badhwar, N.K., 1993a. “Altruism vs Self-Interest: Sometimes a False Dichotomy,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 10(1): 90–117 and in Altruism, E. F. Paul (ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    –––, 1993b, “The Virtues of Benevolence: The Unnamed Virtues in the Fountainhead,” presented at the Ayn Rand Society, The American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division Meetings. [available online (doc)]
    –––, 1999, “Is Virtue Only a Means to Happiness? An Analysis of Virtue and Happiness in Ayn Rand's Writings,” Reason Papers No. 24, 27–44. [available online (pdf)]
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    "Rescue me, you fool!! What do you mean, you don't believe in altruism??!! You selfish bastard!!"

    Last edited by orthodoxymoron on Thu Feb 11, 2016 9:07 am; edited 1 time in total

    Posts : 7999
    Join date : 2010-09-28

    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  orthodoxymoron on Sun Apr 13, 2014 8:19 am

    What if, at the core of solar system governance, there were a manage a trois of church, state, and business -- openly in bed together??!! What if that's what we've had for thousands of years -- secretly??!! What if the bottom-line really is the bottom-line EVERYWHERE??!! Abandon all idealism, ye truth-seekers??!! Was Bertrand Russell correct regarding "Unyielding Despair"??!! What if there were a State Ceremonial Church, which collected no tithes and offerings -- and simply offered a smorgasbord of services, without high-pressure evangelism and fund-raising?? Big-Church without Salvation4Sale?? I'm not suggesting this is how things should be. I'm simply suggesting considering all possibilities.

    If my theory about a hypothetical Reptilian-Human Nazi-Mason-Jesuit Galactic-Empire is even partially true -- especially regarding the potential punishment and exploitation of Humanity -- this alleged horrific child-abuse phenomenon (connected with Rome, London, and Canada) might make a bit more sense -- in a rather horrifying manner. That David Icke -- Arizona Wilder interview was quite graphic -- and I have no idea how true or false it might've been. I continue to be very impressed by that Icke introductory monologue. All I know is that there seems to be something dark and ominous at the core of this solar system. I have no idea who the guilty parties really are -- human and/or otherwise. The more I model idealistic modalities of solar system governance -- the more attacked and miserable I become -- and my sci-fi imagination conceptualizes some VERY upsetting and disorienting possibilities -- which make Star Wars seem somewhat tame -- and I'm NOT joking. I keep thinking about the City-States, the United Nations, and the Darkside of the Moon regarding what I suspect is a very bad present state of affairs -- and a potentially idealistic transformation of that which presently exists. I keep thinking about Michael, Gabriel, and Lucifer as Ancient Brothers and/or Sisters in Arms -- who might've fought side by side -- and then potentially turned on each other -- and formed various alliances. I have no idea. The more I think about all of this -- the more my mental and spiritual state deteriorates. There are those who could reveal the Real-Story to me -- but they continue to choose NOT to give me the gory and sad details -- which might be just as well. I doubt that I could handle the truth. Hell, I can barely handle the lies...

    Consider Dorothy Sayers:

    Dorothy Leigh Sayers (usually pronounced /ˈseɪ.ərz/, although Sayers herself preferred [ˈsɛːz] and encouraged the use of her middle initial to facilitate this pronunciation;[1] 13 June 1893 – 17 December 1957) was a renowned English crime writer, poet, playwright, essayist, translator and Christian humanist. She was also a student of classical and modern languages. She is best known for her mysteries, a series of novels and short stories set between the First and Second World Wars that feature English aristocrat and amateur sleuth Lord Peter Wimsey, that remain popular to this day. However, Sayers herself considered her translation of Dante's Divine Comedy to be her best work. She is also known for her plays, literary criticism and essays.

    Sayers, an only child, was born on 13 June 1893 at the Head Master's House, Christ Church Cathedral, Oxford, her father, the Rev. Henry Sayers, M.A., being a chaplain of Christ Church and headmaster of the Choir School. (When she was six he started teaching her Latin.)[2] She grew up in the tiny village of Bluntisham-cum-Earith in Huntingdonshire, after her father was given the living there as rector. The Regency rectory is an elegant building, while the church graveyard features the surnames of several characters from her mystery The Nine Tailors. The proximity of the River Great Ouse and the Fens invites comparison with the book's vivid description of a massive flood around the village.[3]

    From 1909 she was educated at the Godolphin School,[4] a boarding school in Salisbury. Her father later moved to the less luxurious living of Christchurch, also in Cambridgeshire.

    In 1912, she won a scholarship to Somerville College, Oxford,[5] and studied modern languages and medieval literature. She finished with first-class honours in 1915.[6] Although women could not be awarded degrees at that time, Sayers was among the first to receive a degree when the position changed a few years later, and in 1920 she graduated as a MA. Her experience of Oxford academic life eventually inspired her penultimate Peter Wimsey novel, Gaudy Night.

    Her father was from a line of Sayerses from Littlehampton, West Sussex, and her mother (Helen Mary Leigh – whence Sayers' second name) was born at "The Chestnuts", Millbrook, Hampshire to Frederick Leigh, a solicitor, whose family roots were in the Isle of Wight. Dorothy's aunt Amy, her mother's sister, married Henry Richard Shrimpton.


    Poetry, teaching, and advertisements

    Dorothy Sayers' first book, of poetry, was published in 1916 as OP. I[7] by Blackwell Publishing in Oxford. Later Sayers worked for Blackwell's and then as a teacher in several locations including Normandy, France, just before the First World War began.

    Sayers' longest employment was from 1922 to 1931 as a copywriter at S.H. Benson's advertising agency in London. This was located at International Buildings, Kingsway, London. Sayers was quite successful as an advertiser. Her collaboration with artist John Gilroy resulted in "The Mustard Club" for Colman's Mustard and the Guinness "Zoo" advertisements, variations of which still appear today. One famous example was the Toucan, his bill arching under a glass of Guinness, with Sayers's jingle:

    If he can say as you can
    Guinness is good for you
    How grand to be a Toucan
    Just think what Toucan do

    Sayers is also credited with coining the slogan "It pays to advertise!"[8][9] She used the advertising industry as the setting of Murder Must Advertise, where she describes the role of truth in advertising:

    . . . the firm of Pym’s Publicity, Ltd., Advertising Agents . . .
    “Now, Mr. Pym is a man of rigid morality—except, of course, as regards his profession, whose essence is to tell plausible lies for money—“

    “How about truth in advertising?”
    “Of course, there is some truth in advertising. There’s yeast in bread, but you can’t make bread with yeast alone. Truth in advertising . . . is like leaven, which a woman hid in three measures of meal. It provides a suitable quantity of gas, with which to blow out a mass of crude misrepresentation into a form that the public can swallow.”[8]

    Detective fiction

    Sayers began working out the plot of her first novel some time in 1920–21. The seeds of the plot for Whose Body? can be seen in a letter Sayers wrote on 22 January 1921:

    My detective story begins brightly, with a fat lady found dead in her bath with nothing on but her pince-nez. Now why did she wear pince-nez in her bath? If you can guess, you will be in a position to lay hands upon the murderer, but he's a very cool and cunning fellow... (p. 101, Reynolds)

    Lord Peter Wimsey burst upon the world of detective fiction with an explosive "Oh, damn!" and continued to engage readers in eleven novels and two sets of short stories; the final novel ended with a very different "Oh, damn!". Sayers once commented that Lord Peter was a mixture of Fred Astaire and Bertie Wooster, which is most evident in the first five novels. However, it is evident through Lord Peter's development as a rounded character that he existed in Sayers's mind as a living, breathing, fully human being. Sayers introduced detective novelist Harriet Vane in Strong Poison. Sayers remarked more than once that she had developed the "husky voiced, dark-eyed" Harriet to put an end to Lord Peter via matrimony. But in the course of writing Gaudy Night, Sayers imbued Lord Peter and Harriet with so much life that she was never able, as she put it, to "see Lord Peter exit the stage".

    Sayers did not content herself with writing pure detective stories; she explored the difficulties of First World War veterans in The Unpleasantness at the Bellona Club, discussed the ethics of advertising in Murder Must Advertise, and advocated women's education (then a controversial subject) and role in society in Gaudy Night. In Gaudy Night, Miss Barton writes a book attacking the Nazi doctrine of Kinder, Kirche, Küche, which restricted women's roles to family activities, and in many ways the whole of Gaudy Night can be read as an attack on Nazi social doctrine. The book has been described as "the first feminist mystery novel."[10]

    Sayers's Christian and academic interests are also apparent in her detective series. In The Nine Tailors, one of her most well-known detective novels, the plot unfolds largely in and around an old church dating back to the Middle Ages. Change ringing of bells also forms an important part of the novel. In Have His Carcase, the Playfair cipher and the principles of cryptanalysis are explained. Her short story Absolutely Elsewhere refers to the fact that (in the language of modern physics) the only perfect alibi for a crime is to be outside its light cone, while The Fascinating Problem of Uncle Meleager's Will contains a literary crossword puzzle.

    Sayers also wrote a number of short stories about Montague Egg, a wine salesman who solves mysteries.


    Sayers herself considered her translation of Dante's Divine Comedy to be her best work. The boldly titled Hell appeared in 1949, as one of the recently introduced series of Penguin Classics. Purgatory followed in 1955. Unfinished at her death, the third volume (Paradise) was completed by Barbara Reynolds in 1962.

    On a line-by-line basis, Sayers's translation can seem idiosyncratic. For example, the famous line usually rendered "Abandon all hope, ye who enter here" turns, in the Sayers translation, into "Lay down all hope, you who go in by me." As the Italian reads "Lasciate ogne speranza, voi ch'intrate", both the traditional and Sayers' translation add to the source text in an effort to preserve the original length: "here" is added in the first case, and "by me" in the second. It can be argued that Sayers' translation is actually more accurate, in that the original intimates to "abandon all hope". Also, the addition of "by me" draws from the previous lines of the canto: "Per me si va ne la città dolente;/ per me si va ne l'etterno dolore;/ per me si va tra la perduta gente." (Longfellow: "Through me the way is to the city dolent;/ through me the way is to the eternal dole;/ through me the way is to the people lost.")

    The idiosyncratic character of Sayers's translation results from her decision to preserve the original Italian terza rima rhyme scheme, so that her "go in by me" rhymes with "made to be" two lines earlier, and "unsearchably" two lines before that. Umberto Eco in his book Mouse or Rat? suggests that, of the various English translations, Sayers "does the best in at least partially preserving the hendecasyllables and the rhyme."[11]

    Sayers's translation of the Divine Comedy is also notable for extensive notes at the end of each canto, explaining the theological meaning of what she calls "a great Christian allegory."[12] Her translation has remained popular: in spite of publishing new translations by Mark Musa and Robin Kirkpatrick, as of 2009 Penguin Books was still publishing the Sayers edition.[13]

    In the introduction to her translation of The Song of Roland, Sayers expressed an outspoken feeling of attraction and love for:

    "(...) That new-washed world of clear sun and glittering colour which we call the Middle Age (as though it were middle-aged) but which has perhaps a better right than the blown rose of the Renaissance to be called the Age of Re-birth".

    She praised "Roland" for being a purely Christian myth, in contrast to such epics as Beowulf in which she found a strong pagan content.

    Other Christian and academic work

    Sayers's most notable religious book is probably The Mind of the Maker (1941) which explores at length the analogy between a human creator (especially a writer of novels and plays) and the doctrine of The Trinity in creation. She suggests that any human creation of significance involves the Idea, the Energy (roughly: the process of writing and that actual 'incarnation' as a material object) and the Power (roughly: the process of reading/hearing and the effect it has on the audience) and that this "trinity" has useful analogies with the theological Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

    In addition to the ingenious thinking in working out this analogy, the book contains striking examples drawn from her own experiences as a writer and elegant criticisms of writers when the balance between Idea, Energy and Power is not, in her view, adequate.[14] She defends strongly the view that literary creatures have a nature of their own, vehemently replying to a well-wisher who wanted Lord Peter to "end up a convinced Christian". "From what I know of him, nothing is more unlikely... Peter is not the Ideal Man".[15]

    Creed or Chaos? is a restatement of basic historical Christian Doctrine, based on the Apostles' Creed, the Nicene Creed, and the Athanasian Creed, similar to but somewhat more densely written than C.S. Lewis' Mere Christianity; both sought clearly and concisely to explain the central doctrines of Christianity to those who had encountered them in distorted or watered-down forms, on the grounds that if you are going to criticize something you had best know what it is first.

    Her very influential essay The Lost Tools of Learning[16] has been used by many schools in the US as a basis for the classical education movement, reviving the medieval trivium subjects (grammar, logic and rhetoric) as tools to enable the analysis and mastery of every other subject. Sayers also wrote three volumes of commentaries about Dante, religious essays, and several plays, of which The Man Born to be King may be the best known.

    Her religious works did so well at presenting the orthodox Anglican position that, in 1943, the Archbishop of Canterbury offered her a Lambeth doctorate in divinity, which she declined. In 1950, however, she accepted an honorary doctorate of letters from the University of Durham.

    Although she never describes herself as such, her economic and political ideas, rooted as they are in the classical Christian doctrines of Creation and Incarnation, are very close to the Chesterton-Belloc theory of Distributism.[17]

    Criticism of background material in her novels

    The literary and academic themes in Sayers's novels have appealed to a great many readers, but by no means to all. Poet W. H. Auden and philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein were critics of her novels, for example.[18][19] A savage attack on Sayers's writing ability came from the prominent American critic and man of letters Edmund Wilson, in a well-known 1945 article in The New Yorker called Who Cares Who Killed Roger Ackroyd?[20] He briefly writes about her famous novel The Nine Tailors, saying "I set out to read [it] in the hope of tasting some novel excitement, and I declare that it seems to me one of the dullest books I have ever encountered in any field. The first part is all about bell-ringing as it is practised in English churches and contains a lot of information of the kind that you might expect to find in an encyclopedia article on campanology. I skipped a good deal of this, and found myself skipping, also, a large section of the conversations between conventional English village characters..." Wilson continues "I had often heard people say that Dorothy Sayers wrote well... but, really, she does not write very well: it is simply that she is more consciously literary than most of the other detective-story writers and that she thus attracts attention in a field which is mostly on a sub-literary level."

    The academic critic Q.D. Leavis, in a review of Gaudy Night and Busman's Honeymoon published in the critical journal Scrutiny, criticises Sayers in more specific terms. The basis of Leavis' criticism is that Sayers' fiction is "popular and romantic while pretending to realism."[21] Leavis argues that Sayers presents academic life as "sound and sincere because it is scholarly", a place of "invulnerable standards of taste charging the charmed atmosphere".[22] But, Leavis says, this is unrealistic: "If such a world ever existed, and I should be surprised to hear as much, it does no longer, and to give substance to a lie or to perpetrate a dead myth is to do no one any service really."[23] Leavis suggests that "people in the academic world who earn their livings by scholarly specialities are not as a general thing wiser, better, finer, decenter or in any way more estimable than those of the same social class outside", but that Sayers is popular among educated readers because "the accepted pretence is that things are as Miss Sayers relates". Leavis comments that "only best-seller novelists could have such illusions about human nature".[23]

    Critic Sean Latham has defended Sayers, arguing that Wilson "chooses arrogant condescension over serious critical consideration" and suggests that both he and Leavis, rather than seriously assessing Sayers' writing, simply objected to a detective-story writer having pretensions beyond what they saw as her role of popular-culture "hack".[18] Latham claims that, in their eyes, "Sayers's primary crime lay in her attempt to transform the detective novel into something other than an ephemeral bit of popular culture".[18] All writers of hugely popular detective fiction have been roundly criticized at various times and for various reasons; what makes Sayers' case perhaps unusual are the sources of many of the criticisms: literary and academic figures. But in fact there is nothing remarkable in this: Sayers' fiction touches on a number of controversial topics relating to academia and the literary community, so vociferous criticism of her work must be expected.

    Criticism of major characters

    Lord Peter Wimsey, Sayers' heroic detective, has been criticized for being too perfect; over time the various talents he displays grow too numerous for some readers to swallow. Edmund Wilson also expressed his distaste for Lord Peter in his criticism of The Nine Tailors: "There was also a dreadful stock English nobleman of the casual and debonair kind, with the embarrassing name of Lord Peter Wimsey, and, although he was the focal character in the novel... I had to skip a good deal of him, too."[20] On the other hand, this characterization of Wilson's omits some of the complexities of Lord Peter's character, and these same complexities are what have endeared him to readers fond of protagonists who transcend the standards of the genre.

    Wimsey is rich, well-educated, charming, and brave, as well as an accomplished musician, an exceptional athlete, and a notable lover. He does, however, have serious flaws: the habit of over-engaging in what other characters regard as silly prattling, a nervous disorder (shell-shock) and a fear of responsibility. The latter two both originate from his service in the First World War. The fear of responsibility turns out to be a serious obstacle to his maturation into full adulthood (a fact not lost on the character himself).

    The character Harriet Vane, featured in four novels, has been criticized for being a mere stand-in for the author. Many of the themes and settings of Sayers's novels, particularly those involving Harriet Vane, seem to reflect Sayers's own concerns and experiences.[24] Vane, like Sayers, was educated at Oxford (unusual for a woman at the time) and is a mystery writer. Vane initially meets Wimsey when she is tried for poisoning her lover (Strong Poison); he insists on participating in the defence preparations for her re-trial, where he falls for her but she rejects him. In Have His Carcase she collaborates with Wimsey to solve a murder but still rejects his proposals of marriage. She eventually accepts (Gaudy Night) and marries him (Busman's Honeymoon).

    Alleged racism and anti-Semitism in Sayers's writing

    Biographers of Sayers have disagreed as to whether Sayers was anti-Semitic or not. In Sayers: A Biography,[25] James Brabazon argues that Sayers was anti-Semitic. This is rebutted by Carolyn G. Heilbrun in Dorothy L. Sayers: Biography Between the Lines.[26] McGregor and Lewis argue in Conundrums for the Long Week-End that Sayers was not anti-Semitic but used popular British stereotypes of class and ethnicity. In 1936, a translator wanted "to soften the thrusts against the Jews" in Whose Body?; Sayers, surprised, replied that the only characters "treated in a favourable light were the Jews!"[27]

    On January 3, 1924, at the age of 30, Sayers secretly gave birth to an illegitimate son, John Anthony [later surnamed Fleming, though his father was Bill White], who was cared for as a child by her aunt and cousin, Amy and Ivy Amy Shrimpton, and passed off as her nephew to friends.[28][29] [30] Two years later, after publishing her first two detective novels, Sayers married Captain Oswald Atherton "Mac" Fleming, a Scottish journalist whose professional name was "Atherton Fleming." The wedding took place on 8 April 1926 at Holborn Register Office, London. Fleming was divorced with two children. Sayers and Fleming lived in the flat at 24 Great James Street in St Pancras, London that Sayers maintained for the rest of her life. Both worked, Fleming as an author and journalist and Sayers as an advertising copywriter and author. Over time, Fleming's health worsened, largely due to his First World War service, and as a result he became unable to work.

    Sayers was a good friend of C. S. Lewis and several of the other Inklings. On some occasions, Sayers joined Lewis at meetings of the Socratic Club. Lewis said he read The Man Born to be King every Easter, but he claimed to be unable to appreciate detective stories. J. R. R. Tolkien read some of the Wimsey novels but scorned the later ones, such as Gaudy Night.[31]

    Fleming died on 9 June 1950, at Sunnyside Cottage, Witham, Essex. Sayers died suddenly of a coronary thrombosis[32] on 17 December 1957 at the same place, aged 64. Fleming was buried in Ipswich, while Dorothy's remains were cremated and her ashes buried beneath the tower of St Anne's Church, Soho, London, where she had been a churchwarden for many years. Upon her death it was revealed that her nephew, John Anthony, was her son; he was the sole beneficiary under his mother's will. He died on 26 November 1984 at age 60, in St. Francis's Hospital, Miami Beach, Florida.


    Some of the character Harriet Vane's observations reveal Sayers poking fun at the mystery genre, even while adhering to various conventions.

    Sayers' work was frequently parodied by her contemporaries. E. C. Bentley, the author of the early modern detective novel Trent's Last Case, wrote a parody entitled "Greedy Night" (1938).

    Her characters, and Sayers herself, have been placed in some other works, including:
    Jill Paton Walsh has published three novels about Peter Wimsey and Harriet Vane: Thrones, Dominations (1998), a completion of Sayers' manuscript left unfinished at her death; A Presumption of Death (2002), based on the "Wimsey Papers", letters ostensibly written by various Wimseys and published in The Spectator during the Second World; and The Attenbury Emeralds (2010), based on Lord Peter's "first case", briefly referred to in a number of Sayers' novels.
    Wimsey appears (together with Hercule Poirot and Father Brown) in C. Northcote Parkinson's comic novel Jeeves (after Jeeves, the gentleman's gentleman of the P.G. Wodehouse canon).
    Wimsey makes a cameo appearance in Laurie R. King's A Letter of Mary, one of a series of books relating the further adventures of Sherlock Holmes.
    Sayers appears, with Agatha Christie, as a title character in Dorothy and Agatha [ISBN 0-451-40314-2], a murder mystery by Gaylord Larsen, in which a man is murdered in Sayers' dining room and she has to solve the crime.
    Wimsey is mentioned by Walter Pidgeon's character in the 1945 film Week-End at the Waldorf as one of three possible detectives waiting for him in the hall, outside the apartment of the character played by Ginger Rogers.

    Sayers Classical Academy in Louisville, Kentucky is named after her.

    See also Plays of Dorothy L. Sayers See also List of fictional books#Works invented by Dorothy L. Sayers
    [edit] Poetry collections
    Op. I (1916)[7]
    Catholic Tales and Christian Songs (1918)[33]

    Lord Peter Wimsey novels and short story collections
    Whose Body? (1923)
    Clouds of Witness (1926)
    Unnatural Death (1927). From the papers held by the Marion E. Wade Center, it is clear that Sayers' original title was The Singular Case of the Three Spinsters.
    The Unpleasantness at the Bellona Club (1928)
    Lord Peter Views the Body (1928; 12 short stories)
    Strong Poison (1930)
    Five Red Herrings (1931)
    Have His Carcase (1932)
    Hangman's Holiday (1933; 12 short stories, 4 including Lord Peter)
    Murder Must Advertise (1933)
    The Nine Tailors (1934)
    Gaudy Night (1935)
    Busman's Honeymoon (1937; the play on which it was based, co-written with Muriel St. Clair Byrne, was published in Love All, Together with Busman's Honeymoon, ed. Alzina Stone Dale, 1984)
    In the Teeth of the Evidence (1939; 17 short stories, 2 including Lord Peter; editions published after 1972 usually adds "Talboys", the last story she wrote with Lord Peter)
    Striding Folly (1972; 3 short stories)
    Lord Peter—the Complete Lord Peter Wimsey Stories (1972; the first edition contains 20 Lord Peter short stories; the second edition includes all 21 Lord Peter short stories by adding "Talboys")
    Sayers on Holmes, Essays and Fiction on Sherlock Holmes, introd. Alzina Stone Dale (2001; booklet of 54 pages reprinting various Holmesian essays by Sayers, and including a previously unpublished BBC radio script, broadcast in 1954, in which an 8-year-old Lord Peter brings Holmes a problem of a missing cat).
    Thrones, Dominations (1998; begun by Sayers in 1936, completed by Jill Paton Walsh and published in 1998.)[34]
    The Wimsey Papers a series of fictional letters by members of the Wimsey Family, published in The Spectator in the early months of the Second World War, which are actually essays expressing Sayers' views on various subjects.
    Dorothy L. Sayers: the Complete Stories (2002; all 21 Lord Peter short stories, the 11 Montague Egg stories, and 12 others)
    Sayers also wrote the scenario for the film The Silent Passenger (1935), a Lord Peter story which was never published in book form, and whose script was altered greatly by the film company from her original.[35]

    Other books of crime fiction
    The Documents in the Case (1930) written with Robert Eustace
    The Floating Admiral (1931, written with members of The Detection Club, a chapter each)
    Ask a Policeman (1933, written with members of The Detection Club)
    Six against the Yard (1936, written with members of The Detection Club)
    Double Death: a Murder Story (1939, written with members of The Detection Club)
    The Scoop and Behind the Screen (1983, Originally published in The Listener (1931) and (1930), both written by members of The Detection Club)
    Crime on the Coast and No Flowers by Request (1984, written by members of The Detection Club, Sayers takes part in the second, originally published in Daily Sketch (1953)
    The Travelling Rug (2005, a previously unpublished short detective story, probably written in the early to middle 1930s, planned as the first in a series to be called The Situations of Judkins. It features a house-maid, Jane Eurydice Judkins. This book contains a printed version of the story, as well as a photographic reproduction of the manuscript in Wheaton College Library.)

    Dante translations and commentaries
    The Divine Comedy, Part 1: Hell (1949) ISBN 0-14-044006-2
    The Divine Comedy, Part 2: Purgatory (1955) ISBN 0-14-044046-1
    The Divine Comedy, Part 3: Paradise (1962) (completed by Barbara Reynolds) ISBN 0-14-044105-0
    Introductory Papers on Dante: Volume 1: The Poet Alive in His Writings (1954)
    Further Papers on Dante Volume 2: His Heirs and His Ancestors (1957)
    The Poetry of Search and the Poetry of Statement Volume 3: On Dante and Other Writers (1963)


    The Man Born to be King, a cycle of 12 plays on the life of Jesus (1941)

    Collections of essays and non-fiction
    The Greatest Drama Ever Staged Hodder and Stoughton (1938)
    Strong Meat Hodder and Stoughton (1939)
    Begin Here (A Wartime Essay) Victor Gollancz (1940)
    Even The Parrot (Exemplary Conversations for Enlightened Children) Methuen (1944)
    The Mind of the Maker (1941) ISBN 0-8371-3372-6
    The Lost Tools of Learning (1947)
    Unpopular Opinions (1947)
    The Greatest Drama Ever Staged (reprinted from Unpopular Opinions in a series of pocket-sized booklets) St Hugh's Press
    Creed or Chaos?: Why Christians Must Choose Either Dogma or Disaster (Or, Why It Really Does Matter What You Believe) (1947) ISBN 0-918477-31-X
    Are Women Human? (1971) (two essays reprinted from Unpopular Opinions) ISBN 0-8028-2996-1
    The Whimsical Christian (1978) ISBN 0-02-096430-7
    Sayers on Holmes (2001) ISBN 1-887726-08-X
    Les Origines du Roman Policier: A Wartime Wireless Talk to the French: The Original French Text with an English Translation (ed. and trans. Suzanne Bray, Hurstpierpoint: Dorothy L. Sayers Society, 2003) ISBN 0-9545636-0-3

    Collected letters

    Five volumes of Sayers' letters have been published, edited by Barbara Reynolds.
    The Letters of Dorothy L. Sayers: 1899–1936: The Making of a Detective Novelist ISBN 0-312-14001-0
    The Letters of Dorothy L. Sayers: 1937–1943, From Novelist to Playwright ISBN 0-312-18127-2[34]
    The Letters of Dorothy L. Sayers: 1944–1950, A Noble Daring ISBN 0-9518005-1-5
    The Letters of Dorothy L. Sayers: 1951–1957, In the Midst of Life ISBN 0-9518000-6-X
    The Letters of Dorothy L. Sayers: Child and Woman of Her Time ISBN 0-9518000-7-8


    1.^ Barbara Reynolds (1993). Dorothy L. Sayers: Her Life and Soul. London: Hodder & Stoughton. p. 361. ISBN 0-312-09787-5.
    2.^ Barbara Reynolds, op. cit., pp. 1–14
    3.^ Alzina Stone Dale (2003). Master and CraftsmanThe Story of Dorothy L. Sayers. iUniverse. pp. 3–6. ISBN 978-0-595-26603-6.
    4.^ "Dorothy L. Sayers". Inklings. Taylor University. Retrieved 13 May 2008.
    5.^ Barbara Reynolds, op. cit., p. 43
    6.^ "Biography of DLS". The Dorothy L Sayers Society home pages. The Dorothy L Sayers Society. Retrieved 29 July 2010.
    7.^ a b
    8.^ a b Murder Must Advertise, chapter 5
    9.^ Mitzi Brunsdale (1990). Dorothy L. Sayers. New York: Berg, p. 94.
    10.^ Randi Sørsdal (2006). From Mystery to Manners: A Study of Five Detective Novels by Dorothy L. Sayers (Masters thesis). University of Bergen. pp. 45.,
    11.^ Umberto Eco (2003). Mouse or Rat? Translation as Negotiation. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. pp. 141. ISBN 0-297-83001-5.
    12.^ Dorothy L. Sayers (1949). The Divine Comedy 1: Hell (introduction). London: Pengun Books. pp. 11.
    13.^ Penguin UK web site (accessed 26 August 2009)
    14.^ Examples, some hilarious, given in Chapter 10 of The Mind of the Maker, including a poet whose solemn ode to the Ark of the Covenant crossing Jordan contains the immortal couplet: "The [something] torrent, leaping in the air / Left the astounded river's bottom bare"
    15.^ Dorothy L. Sayers, The Mind of the Maker, p. 105
    16.^ Sayers, GBT, ISBN 978-1-60051-025-0.
    17.^ Adam Schwartz (2000). "The Mind of a Maker: An Introduction to the Thought of Dorothy L. Sayers Through Her Letters". Touchstone Magazine, Volume 13, Issue 4 (May 2000), pp. 28-38.
    18.^ a b c Sean Latham (2003). Am I A Snob? Modernism and the Novel. Cornell University Press. pp. 197. ISBN 0-8014-4022-X.
    19.^ from a letter to his former pupil Norman Malcolm, reproduced on page 109 of Malcolm's Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, O.U.P., 2001, ISBN 0-19-924759-5
    20.^ a b Wilson, Edmund. "Who Cares Who Killed Roger Ackroyd?" Originally published in The New Yorker, 20 January 1945.
    21.^ Leavis 1968, p. 143
    22.^ Leavis 1968, pp. 143–144
    23.^ a b Leavis 1968, p. 144
    24.^ Barbara Reynolds, op. cit.
    25.^ James Brabazon, Sayers: A Biography, pp. 216–219
    26.^ Carolyn G. Heilbrun in 'Dorothy L. Sayers: Biography Between the Lines' in Sayers Centenary.
    27.^ From a letter Sayers wrote to David Highan, 27 November 1936, published in Sayers's Letters.
    28.^ Barbara Reynolds, op. cit., p. 126
    30.^ Petri Liukkonen & Ari Pesonen (2008). "Dorothy L(eigh) Sayers(1893-1957)".
    31.^ The Letters of J.R.R. Tolkien p. 95.
    32.^ "Dorothy Sayers, Author, Dies at 64". The New York Times. 19 December 1957. Retrieved 31 August 2012.
    33.^ "Catholic tales and Christian songs, by Dorothy Leigh Sayers, Author of "Op. I."". Retrieved Feb. 3 2013.
    34.^ a b Joyce Carol Oates (March 15, 1998). "Lord Peter's Last Case". New York Times.
    35.^ Barbara Reynolds, op. cit., p. 262

    References and scholarship
    Op. I by Dorothy Sayers (poetry):
    The Lost Tools of Learning by Dorothy L. Sayers: Audio of this Essay: ISBN 978-1-60051-025-0
    Brabazon, James, Dorothy L. Sayers: a Biography (1980; New York: Avon, 1982) ISBN 978-0-380-58990-6
    Brown, Janice, The Seven Deadly Sins in the Work of Dorothy L. Sayers (Kent, OH, & London: Kent State University Press, 1998) ISBN 0-87338-605-1
    Connelly, Kelly C. "From Detective Fiction to Detective Literature: Psychology in the Novels of Dorothy L. Sayers and Margaret Millar." CLUES: A Journal of Detection 25.3 (Spring 2007): 35–47
    Coomes, David, Dorothy L. Sayers: A Careless Rage for Life (1992; London: Chariot Victor Publishing, 1997) ISBN 978-0-7459-2241-6
    Dale, Alzine Stone, Maker and Craftsman: The Story of Dorothy L. Sayers (1993;, 2003) ISBN 978-0-595-26603-6
    Dean, Christopher, ed., Encounters with Lord Peter (Hurstpierpoint: Dorothy L. Sayers Society, 1991) ISBN 0-9518000-0-0
    – Studies in Sayers: Essays presented to Dr Barbara Reynolds on her 80th Birthday (Hurstpierpoint: Dorothy L. Sayers Society, 1991) ISBN 0-9518000-1-9
    Downing, Crystal, Writing Performances: The Stages of Dorothy Sayers (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) ISBN 1-4039-6452-1
    Gorman, Anita G., and Leslie R. Mateer. "The Medium Is the Message: Busman's Honeymoon as Play, Novel, and Film." CLUES: A Journal of Detection 23.4 (Summer 2005): 54–62
    Kenney, Catherine, The Remarkable Case of Dorothy L. Sayers (1990; Kent, OH, & London: Kent State University Press, 1992) ISBN 0-87338-458-X
    Leavis, Q.D. (1937). "The Case of Miss Dorothy Sayers". Scrutiny VI.
    Lennard, John, 'Of Purgatory and Yorkshire: Dorothy L. Sayers and Reginald Hill's Divine Comedy', in Of Modern Dragons and other essays on Genre Fiction (Tirril: Humanities-Ebooks, 2007), pp. 33–55. ISBN 978-1-84760-038-7
    Loades, Ann. "Dorothy L. Sayers: War and Redemption." In Hein, David, and Edward Henderson, eds. C. S. Lewis and Friends: Faith and the Power of Imagination, pp. 53–70. London: SPCK, 2011.
    McGregor, Robert Kuhn & Lewis, Ethan Conundrums for the Long Week-End : England, Dorothy L. Sayers, and Lord Peter Wimsey (Kent, OH, & London: Kent State University Press, 2000) ISBN 0-87338-665-5
    Nelson, Victoria, L. is for Sayers: A Play in Five Acts (Dreaming Spires Publications, 2012) ISBN 061553872X
    Reynolds, Barbara, Dorothy L. Sayers: Her Life and Soul (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1993; rev. eds 1998, 2002) ISBN 0-340-72845-0
    Sørsdal, Randi, From Mystery to Manners: A Study of Five Detective Novels by Dorothy L. Sayers, Masters thesis, University of Bergen,
    Webster, Peter, 'Archbishop Temple’s offer of a Lambeth degree to Dorothy L. Sayers'. In: From the Reformation to the Permissive Society. Church of England Record Society (18). Boydell and Brewer, Woodbridge, 2010, pp. 565–582. ISBN 978-1-84383-558-5. Full text in SAS-Space
    Young, Laurel. "Dorothy L. Sayers and the New Woman Detective Novel."CLUES: A Journal of Detection 23.4 (Summer 2005): 39–53
    magamud wrote:

    Carol wrote:
    Thank-you magamud and Carol. Young Orthodoxymoron Unveiled!!!

    Today, I've been thinking about the Vatican, the United States, the United Nations, the Darkside of the Moon, and the United States of the Solar System -- Headquartered in the City of London -- and presided-over by an Elected King and Queen!!! What Would Cecil Rhodes Say??!! Is there something constructively-significant to be said for the Financial, Educational, Monarchical, and Church-State Models which exist in England WITH ALL CORRUPTION AND BULLSHIT REMOVED??? I continue to seek an Idealistic Solar System Core -- even though I am completely aware of the various prophetic interpretations. What continues to trouble me is that I am sensing that the Cleansing of the Sanctuary involves more Ethnic-Cleansing than Ethical-Cleansing. Regarding the Cleansing of the Sanctuary -- what if the 2,300 day-year prophecy of Daniel 8:14 began in 168BC and extends to 2133AD??!! What Would Antiochus Epiphanes Say??!! What if the Millenium began in 1133AD?? What if we are dealing with the 2,300 Year Reign of an essentially Reptilian-Human Nazi-Mason-Jesuit Agent-Attorney-Queen over an essentially Reptilian-Human Nazi-Mason-Jesuit Galactic-Empire??!! What if a New-Age Alien Agenda (which might resemble a United States of the Solar System)will continue until 2133AD -- at which time a Perfected United States of the Solar System will commence??!! I'm mostly imagining this hypothetical 2133AD Version in my Private Political and Theological Science-Fiction.

    Once again, I am expressing no hatred, and I wish to throw no stones. I am simply attempting to understand why our history has been so nasty and violent -- in a VERY beautiful world  -- and with a Quite-Fine Human-Race??!! Is Human-Nature REALLY Fallen and Sinful -- or have we been Manipulated and Corrupted on a Massive and Unfathomable Level so as to create a Designer-Purgatory which Maximizes Off-World Profit and Development??!! I continue to speculate that Humanity MIGHT BE a Renegade-Reptilian Creation which most of the universe hates and rejects. Please remember that I am modeling a Contrarian Theology which I do NOT necessarily believe in. I probably lean toward an Anglican-Adventist Perspective with a heavy Robert H. Schuller and Crystal Cathedral Influence -- even though I no longer attend any church -- and I would probably be considered to be a Reprobate-Heretic in ALL Churches. I worry each and every day that I am playing into an Apostate-Protestantism, Catholicism, and Spiritism Scenario which Ellen G. White warned about. I take that VERY SERIOUSLY. I also worry each and every day about playing into an Antichrist, False-Prophet, Descended-Disasters, Mark of the Beast Scenario. I take that with EXTREME-SERIOUSNESS. I worry each and every day about countermanding the Tower of Babel, Flood of Noah, and Genetic-Detuning Judgments of an Angry and Offended God. I think about such things with FEAR AND TREMBLING. I Really Do. You Have NO Idea. I continue to think that the True and Comprehensive Story of Our Origins, Nature, History, and Destiny is contained within Libraries and/or Archives in, under, or around Rome and London. I have NO insider sources -- and I purposely avoid pushing too hard or moving too quickly with this line of thinking. I continue to treat All of This Madness as Political and Theological Science-Fiction -- and I will continue to do so -- at least for the remainder of this particular incarnation. Don't look now -- but this might be the Tip of a British-Israel Conspiratorial-Iceberg!!! What if a lot of what I'm conceptualizing Already Exists??!! What if what presently exists is a Modern-Corruption of an Ancient Idealistic-Plan??!! Is the United States of the Solar System really the New Atlantis???!!!

    If and When a TRUE MESSIAH Arrives -- why would they need to live and reign with a certain select group of Chosen People??? What if they stayed with a different group of people and/or other-than-people each and every day??? What if they expressed NO favoritism??? How many 'Messiahs' do you suppose are in training throughout the solar system??!! There might be a helluva lot of Wannabe Messiahs!!! What if the TRUE MESSIAH isn't good enough for most of us??? What if most of us aren't good enough for the TRUE MESSIAH??? What Does the Bible Teach in This Regard??? Why can't the Temple be rebuilt UNDER Jerusalem -- with Jerusalem being an International City??? Why can't we skip the Seven Last Plagues, the Battle of Armageddon, and World War III??? Why does everything always have to be so goddman nasty and violent??? Why are you more concerned about 'goddamn' than you are about 'nasty' and 'violent'??? Taking Hebrews Chapter Nine into account -- why hasn't Jesus been running the show on Earth for at least the past 2,000 years??? What if Jesus HAS been running the show on Earth for at least the past 2,000 years??!! What if things have NOT been going as well as planned??!! OR what if the plan was for things to go rather badly??!! If Earth really is a Prison Planet in Rebellion -- what should we expect??!! We seem to be serving some sort of a nasty sentence. Doesn't it seem that way to you?? I want things to be Perfected in this Solar System NOW -- but what if such idealism runs counter to some Divine Design for Humanity -- which might NOT be nice at all??? What if we are simply dealing with a bunch of System Lords in conflict with each other??? What if Humanity is simply an Inconsequential-Subset in the Grand Scheme of Things??? Consider studying the Cleansing of the Sanctuary Theme in the context of Daniel, Matthew, Hebrews, Revelation, and the Book of Enoch!!! Perhaps I Should Stop...

    magamud wrote:
    Reptilian-Human Nazi-Mason-Jesuit Agent-Attorney-Queen
    Thats a good one.  Attorney queen.  

    or have we been Manipulated and Corrupted on a Massive and Unfathomable Level so as to create a Designer-Purgatory which Maximizes Off-World Profit and Development?
    That too...

    Lets pray...

    Thank-you magamud. The Mean Queen Theme is sort of cool -- yet sort of cruel. What about a Super Lady Diana as a Model Solar System Queen??!! Sorry if that offends -- but just think about THAT for a while (once your blood-pressure returns to normal). I like St. Patrick's Cathedral in NYC -- but I worry about what I keep hearing concerning various Cardinals -- and regarding what allegedly goes-on beneath Many Cathedrals (or behind locked-doors). I was just reading in Tom Clancy's Sum of All Fears (on page 22) where he refers to Cardinal Spellman as being the Catholic Vicar General of the United States Military (or something to that effect -- I don't have the book with me). I love Roman Catholic Pomp and Circumstance (even though I'm not supposed to as a Protestant) and I am intrigued by Vatican Intrigue -- but the REALLY Nasty Stuff Connected with Rome -- past, present, and future -- DEEPLY Troubles Me...

    magamud wrote: Very Happy
    I should relax more before reading your posts.  Here is a 4 hour picturesque harmonic relaxation video.  Over 7 million hits!

    Vicar general

    past, present, and future -- DEEPLY Troubles Me...

    Lets look at great Chasms....

    Last edited by orthodoxymoron on Thu Feb 11, 2016 9:10 am; edited 3 times in total

    Posts : 7999
    Join date : 2010-09-28

    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  orthodoxymoron on Mon Apr 14, 2014 9:30 am

    What if one studied theology, science, and science-fiction side by side -- in equal proportions?? How many people do this sort of thing?? Might this be similar to the Episcopal methodology of scripture, tradition, and reason?? I've concluded that I'm not particularly limited by the powers that be -- and that I am severely limited by myself!! Consider the Jet Propulsion Laboratory!! If I had Absolute-Access, I'd probably spend a lot of time at JPL!! What if I encountered real, live Moon-Nazis??!! What Would the Masons Say?? Hint: It's a Secret.

    Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) is a federally funded research and development center and NASA field center located in La Cañada Flintridge, California, United States.

    JPL is managed by the nearby California Institute of Technology (Caltech) for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The laboratory's primary function is the construction and operation of robotic planetary spacecraft, though it also conducts Earth-orbit and astronomy missions. It is also responsible for operating NASA's Deep Space Network.

    Among the laboratory's current major active projects are the Mars Science Laboratory mission (which includes the Curiosity rover), the Cassini–Huygens mission orbiting Saturn, the Mars Exploration Rover Opportunity, the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter, the Dawn mission to the dwarf planet Ceres and asteroid Vesta, the Juno spacecraft en route to Jupiter, the Nuclear Spectroscopic Telescope Array (NuSTAR) X-ray telescope, and the Spitzer Space Telescope. JPL's Space Flight Operations Facility and Twenty-Five-Foot Space Simulator are designated National Historic Landmarks.

    JPL traces its beginnings to 1936 in the Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory at the California Institute of Technology (GALCIT) when the first set of rocket experiments were carried out in the Arroyo Seco. Caltech graduate students Frank Malina, Weld Arnold, Apollo M. O. Smith, and Tsien Hsue-shen, along with Jack Parsons and Edward S. Forman, tested a small, alcohol-fueled motor to gather data for Malina's graduate thesis. Malina's thesis advisor was engineer - aerodynamicist Theodore von Kármán, who eventually arranged for U.S. Army financial support for this "GALCIT Rocket Project" in 1939. In 1941, Malina, Parsons, Forman, Martin Summerfield, and pilot Homer Bushey demonstrated the first JATO rockets to the Army. In 1943, von Kármán, Malina, Parsons, and Forman established the Aerojet Corporation to manufacture JATO motors. The project took on the name Jet Propulsion Laboratory in November 1943 formally becoming an Army facility operated under contract by the university.[1][2][3][4]

    During JPL's Army years, the laboratory developed two deployed weapon systems, the MGM-5 Corporal and MGM-29 Sergeant intermediate range ballistic missiles. These missiles were the first US ballistic missiles developed at JPL.[5] It also developed a number of other weapons system prototypes, such as the Loki anti-aircraft missile system, and the forerunner of the Aerobee sounding rocket. At various times, it carried out rocket testing at the White Sands Proving Ground, Edwards Air Force Base, and Goldstone, California. A lunar lander was also developed in 1938-39 which influenced design of the Apollo Lunar Module in the 1960s.[4]

    In 1954, JPL teamed up with Wernher von Braun’s rocketeers at the Army Ballistic Missile Agency’s Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, Alabama, to propose orbiting a satellite during the International Geophysical Year. The team lost that proposal to Project Vanguard, and instead embarked on a classified project to demonstrate ablative re-entry technology using a Jupiter-C rocket. They carried out three successful sub-orbital flights in 1956 and 1957. Using a spare Jupiter-C, the two organizations then launched America’s first satellite, Explorer 1, on February 1, 1958.[2][3]

    JPL was transferred to NASA in December 1958,[6] becoming the agency’s primary planetary spacecraft center. JPL engineers designed and operated Ranger and Surveyor missions to the Moon that prepared the way for Apollo. JPL also led the way in interplanetary exploration with the Mariner missions to Venus, Mars, and Mercury.[2] In 1998, JPL opened the Near-Earth Object Program Office for NASA;[7] as of 2013, it has found 95% of asteroids that are a kilometer or more in diameter that cross Earth's orbit.[8]

    JPL was early to employ women mathematicians. In the 1940s and 1950s, using mechanical calculators, women in an all-female computations group performed trajectory calculations.[9][10] In 1961, JPL hired their first woman engineer to work alongside male engineers as part of the Ranger and Mariner mission tracking teams.[11]

    JPL has been recognized four times by the Space Foundation: with the Douglas S. Morrow Public Outreach Award, which is given annually to an individual or organization that has made significant contributions to public awareness of space programs, in 1998; and with the John L. "Jack" Swigert, Jr., Award for Space Exploration on three occasions – in 2009 (as part of NASA's Phoenix Mars Lander Team[12]), 2006 and 2005.

    When founded, JPL's site was a rocky flood-plain just outside the city limits of Pasadena. Almost all of the 177 acres (72 ha) of the U.S. federal government/NASA owned property that makes up the JPL campus is today located in the city of La Cañada Flintridge, California,[13] on the northwest border of Pasadena, with a Pasadena address (4800 Oak Grove Drive, Pasadena, CA 91011). The city of La Cañada Flintridge, California was incorporated in 1976, well after JPL attained international recognition with a Pasadena address. There has been an occasional conflict between the two cities over the issue of which should be mentioned in the media as the home of the laboratory.

    There are approximately 5,000 full-time Caltech employees, and typically a few thousand additional contractors working on any given day. NASA also has a resident office at the facility staffed by federal managers who oversee JPL's activities and work for NASA. There are also some Caltech graduate students, college student interns and co-op students.

    The JPL Education Office serves educators and students by providing them with activities, resources, materials and opportunities tied to NASA missions and science. The mission of its programs is to introduce and further students' interest in pursuing STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) careers.[14]

    JPL offers research, internship and fellowship opportunities in the summer and throughout the year to high school through postdoctoral and faculty students. (In most cases, students must be U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents to apply, although foreign nationals studying at U.S. universities are eligible for limited programs.) Interns are sponsored through NASA programs, university partnerships and JPL mentors for research opportunities at the laboratory in areas including technology, robotics, planetary science, aerospace engineering, and astrophysics.[15]

    In August 2013, JPL was named one of "The 10 Most Awesome College Labs of 2013" by Popular Science, which noted that about 100 students who intern at the laboratory are considered for permanent jobs at JPL after they graduate.[16]

    The JPL Education Office also hosts the Planetary Science Summer School (PSSS), an annual week-long workshop for graduate and postdoctoral students. The program involves a one-week team design exercise developing an early mission concept study, working with JPL's Advanced Projects Design Team ("Team X") and other concurrent engineering teams.[17]

    JPL created the NASA Museum Alliance in 2003 out of a desire to provide museums, planetariums, visitor centers and other kinds of informal educators with exhibit materials, professional development and information related to the upcoming landing of the Mars rovers Spirit and Opportunity.[18] The Alliance now has more than 500 members, who get access to NASA displays, models, educational workshops and networking opportunities through the program. Staff at educational organizations that meet the Museum Alliance requirements can register to participate online.[19]

    The Museum Alliance is a subset of the JPL Education Office's Informal Education group, which also serves after-school and summer programs, parents and other kinds of informal educators.[20]

    The NASA/JPL Educator Resource Center, which is moving from its location at the Indian Hill Mall in Pomona, Calif. at the end of 2013,[21] offers resources, materials and free workshops for formal and informal educators covering science, technology, engineering and science topics related to NASA missions and science.

    The lab has an open house once a year on a Saturday and Sunday in May or June, when the public is invited to tour the facilities and see live demonstrations of JPL science and technology. More limited private tours are also available throughout the year if scheduled well in advance. Thousands of schoolchildren from Southern California and elsewhere visit the lab every year.[22] Due to federal spending cuts mandated by budget sequestration, the open house has been cancelled indefinitely.[23]

    In addition to its government work, JPL has also assisted the nearby motion picture and television industries, by advising them about scientific accuracy in their productions. Science fiction shows advised by JPL include Babylon 5 and its sequel series, Crusade.

    JPL also works with the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate (DHSSTD). JPL and DHSSTD developed a search and rescue tool for first responders called FINDER. First responders can use FINDER to locate people still alive who are buried in rubble after a disaster or terrorist attack. FINDER uses microwave radar to detect breathing and pulses.[24]

    JPL is a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) managed and operated by Caltech under a contract from NASA. In fiscal year 2012, the laboratory's budget was slightly under $1.5 billion, with the largest share going to Earth Science and Technology development.[25]

    There is a tradition at JPL to eat "good luck peanuts" before critical mission events, such as orbital insertions or landings. As the story goes, after the Ranger program had experienced failure after failure during the 1960s, the first successful Ranger mission to impact the moon occurred while a JPL staff member was eating peanuts. The staff jokingly decided that the peanuts must have been a good luck charm, and the tradition persisted.[26][27]

    These are some of the missions partially sponsored by JPL:[28]
    Explorer program
    Ranger program
    Surveyor program
    Mariner program
    Pioneer 3 & 4
    Viking program
    Voyager program
    Magellan probe
    Galileo probe
    Wide Field and Planetary Camera 2
    Deep Space 1 & 2
    Mars Global Surveyor
    Mars Climate Orbiter
    Mars Odyssey
    Mars Pathfinder
    Mars Exploration Rover Mission
    Spitzer Space Telescope
    Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter
    Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment (GRACE)
    Phoenix (spacecraft)
    Ocean Surface Topography Mission (OSTM/Jason-2)
    Orbiting Carbon Observatory
    Mars Science Laboratory
    Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer

    List of directors
    Theodore von Kármán, 1938 – 1944
    Frank Malina, 1944 – 1946
    Louis Dunn, 1946 – October 1, 1954
    William Hayward Pickering, October 1, 1954 – March 31, 1976
    Bruce C. Murray, April 1, 1976 – June 30, 1982
    Lew Allen, Jr., July 22, 1982 – December 31, 1990
    Edward C. Stone, January 1, 1991 – April 30, 2001
    Charles Elachi, May 1, 2001 – present[29]

    The JPL Advanced Projects Design Team, also known as Team X, is an interdisciplinary team of engineers that "utilizes concurrent engineering methodologies to complete rapid design, analysis and evaluation of mission concept designs".[30]

    On February 25, 2005, the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 was approved by the Secretary of Commerce.[31] This was followed by the Federal Information Processing Standards 201 (FIPS 201), which specified how the federal government should implement personal identity verification. New specifications led to a need for rebadging to meet the updated requirements.

    On August 30, 2007, a group of JPL employees filed suit in federal court against NASA, Caltech, and the Department of Commerce, claiming their Constitutional rights were being violated by new, overly invasive background investigations.[32] 97% of JPL employees were classified at the low-risk level and would be subjected to the same clearance procedures as those obtaining moderate/high risk clearance. Under HSPD12 and FIPS 201, investigators have the right to obtain any information on employees, which includes questioning acquaintances on the status of the employee's mental, emotional, and financial stability. Additionally, if employees depart JPL before the end of the two-year validity of the background check, no investigation ability gets terminated; former employees can still be legally monitored.

    Employees were told that if they did not sign an unlimited waiver of privacy,[33] they would be deemed to have "voluntarily resigned".[34] The rebadging rules were designed to make JPL compliant with FIPS 201. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the process violated the employees' privacy rights and has issued a preliminary injunction.[35] NASA appealed and the US Supreme Court granted certiorari on March 8, 2010. On January 19, 2011, the Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit decision, ruling that the background checks did not violate any constitutional privacy right that the employees may have had.[36]

    On March 12, 2012, Los Angeles Superior Court took opening statements on the case in which former-JPL employee David Coppedge brought suit against the lab due to workplace discrimination and wrongful termination. In the suit, Coppedge alleges that he first lost his "team lead" status on JPL's Cassini-Huygens mission in 2009 and then was fired in 2011 because of his evangelical Christian beliefs and specifically his belief in intelligent design. Conversely, JPL, through the Caltech lawyers representing the laboratory, allege that Coppedge's termination was simply due to budget cuts and his demotion from team lead was because of harassment complaints and from on-going conflicts with his co-workers.[37] Superior Court Judge Ernest Hiroshige issued a final ruling in favor of JPL on January 16, 2013.[38]


    1.Jump up ^ "Early Years". JPL.
    2.^ Jump up to: a b c Koppes, Clayton (1982). "JPL and the American Space Program". New Haven: Yale University Press.
    3.^ Jump up to: a b Conway, Erik M. "From Rockets to Spacecraft: Making JPL a Place for Planetary Science". Engineering and Science 30 (4). pp. 2–10.
    4.^ Jump up to: a b Launius, Roger (2002). To Reach High Frontier, A History of U.S. Launch Vehicles. University of Kentucky. pp. 39–42. ISBN [[Special:BookSources/0-313-12245-7|0-313-12245-7 [[Category:Articles with invalid ISBNs]]]] Check |isbn= value (help).
    5.Jump up ^ Keymeulen, Didier; Myers, John; Newton, Jason; Csaszar, Ambrus; Gan, Quan; Hidalgo, Tim; Moore, Jeff; Sandoval, Steven; Xu, Jiajing; Schon, Aaron; Assad, Chris; Stoica, Adrian. "Humanoids for Lunar and Planetary Surface Operations". Pasadena, CA : Jet Propulsion Laboratory, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2006. JPL TRS 1992+. hdl:2014/39699.
    6.Jump up ^ Bello, Francis (1959). "The Early Space Age". Fortune. Retrieved June 5, 2012.
    7.Jump up ^ Whalen, Mark; Murrill, Mary Beth (24 July 1998). "JPL will establish Near-Earth Object Program Office for NASA". Jet Propulsion Laboratory. NASA. Retrieved 19 February 2013.
    8.Jump up ^ "NASA scrambles for better asteroid detection". France 24. 18 February 2013. Retrieved 19 February 2013.
    9.Jump up ^ Women Made Early Inroads at JPL - NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Retrieved on 2013-07-21.
    10.Jump up ^ [1][dead link]
    11.Jump up ^ FO1 D. L. Ulery and J. P. Fearey, EVALUATION OF GOLDSTONE POLAR – MOUNT ANTENNA SYSTEMA'TIC ERRORS FROM STAR TRACKS, Technical Memorandum 33-45, May 5,1962 (Unclassified)
    12.Jump up ^ [2][dead link]
    13.Jump up ^ Directions - NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Retrieved on 2013-07-21.
    14.Jump up ^
    15.Jump up ^
    16.Jump up ^
    17.Jump up ^ "Planetary Science Summer School". Retrieved May 14, 2008.
    18.Jump up ^
    19.Jump up ^
    20.Jump up ^
    21.Jump up ^
    22.Jump up ^ "JPL Open House". Retrieved January 2, 2009.
    23.Jump up ^
    24.Jump up ^ Cohen, Bryan. "DHS staff members attend annual Day on the Hill". BioPrepWatch. February 10, 2014 (Retrieved 02-10-2014).
    25.Jump up ^
    26.Jump up ^ "NPR All Things Considered interview referring to peanuts tradition". Retrieved January 3, 2009.
    27.Jump up ^ "Planetary Society chat log for Phoenix referring to peanuts tradition". Retrieved January 3, 2009.
    28.Jump up ^ JPL. "NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory: Missions". Retrieved August 26, 2010.
    29.Jump up ^ "JPL Directors". JPL. Retrieved August 26, 2010.
    30.Jump up ^ "JPL Team X". August 31, 2007. Retrieved August 18, 2010.
    31.Jump up ^ HSPD-12 and JPL Rebadging Overview. HSPD12 JPL. Retrieved on 2013-07-21.
    32.Jump up ^ Overview. HSPD12 JPL. Retrieved on 2013-07-21.
    33.Jump up ^ US Office of Personnel Management. "Questionnaire for Non-Sensitive Positions" (PDF). Retrieved August 26, 2010.
    34.Jump up ^ "Declaration of Cozette Hart, JPL Human Resources Director" (PDF). October 1, 2007. Retrieved August 26, 2010.
    35.Jump up ^ "Nelson v. NASA -- Preliminary Injunction issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit" (PDF). Jan 11, 2008. Retrieved August 26, 2010.
    36.Jump up ^ National Aeronautics and Space Administration et al. v. Nelson et al., No. 09-530 (U.S. January 19, 2011).
    37.Jump up ^ "Former NASA specialist claims he was fired over intelligent design". Fox News. March 11, 2012.
    38.Jump up ^ "Judge confirms earlier ruling, sides with JPL in 'intelligent design' case". La Canada Valley Sun. January 17, 2013.

    The Top Nazi-Mason-Jesuit JPL Scientist

    Last edited by orthodoxymoron on Thu Feb 11, 2016 9:13 am; edited 2 times in total

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    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  magamud on Mon Apr 14, 2014 7:55 pm

    Jack Parsons worked for Hercules a spun off from Dupont and with heavy duty contracts with the first ICBM missles. Parsons was a genius in coincidentally ALCHEMY. Hercules is now ASHLAND which deals in WATER TREATMENT PLANTtS. Jack eventually got to the infamous JPL where his main bosses at CALTECH/JPL was Frank Malina who eventually worked for UNESCO under the ASSWIPE Julian Huxley of UNESCO/Leauge of Nations/United Nations etc.... Malina became head of UNESCO scientific research, Parsons also worked for Theodore von K?rm?n who won the first National Medal of Science presented by John F Kennedy. The Medal states The National Medal of Science depicts Man, surrounded by earth, sea, and sky, contemplating and struggling to understand Nature. The crystal in his hand represents the universal order and also suggests the basic unit of living things. The formula being outlined in the sand symbolizes scientific abstraction. But here is the jewel with Theodore, his ancestor is Judah Loew ben Bezalel who was a jewish mystic rabbi and is particularly known for the legend that he created The Golem of Prague, an animate being fashioned from clay, using mystical powers based on the esoteric knowledge of how God created Adam. Golem of Prague
    In modern Hebrew the word golem means "dumb" or "helpless"

    It was in 1942, the same year Parsons was appointed as head of the Agap? Lodge by Aleister Crowley (who himself had studied chemistry), that Parsons made the crucial breakthrough in the development of rocket solid fuel. Following intuition, Parsons switched from black powder to asphalt and potassium perchlorate.[5] Compared with Peenem?nde, America was finally in the race for rocket propulsion with solid fuel for the space age.

    Sara Northrup (aka "Sarah Elizabeth" or "Betty" Northrup), began living with Parsons and Parsons' wife, Sara's half-sister Helen Northrup; later, Parsons and Sara became involved in an affair, which caused strife with Helen and eventually led to Helen leaving with Wilfred Smith. Sara Northrup went on to marry author L. Ron Hubbard, who served as the occasional magical partner of Parsons, and who would later found the Church of Scientology.

    This is where the three stooges Parsons, Hubbard and Crowley started the Babylon workings:

    The rest shall we say is history......

    A stage play about Parsons by George Morgan, Pasadena Babalon, premiered at the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena in 2010.[21] It was directed by film and TV actor Brian Brophy.

    Phillip K Dick wrote a comic around Jack called Dr. Futurity
    Dr. Jim Parsons is a doctor from 2012, born in 1980. Abruptly, he undergoes involuntary time travel to 2405 CE, and finds that his profession is treated with disdain. In the future, the population is static, with no natural births; only a death can cause the formation of a new embryo. The result is a society ambivalent toward death, as controlled genetics ensures that each successive generation better benefits the human race as a whole. By killing off the weak, poverty and disease are eliminated, and humanity has an optimal chance for survival. Moreover, a single race derived from African Americans and Native Americans controls this future world, as caucasians have been wiped out or integrated centuries earlier.


    Posts : 7999
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    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  orthodoxymoron on Tue Apr 15, 2014 9:31 am

    Thank-you magamud. It seems as if one must sleep with the devil to get anywhere in this god-forsaken world. There are even some aspects of Judeo-Christianity which seem quite dark to me.
    mudra wrote:
    Laura Magdalene Eisenhower: ET invasion has already occurred and governments do not want us to know

    Love Always

    magamud wrote:I like these two, but they lose the truth when they don't acknowledge the Messiah.  They believe this is a Lucifer trick and then put their "Faith" into the Goddess and benevolent ET's.  And they have quite the detailed architecture about it and use empathy to reinforce it.  Im not judging them, its where they are in their power and evolution.  What happens is people see what they want to see.  They can't see Gods entire plan and how the cosmos really works with The Father, the son and the holy ghost.  So "their" story is mixed with half truths, because they are good people.  

    Its very simple.  Lets try to concept it.  There are 3 levels.  There is the Kingdom.  This is where truth reigns and light emanates from.  Then there is the Cosmic realm.  This is where ET's of all levels exist, mystics, avatars and any kind of inter dimensional beings.  Then there is the Mortal plain which we are on in Earth.  The dynamics with the Mortal plain and the Cosmic plain are the same.  To understand Good and Evil.  Its just the manifestations are different due to the variance in paradigms.  What these two are in is following the Cosmic drama of the timeline without knowing how the kingdom works with it.  So they are getting involved in Cosmic co dependence which benevolent ET's definitely don't want.  They are trying to evolve too.  And this points to the meaning of the Son of god or the Messiah.  The Messiah brings all realms together every once in a while or cycles or harvests.  He brings equality, transparency and shows the truth of existence.  

    People are very shortsighted with the power of God.  He never at anytime left you alone or our collective.  This is why he controlled the timeline with his prophets and gave us his Son and gave us Prophecy.  And god knows whatever he controls, will be exploited by Lucifer and his Legion, as to why he only does as little as possible and lets people choose for themselves, so they can grow in their own power.  This is the nature of Existence and growth in consciousness.  Godspeed people.
    orthodoxymoron wrote:I'll watch the video later today -- but I just wish to say that I am very paranoid regarding governance -- micro or macro. How does one determine who is REALLY in the Driver's-Seat -- and whether they are good for this civilization, or not?? Further, how do we know that we know anything about anything, with a high degree of certainty?? I lean toward Judeo-Christianity -- but there are literally hundreds (or thousands?) of versions of what that is, exactly. I keep providing study-lists regarding Judeo-Christianity -- but no one seems to notice. Who REALLY wrote the Bible -- and under what circumstances?? I am not at peace with the Bible. I have HUGE problems with human-sacrifice and mass-murder -- which are central to the substitutionary-atonement and apocalyptic-salvation. I keep wondering if Malevolent ET has been ruling humanity for thousands of years -- with other Malevolent ET Factions waiting for their turn to have their way with humanity. Talk of a Regime-Change doesn't exactly make me jump up and down with joy. It might take Bad ET to defeat Bad ET!! But then we're still stuck with Bad ET!! I'm seriously considering studying Intergalactic-Banking and Star-Warfare (as stupid as that sounds)!! I am VERY disillusioned regarding life, the universe, and everything.
    I hate to keep talking about my encounter with one who claimed to be a particular Ancient Egyptian Deity. I don't know who they really were -- but they were very smart, very tough, and somewhat sinister. They frankly scared me -- and they made me think they might've been close to the Top of the Pyramid (either directly, or as an ambassador). They made me think that we might not be dealing with Kind and Loving Gods and Goddesses. I sometimes joke about Nazis, Masons, and Jesuits -- sometimes as being three facets of one faction. But what if it takes Bad@$$ SOB's to run a solar system in a really violent and nasty universe!! What if we're really dealing with Zionists and Teutonic-Zionists at the highest levels of solar system governance?? I keep imagining a Really Bad@$$ War-Room at the center of solar system governance -- with some really frightening individuals (human and otherwise)!! I've joked about being a Token Nice-Guy Insider -- but just thinking about this makes me feel incredibly guilty and dirty. I get the feeling that it might be VERY Difficult to remain Good at the Top of the Pyramid. When I joke about a Reptilian-Human Nazi-Mason-Jesuit Agent-Attorney-Queen -- I'm Really NOT Joking!!!
    orthodoxymoron wrote:Thank-you magamud. What you wrote gets at the heart of a theory of mine. "The only real technology is nature. I suspect as we use entertainment for voyeurism to process our unconscious, other worlds use us, in the same way. Since our species cannot see, it is used like a hub for other species to play out their unconscious. They keep it unconscious, because it is believed this will forgo their responsibility. This is of course a great fallacy and what experience, evolution and awareness is all about." What if Earth-Humanity is a Fallen and Sinful Illegal-Creation in Lockdown?? What if the confusion, misery, and forbidden-pleasures of this dark world have somehow developed the souls in this solar-system in good and bad ways -- with the net-change being in the positive direction?? But what if the rest of the universe has been corrupted by watching this Theater of the Universe aka Theater of the Absurd?? "By beholding we become changed." What if Earth-Humanity has been a desperate and dangerous experiment -- designed to accelerate the evolution of the universe?? I have suggested the possibility of a very Ancient, Traditional, and Violent Other-Than-Human Universe -- with Earth-Humanity being a "Fly in the Ointment." I continue to feel as if I am in profound conflict with Divinity, Humanity, and Myself -- regardless of whether I wish to be, or not. I have been hinting at a very structured and organized responsible-democracy under the guidance of a benevolent minimalist-theocracy aka The United States of the Solar System. One would probably have to study this concept for decades to really "get it". I don't think I "get" my own internet posting. It might really require 122 years to properly analyze and implement such a concept. If it were presently dumped upon this solar system -- things might REALLY go to hell. I am extremely apprehensive regarding Disclosure-Events, Regime-Changes, and Apocalyptic-Salvation. The Revolutionary-Evolution of this Solar-System might get unimaginably nasty. If there were an all-out Solar-System Final-Jihad -- there might be nothing left -- nothing but one big asteroid-belt mixed with space-dust -- and I wish I were kidding. I've been told that we've done better than expected -- that things have worked-out well for humanity -- but that things continue to worsen -- and that I don't want to know what deals and treaties exist at the highest levels of this solar system. I've been told that humanity should never have been created -- and that we need to start over. I've been told that a Leader of Humanity will fail -- which will be followed by an extermination. I've heard that God was (and is?) prepared to start-over (regarding humanity) rather than change the way they govern the universe. Physicality and Governance seem to be the Key-Issues. Consider the concepts of Absolute-Ethics and Absolute-Obedience relative to Human-Nature, Divine-Sovereignty, and Responsible-Freedom. Consider reading the Bible (from cover to cover -- straight-through) in the context of Science-Fiction. Once again -- I'm not out to screw anyone or anything. I simply wish for things to work out well for all-concerned. Here is one more study-list (with scripture preferably in the KJV):

    1. Patriarchs and Prophets by Ellen White.
    2. Isaiah.
    3. Matthew.
    4. Job.
    5. Mark.
    6. Psalms.
    7. Luke.
    8. Proverbs.
    9. John.
    10. Ecclesiastes.
    11. Acts.
    12. The Desire of Ages by Ellen White.
    13. The 1928 Book of Common Prayer (and Liturgy).
    14. The Music of J.S. Bach.
    15. The Gods of Eden by William Bramley.
    16. The Federalist Papers (with US Constitution).
    17. Astronomy Textbooks.
    18. Science Fiction.

    All of this has as much to do with mental and spiritual conditioning as it has to do with any perception or conviction regarding absolute truth. Continue to focus upon Ethics, Law, Law-Enforcement, Governance, Spirituality, Physicality, Business, and Church-State Issues.

    Last edited by orthodoxymoron on Thu Feb 11, 2016 9:25 am; edited 4 times in total

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    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  magamud on Tue Apr 15, 2014 9:59 am

    It seems as if one must sleep with the devil to get anywhere in this god-forsaken world
    It is what it is...

    There are even some aspects of Judeo-Christianity which seem quite dark to me.
    If there weren't I would not think you sane. The question is can you find Gods love in the narrative. Do people even want to? There is so much mysticism or atheism to tempt you. Godspeed Ortho...


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    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  orthodoxymoron on Tue Apr 15, 2014 10:15 am

    Thank-you magamud. I keep quoting Ellen White -- but her writings are really quite Harsh and Royal-Model in nature. I doubt that she wrote her own writings -- but I often wonder who the true author really was?! They make me think of a British-Israel Queen!!! I use the writings of Ellen White to enhance my Queen-Theme within this thread!! I think it is VERY Important to understand Egypt, Israel, Germany, Rome, and London!! I've tried to conceptualize a Royal-Model United States of the Solar System -- as an idealistic and open version of That Which Presently Exists!! But really, this concept would probably have to be implemented and operated with an Iron-Fist (as contradictory as that sounds)!! I will continue to attempt to Positively-Reinforce That Which Presently Exists -- as Both Friend and Foe of Those in the Know!! I am NOT against any particular group or race. Those at the Top of the Pyramid might be quite bad -- yet if 'good-guys' took their place -- they might end-up being worse than the 'bad-guys'!! I wish to keep repeating that I have no animosity toward anyone in particular -- yet I am feeling worse and worse and worse about life, the universe, and everything. I feel horrible 24/7. I'm somewhat crabby and critical -- and I attempt to deal with this madness by being a smart@$$!!! Don't take it personally. More Sherry Shriner!!

    mudra wrote:
    orthodoxymoron wrote:I'll watch the video later today -- but I just wish to say that I am very paranoid regarding governance -- micro or macro. How does one determine who is REALLY in the Driver's-Seat -- and whether they are good for this civilization, or not?? Further, how do we know that we know anything about anything, with a high degree of certainty?? I lean toward Judeo-Christianity -- but there are literally hundreds (or thousands?) of versions of what that is, exactly. I keep providing study-lists regarding Judeo-Christianity -- but no one seems to notice. Who REALLY wrote the Bible -- and under what circumstances?? I am not at peace with the Bible. I have HUGE problems with human-sacrifice and mass-murder -- which are central to the substitutionary-atonement and apocalyptic-salvation. I keep wondering if Malevolent ET has been ruling humanity for thousands of years -- with other Malevolent ET Factions waiting for their turn to have their way with humanity. Talk of a Regime-Change doesn't exactly make me jump up and down with joy. It might take Bad ET to defeat Bad ET!! But then we're still stuck with Bad ET!! I'm seriously considering studying Intergalactic-Banking and Star-Warfare (as stupid as that sounds)!! I am VERY disillusioned regarding life, the universe, and everything.

    Oxy to me the real thing to fear is our own thoughts for freedom begins with our state of mind.

    Love for You
    orthodoxymoron wrote:Thank-you, mudra. In Communist-Russia and Nazi-Germany -- one might legitimately harbor fear and paranoia. They really might be out to get you -- especially if one were critical of the government. I understand inner-peace -- yet I also understand facing-reality and acting-responsibly.

    mudra wrote:
    orthodoxymoron wrote:Thank-you, mudra. In Communist-Russia and Nazi-Germany -- one might legitimately harbor fear and paranoia. They really might be out to get you -- especially if one were critical of the government. I understand inner-peace -- yet I also understand facing-reality and acting-responsibly.

    Inner peace to me is about knowning without an inch of a doubt that your are soul , that you are Spirit  so that when adversity comes and death is maybe your last experience on the line mind does't have you believe that this is the end. A confused mind is like a veil on Spirit. Your body maybe shivering in fear but who you really are, HeartSoul, is'nt stopped by that. On the contrary HeartSoul takes command and  faces whatever there is to face with full responsability for it knows well that life is more. There is no contradiction there Oxy.

    Love from me
    Thank-you mudra. I guess I'm dealing with some heavy-duty modeling and speculation -- which involves Angry and Jealous Gods -- who might meet me on the 'other-side' with unimaginable harshness -- especially in light of what I've posted on this website. It almost seems as if considering all possibilities, and solving the world's problems, is viewed with suspicion and scorn -- consequently placing one on multiple agency lists -- as a threat to who knows who and/or what. What's really scary to me, is that I seem to be getting more understanding and sympathetic toward the powers that be (human and otherwise)!

    What if Europe and Great Britain had been unified by Adolph Hitler -- with no unethical or violent activities whatsoever?? What if the Catholics, Anglicans, and Lutherans had unified around a reasonable common-denominator?? What if the Pope, Queen, and Hitler had held hands and sung kumbaya?? What if they had invited the rest of the world to join them -- with no pressure or violence whatsoever?? What might've happened if the Nazis hadn't waged war?? One source claims that the original plan was for Germany to NOT go to war!!

    Last edited by orthodoxymoron on Thu Feb 11, 2016 9:28 am; edited 3 times in total

    Posts : 7999
    Join date : 2010-09-28

    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  orthodoxymoron on Tue Apr 15, 2014 4:45 pm

    Thank-you magamud. I guess I didn't mean you personally. It's just that when a major public figure dies under violent and/or mysterious circumstances there seems to be a deep emotional connection to them for a lot of people. I am somewhat impolite regarding the Queen speculations I make -- but I have a combination of respect and contempt for that hypothetical phenomenon. Diana and Anna in the old and new 'V' series were hot, intelligent, articulate -- and VERY dangerous and cruel. I will continue to speculate about a Hostile Universe with Queens in Conflict. I have no idea regarding the various alleged alien races, angels, and archangels. Once again, I just take in a lot of information in a very passive and unscholarly manner -- and then I use my imagination. I'm going to listen to some more Alex Collier today and tomorrow. I like listening to Alex -- even if 90% of what he says is utter BS. I have no way of verifying any of it -- even though a lot of what he says rings true -- or at least makes me think deeply about difficult subjects.

    Try reading books by Ellen White and Desmond Ford -- for a British-Israel Royal-Model Gizeh-Intelligence Experience -- imagining Quetesh and Ba'al speaking the words in their Pyramid Spaceship!! I'm very, very strange, aren't I??!!

    I didn't pull that Reptilian-Human Nazi-Mason-Jesuit Agent-Attorney-Queen concept out of an anatomical black-hole. It takes in Ancient-Egypt, Pagan and Papal Rome, the Holy Roman Empire, All Four Reichs, Secret Societies, Ancient and Modern Advanced-Technology, the Secret Government, Ashtar Command, Gizeh Intelligence, Archangelic Conflict, Reptilian Queens, Galactic Chain of Command, Jurisprudence and Law-Enforcement, Matriarchy>Patriarchy Issues, etc, etc, etc. You might be amazed regarding who and what I conceptualize in connection with all of the above. I have no idea if this might have something to do with reincarnational flashbacks. This subject deeply frightens me -- despite all of the irreverent joking. I keep sensing a militaristic solar system core -- which might include a lot of the content of Earth: Final Conflict and Stargate SG-1. Raymond Sandoval was a trained attorney, FBI agent, secret-government employee -- who was working for an Alien Queen. I have also imagined Sandoval as being a Jesuit (or equivalent). I'm not sure exactly why. I listen to Sherry Shriner a lot -- and it wouldn't surprise me one little bit if she turns out to be the Queen of Nibiru -- but really I shouldn't be that bold. I guess I use her shows to fuel my fevered imagination. I live in a VERY strange mental and spiritual space. I don't think I'm possessed (the AED told me that I'd know it if I was -- and they advised me NOT to read Hostage to the Devil -- which sometimes results in possession) -- but I'm certain that I'm attacked and somewhat compromised. I'm fighting something 24/7 -- and most days I'm not sure who's side I'm on -- or who the good and bad guys and gals really are.

    I've recently been thinking it might be cool if everyone went through some sort of military training -- which might include the proper use of firearms. I've never owned guns (other than a BB gun) -- and I don't intend to ever get a gun -- but I strongly support the 2nd Amendment (with qualifications and regulations). I like the idea of stockpiling food, camping supplies, and medical supplies -- rather than stockpiling guns and ammo. The 2nd Amendment should be read as a whole -- and not chopped-up like it always is. A well-regulated militia should be part of the gun-ownership deal IMHO. Uncivil War and Martial Law might be nearly impossible to avoid in the next couple of decades. I see a Perfect Storm of problems in our future. Sorry about that. My optimism is long-term -- but not short-term. I will continue to say that I'm at war with humanity -- at war with divinity (the management of humanity -- which might be middle-management) -- and at war with myself. The whole thing stinks -- and even though I keep conceptualizing idealistic solutions -- I fear that things might get a lot worse before they get better -- if they get better.

    orthodoxymoron wrote:
    Beren wrote:
    orthodoxymoron wrote:I will continue to say that I'm at war with humanity -- at war with divinity (the management of humanity -- which might be middle-management) -- and at war with myself. The whole thing stinks -- and even though I keep conceptualizing idealistic solutions -- I fear that things might get a lot worse before they get better -- if they get better.

    maybe you need to see who is activating your personal energy so that you act like a ping pong ball-here and there .
    I am saying this with all sincerity and care.
    You write and spare a lot of energy on too many ideas.
    It sounds like a confusion my friend.

    In ultimate reality all is possible even here though consciousness to realize this is limited now.
    I see you as a good soul though a bit confused sometimes.
    But an awesome library of knowledge is within you, just focus! :)
    Thank-you Beren. Your kind counsel is always welcome -- and you have pointed-out that I am a confused-soul several times. I am still awaiting a detailed critique of my internet activities. I applied for an NSA FoIA half a year ago -- with no results. Are you pleased with the history of this solar system and its inhabitants?? Are the inmates well-behaved?? Has the insanity been well-managed?? Are you proud of yourself -- and satisfied with your mental and spiritual progress?? Namaste.

    Has anyone considered my suggestion that 168BC to 2133AD be viewed as the 2,300 year period referred to in Daniel 8:14?? If my concept of a United States of the Solar System were implemented in the next decade or two -- it might take until 2133AD to make the damn thing work -- especially regarding gaining universe-wide acceptance -- at least to the point where the universal powers that be would no longer wish to exterminate the human race. I doubt the historical Adventist interpretation -- and I doubt the Desmond Ford reinterpretation -- but I find both views highly instructive. I really think you esoteric researchers need to get your fingernails dirty and your hair messed-up with Biblical Research -- whether you like it or not. Consider Antiochus IV Epiphanes. What if Antiochus (on a soul-level) is the Antichrist -- and what if they have been running Earth at least since 168BC?? What if they will be completely disempowered by 2133AD?? What if Antiochus Epiphanes is Saint Germain??!! Once again, my posting is intended to make all of us think -- and I am NOT a scholar, a prophet, or a son of a prophet (that I know of). Please consider studying Daniel, Matthew, Hebrews, Revelation, the Book of Enoch, Desmond Ford's commentary on Daniel (1978) along with his Daniel 8:14 the Investigative Judgment and the Day of Atonement (1981), and The Great Controversy (EG White) -- side by side. This is NOT an easy way to go -- but if you wish to get out of jail -- you might wish to make the effort. Just a thought. I think there might be a Queen in this solar system who knows EXACTLY what I'm talking about -- and who might be on an intellectual level we can't even imagine. This doesn't mean that I like them -- or that I would bow-down and worship them -- but I am saying that we need to get with it if we want a seat at the table -- so to speak. Otherwise, the corrupt will continue to rule the stupid. World Without End or Reason. Amen Ra. Antiochus IV Epiphanes (pron.: /ænˈtaɪ.əkəs ɛˈpɪfəniːz/; Greek: Ἀντίοχος Ἐπιφανής, 'God Manifest';[1] c. 215 BC – 164 BC) ruled the Seleucid Empire from 175 BC until his death in 164 BC. He was a son of King Antiochus III the Great. His original name was Mithridates; he assumed the name Antiochus after he ascended the throne.

    Notable events during the reign of Antiochus IV include his near-conquest of Egypt, which led to a confrontation that became an origin of the metaphorical phrase, "line in the sand" (see below), and the rebellion of the Jewish Maccabees.

    Antiochus was the first Seleucid king to use divine epithets on coins, perhaps inspired by Bactrian Hellenistic kings who had earlier done so, or else building on the ruler cult that his father Antiochus the Great had codified within the Seleucid Empire. These epithets included Θεὸς Ἐπιφανής 'manifest god', and, after his defeat of Egypt, Νικηφόρος 'bringer of victory'.[2] However, Antiochus also tried to interact with common people, by appearing in the public bath houses and applying for municipal offices, and his often eccentric behavior and capricious actions led some of his contemporaries to call him Epimanes ("The Mad One"), a word play on his title Epiphanes.[1][3]

    Rise to power

    As the son and a potential successor of King Antiochus III, Antiochus became a political hostage of the Roman Republic following the Peace of Apamea in 188 BC. When his older brother, Seleucus IV followed his father onto the throne in 187 BC, Antiochus was exchanged for his nephew Demetrius I Soter (the son and heir of Seleucus). After King Seleucus was assassinated by Heliodorus, an usurper, in 175 BC, Antiochus in turn ousted him. Since Seleucus' legitimate heir, Demetrius I Soter, was still a hostage in Rome, Antiochus, with the help of King Eumenes II of Pergamum, seized the throne for himself, proclaiming himself co-regent for another son of Seleucus, an infant named Antiochus (whom he then murdered a few years later).[4]

    Wars against Egypt

    When the guardians of King Ptolemy VI of Egypt demanded the return of Coele-Syria in 170 BC, Antiochus launched a preemptive strike against Egypt, conquering all but Alexandria and capturing King Ptolemy. To avoid alarming Rome, Antiochus allowed Ptolemy VI to continue ruling as a puppet king. Upon Antiochus' withdrawal, the city of Alexandria chose a new king, one of Ptolemy's brothers, also named Ptolemy (VIII Euergetes). Instead of fighting a civil war, the Ptolemy brothers agreed to rule Egypt jointly.

    In 168 BC Antiochus led a second attack on Egypt and also sent a fleet to capture Cyprus. Before reaching Alexandria, his path was blocked by a single, old Roman ambassador named Gaius Popillius Laenas, who delivered a message from the Roman Senate directing Antiochus to withdraw his armies from Egypt and Cyprus, or consider themselves in a state of war with the Roman Republic. Antiochus said he would discuss it with his council, whereupon the Roman envoy drew a line in the sand around him and said, "Before you cross this circle I want you to give me a reply for the Roman Senate" – implying that Rome would declare war if the King stepped out of the circle without committing to leave Egypt immediately. Weighing his options, Antiochus decided to withdraw. Only then did Popillius agree to shake hands with him.[5]

    Sacking of Jerusalem and persecution of Jews

    Tetradrachm of Antiochus IV. Reverse shows the Greek inscription ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΑΝΤΙΟΧΟΥ ΘΕΟΥ ΕΠΙΦΑΝΟΥ ΝΙΚΗΦΟΡΟΥ ("Basileus Antiochus, God Manifest, Bearer of Victory"). While Antiochus was busy in Egypt, a rumor spread that he had been killed. The deposed High Priest Jason gathered a force of 1,000 soldiers and made a surprise attack on the city of Jerusalem. The High Priest appointed by Antiochus, Menelaus, was forced to flee Jerusalem during a riot. On the King's return from Egypt in 167 BC enraged by his defeat, he attacked Jerusalem and restored Menelaus, then executed many Jews.[6]“

    When these happenings were reported to the king, he thought that Judea was in revolt. Raging like a wild animal, he set out from Egypt and took Jerusalem by storm. He ordered his soldiers to cut down without mercy those whom they met and to slay those who took refuge in their houses. There was a massacre of young and old, a killing of women and children, a slaughter of virgins and infants. In the space of three days, eighty thousand were lost, forty thousand meeting a violent death, and the same number being sold into slavery.” — 2 Maccabees 5:11–14

    To consolidate his empire and strengthen his hold over the region, Antiochus decided to side with the Hellenized Jews by outlawing Jewish religious rites and traditions kept by observant Jews and by ordering the worship of Zeus as the supreme god (2 Maccabees 6:1–12). This was anathema to the Jews and when they refused, Antiochus sent an army to enforce his decree. Because of the resistance, the city was destroyed, many were slaughtered, and a military Greek citadel called the Acra was established.[7]“

    Not long after this the king sent an Athenian senator to force the Jews to abandon the customs of their ancestors and live no longer by the laws of God; also to profane the temple in Jerusalem and dedicate it to Olympian Zeus, and that on Mount Gerizim to Zeus the Hospitable, as the inhabitants of the place requested...They also brought into the temple things that were forbidden, so that the altar was covered with abominable offerings prohibited by the laws. A man could not keep the sabbath or celebrate the traditional feasts, nor even admit that he was a Jew. At the suggestion of the citizens of Ptolemais, a decree was issued ordering the neighboring Greek cities to act in the same way against the Jews: oblige them to partake of the sacrifices, and put to death those who would not consent to adopt the customs of the Greeks. It was obvious, therefore, that disaster impended. Thus, two women who were arrested for having circumcised their children were publicly paraded about the city with their babies hanging at their breasts and then thrown down from the top of the city wall. Others, who had assembled in nearby caves to observe the sabbath in secret, were betrayed to Philip and all burned to death.” — 2 Maccabees 6:1–11

    Maccabean revolt

    The First and Second Book of Maccabees painted the Maccabean Revolt as a national resistance of a foreign political and cultural oppression. Modern scholars argue that the king was intervening in a civil war between the traditionalist Jews in the country and the Hellenized Jews in Jerusalem.[8][9][10] According to Joseph P. Schultz:

    Modern scholarship on the other hand considers the Maccabean revolt less as an uprising against foreign oppression than as a civil war between the orthodox and reformist parties in the Jewish camp.[11]

    It seems that the traditionalists, with Hebrew/Aramaic names like Onias, contested with the Hellenizers with Greek names like Jason and Menelaus over who would be the High Priest.[12] Other authors point to possible socio/economic motives in addition to the religious motives behind the civil war.[13]

    What began in many respects as a civil war escalated when the Hellenistic kingdom of Syria sided with the Hellenizing Jews in their conflict with the traditionalists.[14] As the conflict escalated, Antiochus took the side of the Hellenizers by prohibiting the religious practices that the traditionalists had rallied around. This may explain why the king, in a total departure from Seleucid practice in all other places and times, banned the traditional religion of a whole people.[15]

    Final years

    Taking advantage of Antiochus' western problems, King Mithridates I of Parthia attacked from the east and seized the city of Herat in 167 BC, disrupting the direct trade route to India and effectively splitting the Greek world in two.

    Recognizing the potential danger in the east, but unwilling to give up control of Judea, Antiochus sent a commander named Lysias to deal with the Maccabees, while the King himself led the main Seleucid army against the Parthians. After initial success in his eastern campaign, including the reoccupation of Armenia, Antiochus died suddenly of disease in 164 BC.


    The reign of Antiochus was the last period of real strength for the Seleucid Dynasty, but in some ways his rule was also fatal to the Empire. Technically Antiochus IV was a usurper, and he left an infant son named Antiochus V Eupator as his only heir. The result was a series of civil wars between rival claimants to the throne, effectively crippling the Empire during a critical phase in the wars against Parthia.

    Jewish tradition

    Antiochus IV ruled the Jews from 175 to 164 BC. He is remembered as a major villain and persecutor in the Jewish traditions associated with Hanukkah, including the books of Maccabees and the "Scroll of Antiochus".[16] Rabbinical sources refer to him as הרשע harasha ("the wicked").[17]

    Daniel 8

    Jewish and Christian commentaries[18][19] view Antiochus IV as a possible candidate for being the "little horn" (Daniel 8:9) as mentioned in Daniel's vision in the Book of Daniel, Chapter 8.

    See also
    Abomination of Desolation
    The Wars of the Jews
    List of people who have been considered deities


    1.^ a b Encyclopædia Britannica Online: Antiochus IV Epiphanes
    2.^ C. Habicht, "The Seleucids and their rivals", in A. E. Astin, et al., Rome and the Mediterranean to 133 B.C., The Cambridge Ancient History, volume 8, p. 341
    3.^ Polybius 26.10
    4.^ M. Zambelli, "L'ascesa al trono di Antioco IV Epifane di Siria," Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzione Classica 38 (1960) 363–389
    5.^ Polybius 29.27.4, Livy 45.12.4ff.
    6.^ Josephus, Wars of the Jews 1:1:1–2
    7.^ 1 Maccabees 1:30–37; Witherington
    8.^ Telushkin, Joseph (1991). Jewish Literacy: The Most Important Things to Know about the Jewish Religion, Its People, and Its History. W. Morrow. p. 114. ISBN 0-688-08506-7.
    9.^ Johnston, Sarah Iles (2004). Religions of the Ancient World: A Guide. Harvard University Press. p. 186. ISBN 0-674-01517-7.
    10.^ Greenberg, Irving (1993). The Jewish Way: Living the Holidays. Simon & Schuster. p. 29. ISBN 0-671-87303-2.
    11.^ Schultz, Joseph P. (1981). Judaism and the Gentile Faiths: Comparative Studies in Religion. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ Press. p. 155. ISBN 0-8386-1707-7.
    12.^ Gundry, Robert H. (2003). A Survey of the New Testament. Zondervan. p. 9. ISBN 0-310-23825-0.
    13.^ Freedman, David Noel; Allen C. Myers, Astrid B. Beck (2000). Eerdmans Dictionary of the Bible. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing. p. 837. ISBN 0-8028-2400-5.
    14.^ Wood, Leon James (1986). A Survey of Israel's History. Zondervan. p. 357. ISBN 0-310-34770-X.
    15.^ Tchrikover, Victor. Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews.
    16.^ Vedibarta Bam — And You Shall Speak of Them: Megilat Antiochus The Scroll of the Hasmoneans
    17.^ Jewish Encyclopedia
    18.^ Christian commentaries on Daniel 8:9
    19.^ Jewish Encyclopedia: Book of Daniel

    As you know I am presently modeling and promoting Responsible-Freedom, Representative-Theocracy, and a Royal-Model Version of the American-System. Consider Libertariansim. First published Thu Sep 5, 2002; substantive revision Tue Jul 20, 2010

    Libertarianism, in the strict sense, is the moral view that agents initially fully own themselves and have certain moral powers to acquire property rights in external things. In a looser sense, libertarianism is any view that approximates the strict view. This entry will focus on libertarianism in the strict sense. For excellent discussion of the liberty tradition more generally (including classical liberalism), see Gaus and Mack (2004) and Barnett (2004).

    Libertarianism is sometimes identified with the principle that each agent has a right to maximum equal empirical negative liberty, where empirical negative liberty is the absence of forcible interference from other agents when one attempts to do things. (See, for example, Narveson 1988, 2000, Steiner 1994, and Narveson and Sterba 2010.) This is sometimes called “Spencerian Libertarianism” (after Herbert Spencer). It is usually claimed that this view is equivalent to above “self-ownership” version of libertarianism. Kagan (1994), however, has cogently argued that the former (depending on the interpretation) either leads to radical pacifism (the use of force is never permissible) or is compatible with a wide range of views in addition to the above “self-ownership” libertarianism. I shall not, however, attempt to assess this issue here. Instead, I shall simply focus on the above “self-ownership” version of libertarianism.

    Libertarianism can be understood as a basic moral principle or as a derivative one. It might, for example, be advocated as a basic natural rights doctrine. Alternatively, it might be defended on the basis of rule consequentialism or teleology (e.g., Epstein 1995, 1998; Rasmussen and Den Uyl 2005; or Shapiro 2007) or rule contractarianism (e.g., Narveson 1988 and roughly Lomasky 1987). Instrumental derivations of libertarianism appeal to considerations such as human limitations (e.g., of knowledge and motivation), incentive effects, administrative costs, the intrinsic value of liberty for the good life, etc. This entry will not address arguments for libertarian principles on the basis of other moral principles. Instead, it will simply address the plausibility of libertarian principles in their own right.

    Although libertarianism could be advocated as a full theory of moral permissibility, it is almost always advocated as a theory of justice in one of two senses. In one sense, justice is concerned with the moral duties that we owe others. It does not address impersonal duties (duties owed to no one) or duties owed to self. In a second sense, justice is concerned with the morally enforceable duties that we have. It does not address duties for which it is impermissible to use force to ensure compliance or to rectify (e.g., punish) non-compliance (e.g. a duty to see your mother on her birthday). We shall here consider libertarianism as a theory of justice in each sense.

    Libertarianism is often thought of as “right-wing” doctrine. This, however, is mistaken for at least two reasons. First, on social—rather than economic—issues, libertarianism tends to be “left-wing”. It opposes laws that restrict consensual and private sexual relationships between adults (e.g., gay sex, extra-marital sex, and deviant sex), laws that restrict drug use, laws that impose religious views or practices on individuals, and compulsory military service. Second, in addition to the better-known version of libertarianism—right-libertarianism—there is also a version known as “left-libertarianism”. Both endorse full self-ownership, but they differ with respect to the powers agents have to appropriate unowned natural resources (land, air, water, minerals, etc.). Right-libertarianism holds that typically such resources may be appropriated by the first person who discovers them, mixes her labor with them, or merely claims them—without the consent of others, and with little or no payment to them. Left-libertarianism, by contrast, holds that unappropriated natural resources belong to everyone in some egalitarian manner. It can, for example, require those who claim rights over natural resources to make a payment to others for the value of those rights. This can provide the basis for a kind of egalitarian redistribution.

    The best known early statement of (something close to) libertarianism is Locke (1690). The most influential contemporary work is Nozick (1974).
    •1. Self-Ownership
    •2. The Power to Appropriate Natural Resources: Libertarianism, Left and Right
    •3. Enforcement Rights: Prior Restraint and Rectification
    •4. Anarchism and the Minimal State
    •5. Some Ancillary Issues ◦5.1 Non-Autonomous Sentient Beings
    ◦5.2 Historical Principles and the Real World

    •6. Conclusion
    •Academic Tools
    •Other Internet Resources
    •Related Entries


    1. Self-Ownership

    Libertarianism holds that agents are, at least initially, full self-owners. Agents are (moral) full self-owners just in case they morally own themselves in just the same way that they can morally fully own inanimate objects. Below we shall distinguish between full (interpersonal) self-ownership and full political self-ownership. Many versions of libertarianism endorse only the latter.

    Full ownership of an entity consists of a full set of the following ownership rights: (1) control rights over the use of the entity: both a liberty-right to use it and a claim-right that others not use it, (2) rights to compensation if someone uses the entity without one's permission, (3) enforcement rights (e.g., rights of prior restraint if someone is about to violate these rights), (4) rights to transfer these rights to others (by sale, rental, gift, or loan), and (5) immunities to the non-consensual loss of these rights. Full ownership is simply a logically strongest set of ownership rights over a thing. There is some indeterminacy in this notion (since there can be more than one strongest set of such rights), but there is a determinate core set of rights (see below).

    At the core of full self-ownership, then, is full control self-ownership, the full right to control the use of one's person. Something like control self-ownership is arguably needed to recognize the fact there are some things (e.g., various forms of physical contact) that may not be done to a person without her consent, but which may be done with that consent. It wrongs an individual to subject her to non-consensual and unprovoked killing, maiming, enslavement, or forcible manipulation.

    Full-self ownership is sometimes thought to guarantee that the agent has a certain basic liberty of action, but this is not so. For if the rest of the world (natural resources and artifacts) is fully (“maximally”) owned by others, one is not permitted to do anything without their consent—since that would involve the use of their property. For example, as a result of one's trespass on their land, one may become their slave. The protection that self-ownership affords is a basic protection against others doing certain things to one, but not a guarantee of liberty. Even this protection, however, may be merely formal. A plausible thesis of self-ownership must allow that some rights (e.g., against imprisonment) may be lost if one violates the rights of others. Hence, if the rest of world is owned by others, then anything one does without their consent violates their property rights, and, as a result of such violations, one may lose some or all of one's rights of self-ownership. This point shows that, because agents must use natural resources (occupy space, breathe air, etc.), self-ownership on its own has no substantive implications. It is only when combined with assumptions about how the rest of the world is owned (and the consequences of violating those property rights) that substantive implications follow.

    Let us now consider five important objections to full self-ownership.

    One objection to full (interpersonal) self-ownership is that it denies that individuals have an obligation to help others in need, except through voluntary agreement or prior wrongdoing. Those who advocate libertarianism as a theory of the duties owed to others typically endorse full (interpersonal) self-ownership and are subject to this objection. They reject any such obligation on the ground that it induces a form of partial slavery.

    Those who advocate libertarianism as theory of enforceable duties, however, need not be subject to this objection. They can endorse full political self-ownership, without endorsing full (interpersonal) self-ownership. The two are the same except the former is silent about what duties one may owe to others and asserts instead that one has no enforceable duties to aid others, except those that arise from voluntary agreement and prior wrongdoing. Of course, many would still insist that we have non-voluntary enforceable duties to aid those in extreme need when we can do so at little cost to ourselves or others.

    The remaining objections apply to both interpersonal and political self-ownership, and hence I shall cease distinguishing them.

    A second objection also concerns situations in which individuals in extreme needed can greatly benefit from the involvement of an agent. Instead, however, of addressing whether the agent owes the individual a duty, or has an enforceable duty, to aid her, the question is whether others may use the agent's person without her consent to aid those in need. For example, is it permissible to gently push an innocent agent to the ground in order to save ten innocent lives? Full self-ownership (of both sorts) asserts that it is not. The rough idea is that individuals are normatively separate and their person may not be used non-consensually for the benefit of others.

    A third objection to full self-ownership is that it includes a right to make gifts of one's services, and that such gifts, when given from members of an older generation to members of a younger generation, can significantly disrupt the conditions of equality of opportunity. (Note that the right to make gifts of external things is not at issue here, since it does not follow from full self-ownership alone.) The right to make gifts of personal services can be defended by emphasizing how such gifts are an essential part of intimate personal relationships. Moreover, if a person has the right to perform an action for her own benefit, then she arguably also has the right to perform it for someone else's benefit. A possible reply here is that, although the donor may well have the power to make gifts of her services, the recipient may not have a right to the full benefit of those services (e.g., the benefits may not be immune to taxation).

    A fourth objection to full self-ownership is that it permits voluntary enslavement. Agents have, it claims, not only the right to control the use of their person, but also the right to transfer that right (e.g., by sale or gift) to others. Some libertarians—such as Rothbard (1982) and Barnett (1998, pp. 78–82)—deny that such transfer is even possible, since others cannot control one's will. This, however, seems to be a mistake, since what is at issue is the moral right to control permissible use (by giving or denying permission), not the psychological capacity to control. Many authors—such as Locke (1690) and Grunebaum (1987)—deny that the rights over oneself are so transferable, typically on the ground that such transfers undermine one's autonomy. One might, however, reply that the right to exercise one's autonomy is more fundamental than the protection or promotion of one's autonomy. (For elaboration, see Vallentyne 1998. See also Steiner 1994.)

    A fifth objection to full self-ownership is that it (like rights in general) can lead to inefficient outcomes. Where there are externalities or public goods (such as police protection), each person may be better off if some of each person's rights are infringed (e.g., if each person is required to provide service each week on a police patrol). Given the problems generated by prisoners' dilemmas and other kinds of market failure, in large societies it will typically be impossible to obtain everyone's consent to perform such services. Given the importance of such services, it is arguably permissible to force individuals to provide certain services (in violation of full self-ownership) as long as everyone benefits appropriately.

    2. The Power to Appropriate Natural Resources: Libertarianism, Left and Right

    Libertarianism is committed to full self-ownership. A distinction can be made, however, between right-libertarianism and left-libertarianism, depending on the stance taken on how natural resources can be owned. (Throughout, I use “resource” in the weak sense of “stuff” in the world, with no assumption about whether it has any value to individuals. The term is often used in a more restrictive sense.)

    One possible view holds that initially no one has any liberty right to use, or any moral power to appropriate, natural resources. A radical version of joint-ownership left-libertarianism, for example, holds that individuals may use natural resources only with the collective consent (e.g., majority or unanimous) of the members of society. Given that all action requires the use of some natural resources (land, air, etc.), this leaves agents no freedom of action (except with the permission of others), and this is clearly implausible. A less radical version of joint-ownership left-libertarianism allows that agents may use natural resources, but holds that they have no moral power to appropriate natural resources without the collective consent of the members of society (e.g., Grunebaum 1987). Although this leaves agents a significant range of freedom of action, it leaves them little security in their plans of action. They have the security that others are not permitted to use their person (e.g., assault them) without their consent, but they have only limited security in their possessions of external things (except with the consent of others). Agents are permitted to cultivate and gather apples, but others are permitted to take them when this violates no rights of self-ownership (e.g., when they can simply take them from the collected pile).

    Given the central importance of security of some external resources, it is implausible that agents have no power to appropriate without the consent of others. More specifically, it is most implausible to hold that the consent of others is required for appropriation when communication with others is impossible, extremely difficult, or expensive (as it almost always is). And even when communication is relatively easy and costless, there is no need for the consent of others as long as one appropriates no more than one's fair share. Joint-ownership left-libertarianism is thus implausible.

    A plausible account of liberty rights and powers of appropriation over natural resources must, I claim, be unilateralist in the sense that, under a broad range of conditions (1) agents are initially permitted to use natural resources without anyone's consent, and (2) agents initially have the power to appropriate (acquire rights over) natural resources without anyone's consent. This is just to say that initially natural resources are not protected by a property rule (which requires consent for permissible use or appropriation).

    According to a unilateralist conception of the power to appropriate, agents who first claim rights over a natural resource acquire those rights—perhaps provided that certain other conditions are met. These additional conditions may include some kind of an interaction constraint (such as that the agent “mixed her labor” with the resource or that she was the first to discover the resource) and some kind of “fair share” constraint. In what follows, for simplicity, I shall ignore the interaction constraint and focus on the fair share constraint.

    Let us, then, consider some unilateralist versions of libertarianism. Radical right libertarianism— advocated, for example, by Rothbard (1978, 1982), Narveson (1988, ch. 7; 1999), and Feser (2005)—holds that that there are no fair share constraints on use or appropriation.[1] Agents may destroy whatever natural resources they want (as long as they violate no one's self-ownership) and they have the power to appropriate whatever natural resources they first claim. On this view, natural resources are initially not merely unprotected by a property rule (i.e., permissible use does not require anyone else's permission); they are also unprotected by a compensation liability rule (i.e., no compensation is owed if one uses). A main objection to this view is that no human agent created natural resources, and there is no reason that the lucky person who first claims rights over a natural resource should reap all the benefit that the resource provides. Nor is there any reason to think the individuals are morally permitted to ruin or monopolize natural resources as they please. Some sort of fair share condition restricts use and appropriation.

    Consider Lockean libertarianism, which allows unilateral use and appropriation but requires the satisfaction of some version of the Lockean proviso that “enough and as good” be left for others. Lockean libertarianism views natural resources as initially unprotected by any property rule (no consent is needed for use or appropriation) but as protected by a compensation liability rule. Those who use natural resources, or claim rights over them, owe compensation to others for any wrongful costs imposed.

    Nozickean right-libertarianism—advocated, for example, by Nozick (1974)—interprets the Lockean proviso as requiring that no individual be made worse off by the use or appropriation of a natural resource compared with non-use or non-appropriation.[2] One might object that this sets the compensation payment too low. It bases compensation on each person's reservation price, which is the lowest payment that would leave the individual indifferent with non-use or non-appropriation. Use or appropriation of natural resources typically brings significant benefits even after providing such compensation. There is little reason, one might argue, to hold that those who first use or claim rights over a natural resource should reap all the excess benefits that those resources provide.

    Sufficientarian (centrist) libertarianism—such as something in the spirit of Simmons (1992, 1993) or Lomasky (1987)—interprets the Lockean proviso as requiring that others be left an adequate share of natural resources (on some conception of adequacy). There are different criteria that can be invoked for adequacy, but the most plausible ones are based on the quality of one's life prospects: enough for life prospects worth living, enough for basic subsistence life prospects, or enough for “minimally decent” life prospects. Depending on the nature of the world and the conception of adequacy, the sufficientarian proviso may be more, or less, demanding than the Nozickean proviso. If natural resources are sufficiently abundant relative to the individuals, then Nozickean proviso will be more demanding (since many individuals would get more than an adequate share without the use or appropriation), but if natural resources are sufficiently scarce, then the sufficientarian proviso will be more demanding than the Nozickean one.

    Although sufficientarian libertarianism may be more sensitive than Nozickean libertarianism to the quality of life prospects left to others, some libertarians, left-libertarians, argue that it nevertheless fails to recognize the extent to which natural resources belong to all of us in some egalitarian manner. Suppose that there are enough natural resources to give everyone fabulous life prospects, and someone appropriates (or uses) natural resources leaving others only minimally adequate life prospects and generating ultra fabulously life prospects for herself. Left-libertarians argue that it is implausible to hold that those who first use or claim a natural resource are entitled to reap all the benefits in excess of what is needed to leave others adequate life prospects. Natural resources were not created by any human agent and their value, they argue, belongs to all of us in some egalitarian manner.

    Let us now consider left-libertarianism. It holds that natural resources initially belong to everyone in some egalitarian manner.[3] We have already rejected one version—joint-ownership left-libertarianism—for failing to be unilateralist (i.e., because it requires the permission of others for use or appropriation of unowned natural resources). We shall now focus on Lockean (and hence unilateralist) versions of left-libertarianism.

    Equal share left-libertarianism—advocated, for example, by Henry George (1879) and Hillel Steiner (1994)—interprets the Lockean proviso as requiring that one leave an equally valuable share of natural resources for others. Individuals are morally free to use or appropriate natural resources, but those who use or appropriate more than their per capita share owe others compensation for their excess share.

    Even equal share libertarianism, one might argue, is not sufficiently egalitarian. Although it requires that the competitive value of natural resources be distributed equally, it does nothing to offset disadvantages in unchosen internal endowments (e.g., the effects of genes or childhood environment). Equal share libertarianism is thus compatible with radically unequal life prospects.[4]

    Consider, then, equal opportunity left-libertarianism advocated, for example, by Otsuka (2003).[5] It interprets the Lockean proviso as requiring that one leave enough for others to have an opportunity for well-being that is at least as good as the opportunity for well-being that one obtained in using or appropriating natural resources. Individuals who leave less than this are required to pay the full competitive value of their excess share to those deprived of their fair share. Unlike the equal share view, those whose initial internal endowments provide less favorable effective opportunities for well-being are entitled to larger shares of natural resources. Although this version of libertarianism is highly egalitarian, it limits the egalitarianism to the distribution of the value of the natural resources. Full self-ownership still places constraints on the promotion of equality: Individuals are not morally required to provide personal services or body parts merely because they have more valuable personal endowments.

    3. Enforcement Rights: Prior Restraint and Rectification

    So far, we have addressed the core libertarian rights of full self-ownership and the right to appropriate natural resources. A complete libertarian theory must also specify what enforcement rights individuals have when others violate their rights. The idea of full self-ownership does not include a full specification of enforcement rights. This is because the relevant idea is universal full self-ownership (i.e., every agent being a full self-owner), and this notion is indeterminate with respect to enforcement rights (as well as compensation rights). For a given individual, a maximal set of self-ownership rights would include both a full immunity against loss even if the agent violates the rights of others (and hence others would not be permitted to use non-consensual force against her ever) and maximal enforcement rights against others (which would permit the agent to use force against others in order to prevent their violation of her rights). This set of rights, however, is not universalizable. If one agent has the strong immunity to loss of rights, then other agents cannot have the strong enforcement rights (which require the offending agent to have lost some of her rights of self-ownership). Thus, full (universalizable) self-ownership can include no enforcement rights (but a full immunity to loss), or full enforcement rights (but no immunity to loss for rights violations), or anything in between. (On the issue of indeterminacy, see Fried (2004, 2005) and Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka (2005).

    One possible position is extreme pacifism, according to which individuals are never permitted to use non-consensual force against others. Another is moderate pacifism, according to which individuals are permitted to use non-consensual force against others only when necessary in self-defense (or the defense of others). This moderate view would allow the use of force against a person to prevent her from wrongfully using force against others, but it would not allow the use of force to rectify past violations (e.g., punish or extract compensation from the rights-violator). Most libertarian positions would allow the use of force for cases of rectification. Many would allow the use of force for retributive punishment, but some—Barnett (1998), for example—reject retributive punishment and insist that compensation for wrongful harms is the sole justification for the rectificatory use of force.

    4. Anarchism and the Minimal State

    Libertarianism holds that many of the powers of the modern welfare state are morally illegitimate. Agents of the state violate the rights of citizens when they punish, or threaten to punish, a person for riding a motorcycle without a helmet, for taking drugs, for refusing to serve in the military, for engaging in consensual sexual relations in private, or for gambling. Furthermore, agents of the state violate the rights of citizens when they force, or threaten to force, individuals to transfer their legitimately held wealth to the state in order to provide for pensions, to help the needy, or to pay for public goods (e.g., parks or roads). (Left-libertarians object to such transfers to the extent that these are in excess of what is owed for the appropriation of natural resources.) Some libertarian-leaning theorists—such as Hayek (1960)—argue that it is legitimate to force people to pay their fair share of the costs of providing basic police services (i.e., protection of the libertarian rights and prosecution of those who violate them), but it's hard to see how this could be legitimate on right-libertarian grounds. If one does not voluntarily agree to share one's wealth in this way, the mere fact that one reaps a benefit from the services does not, on libertarian grounds, generate an enforceable duty to pay one's fair share.[6]

    One objection, then, that libertarians raise against the modern welfare state is that it uses force, or the threat thereof, to restrict people's freedom to engage in activities that do not violate anyone's rights. A second objection is that the modern welfare state—and most states generally—uses force, or the threat thereof, to restrict people's freedom to use force to protect and enforce their own rights. Although most states recognize a right to use force in self-defense, few states recognize a legal right to forcibly extract compensation from, or punish, a person who has violated one's rights. States typically punish those who attempt to impose the relevant rectification—even if the private citizens impose the very same rectification that the state would impose. Non-pacifist libertarians, however, deny this. Each individual has the right to enforce his rights in various ways, and these are not lost unless the individual voluntarily gives them up. The objection here, then, is not that agents of the state enforce people's rights (which they are perfectly entitled to do if the protected person so wishes), but rather that the state uses force to prevent citizens from directly enforcing their own rights.

    The above objections to the modern welfare state would be made both by right-libertarians and left-libertarians. Left-libertarians, however, can endorse certain “state-like” activities that right-libertarians reject. For on most left-libertarian views, individuals have an enforceable duty to pay others for the value of the rights that they claim over natural resources. Individuals seeking economic justice could form organizations that, under certain conditions, could force individuals to give them the payment they owe for their rights over natural resources, and could then transfer the payments to the individuals who are owed payments (after deducting a fee for the service, if the person agrees). The organization could also provide various public goods such as basic police services, national defense, roads, parks, and so on. By providing such public goods, the value of the rights claimed over natural resources by individuals will increase (e.g., rights over land for which police protection is provided are more valuable than rights over that land without police protection). Such public goods could be provided when and only when they would be self-financing based on the increased rents that they generate.

    Such “justice-promoting” organizations engage in many of the activities of the modern states, and left-libertarianism can accept the legitimacy of such activities. There are, however, three important qualifications. First, organizational activities are limited to enforcing people's libertarian rights and to enhancing people's opportunities by providing public goods. Force is never used to restrict activities that violate no libertarian rights. Second, no monopoly on such activities is claimed. There may be many organizations providing such services. Third and finally, the agents of the organization are permitted to use force to make an individual make her payment for the value of rights over natural resources only if such use is, in some suitable sense, the most reliable way of ensuring that she discharges her duty. Corrupt or inefficient organizations are not permitted to use force to collect such payments. Furthermore, even honest and efficient organizations are not so permitted when the individual owing the payment will voluntarily make the payment directly to the relevant parties. (For elaboration, see Vallentyne, 2007.)

    Libertarianism, then, is not only critical of the modern welfare state, but of states in general. Given that so much of modern life seems to require a state, libertarianism's anarchist stance is a powerful objection against it. In reply, libertarians argue that (1) many of the effects of states are quite negative, (2) many of the positive effects can be obtained without the state through voluntary mechanisms, and (3) even if some positive effects cannot be so obtained, the ends do not justify the means in these cases.

    5. Some Ancillary Issues

    5.1 Non-Autonomous Sentient Beings

    Libertarianism asserts that each autonomous agent initially fully owns herself and that agents have moral power to acquire property rights in natural resources and artifacts. What is the status of non-autonomous beings—such as children and many animals—that have moral standing (e.g., because sentient)? One possible reply is to deny that there are any non-autonomous beings with moral standing (e.g., because only beings capable of having moral duties—agents—are owed any duties). Non-autonomous beings are simply things to be used. As such, they can be the full private property of agents. Few people, however, will accept that position. Children are not the full private property of their parents. Dogs may not be tortured for fun. Another possibility is to hold that non-autonomous sentient beings are also full self-owners, where the rights involved are understood as protecting their interests rather than their choices (see, for example, Vallentyne 2002). This, of course, would have the wild implication that rats are protected by rights of self-ownership. Perhaps there is some plausible intermediate position, but if so, it has not yet been developed adequately. (See Steiner 1999 for one attempt.)

    5.2 Historical Principles and the Real World

    According to libertarianism, the justice of the current distribution of legal rights over resources depends on what the past was like. Given that the history of the world is full of systematic violence (genocide, invasion, murder, assault, theft, etc.), we can be sure that the current distribution of legal rights over resources did not come about justly and that adequate reparations have not been made. At the same time, however, we have little knowledge of the specific rights violations that took place in the past (e.g., we have little knowledge of all but the most egregious rights violations that took place more than one hundred years ago). Thus, we have little knowledge of what justice today requires.

    The epistemic problem confronting libertarianism is similar to that confronting utilitarianism and other consequentialist theories. Consequentialist theories require knowledge of the entire future that will result from each possible action, and we have very little such knowledge. Libertarianism requires knowledge of the entire past, and we have very little such knowledge. The appropriate answer in both cases is that the facts determine what is just, and we should simply make our best judgments about what is just based on what we know. Moral reality is complex, and it's not surprising that it's extremely difficult to know what is permissible.

    In the case of libertarianism, an additional response is possible. One could hold that there is a moral statute of limitations for rights violations. After the passage of enough time—or perhaps, after the passage of enough time during which no claim for rectification is made—the right of rectification for a specific past rights-violation may cease to be valid. If the period of time is short enough (e.g., 100 years), this would radically reduce the epistemic problem. It's not clear, however, that there is a plausible principled libertarian justification (as opposed to a practical one) for such a statute of limitations.

    6. Conclusion

    Libertarianism is attractive because (1) it provides significant moral liberty of action, (2) it provides significant moral protection against interference from others, and (3) it is sensitive to what the past was like (e.g., what agreements were made and what rights violations took place). It faces, however, the serious objection that it gives too much protection from interference and not enough attention to making the future better (e.g., by meeting people's basic needs, making people's lives go better, or promoting equality). As with all prominent moral and political theories, the overall assessment of libertarianism is a matter of on-going debate.


    Barnett, R., 1998, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Epstein, R.A., 1995, Simple Rules for a Complex World, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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    Feser, E., 2005, “There Is No Such Thing As An Unjust Initial Acquisition,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 22: 56–80.
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    Hayek, F.A., 1960, The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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    Locke, J., 1690, Two Treatises of Government, P. Laslett (ed.), New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960. Extract reprinted in Vallentyne and Steiner, 2000b.
    Machan, T. (ed.), 1974, The Libertarian Alternative: Essays in Social and Political Philosophy, Chicago: Nelson-Hall Company.
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    Machan, T. and Rasmussen, D. (eds.), 1997, Liberty for the 21st Century, Latham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
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    Related Topics
    Barnett, R. E., 2004, “The Moral Foundations of Modern Libertarianism,” in P. Berkowitz (ed.), Varieties of Conservatism in America, Stanford: Hoover Press, pp. 51–74.
    Christman, J., 1994, The Myth of Property, New York: Oxford University Press.
    Gaus, G. and Mack, E., 2004, “Libertarianism and Classical Liberalism,” A Handbook of Political Theory, G. Gaus and C. Kukathus (eds.), London: Routledge, pp. 115–129.
    Kagan, S., 1994, “The Argument from Liberty,” in In Harm's Way: Essays in honor of Joel Feinberg, J. Coleman and A. Buchanan (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 16–41.
    Sanders, J and J. Narveson (eds.), 1996, For and Against the State, London: Rowman & Littlefield.
    Skoble, A., 2008, Deleting the State, New York: Open Court Press.
    Simmons, A.J., 1992, The Lockean Theory of Rights, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    Simmons, A.J., 1993, On the Edge of Anarchy, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    Sreenivasan, G., 1995, The Limits of Lockean Rights in Property, New York: Oxford University Press.
    Vallentyne, P., 2002, “Equality and the Duties of Procreators,” in Children and Political Theory, D. Archard and C. MacLeod (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Vallentyne, P., 2007, “Libertarianism and the State,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 24: 187–205.

    Last edited by orthodoxymoron on Thu Feb 11, 2016 9:32 am; edited 2 times in total

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    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  orthodoxymoron on Wed Apr 16, 2014 1:21 pm

    I continue to use Wikipedia because of the brief summaries and fresh nature of the information -- but NOT for scholarly reasons. Again, I am attempting to give us a mental and spiritual exercise -- rather than creating a Doctoral Dissertation. Consider one of the latest Alex Collier interviews. Consider Nibiru. By some accounts, Nibiru was on the outskirts of the solar system (in a somewhat circular orbit) -- but is now within the solar system, and heading toward us with great speed. I had made a suggestion that Nibiru remain safely beyond the orbit of Pluto -- and possibly become part of a United States of the Solar System. For a while it seemed as if this might be a possibility -- even though I have no inside information -- and I have no idea regarding the true nature of Nibiru and its inhabitants -- or even if it exists at all. I keep hearing about a Regime-Change which probably won't be a change for the better. I have no idea. Are we in the process of getting passed from one bully to another??? If so, this was NOT my intent relative to proposing an idealistic United States of the Solar System. I was merely seeking an alternative to Armageddon, World War III, Alien Invasions, and More Bullshit from the Usual Sources. I simply wished for things to improve. Well, I am becoming more and more cynical and despondant regarding the true nature of the universe. I am seeing it as being hostile toward Earth-Humanity and Responsible-Freedom. I am VERY afraid at this point. I wish to just get along with everyone in the universe -- and be a happy-camper holding-hands and singing Kumbaya -- but this seems to NOT be an option. I have more recently been thinking that MY version of a United States of the Solar System might not become a reality until at least 2133AD. I've been rethinking Daniel 8:14 and the Cleansing of the Sanctuary -- by virtue of the Apotelesmatic-Principle. I like seeing Patterns in the Clouds. I keep thinking that what has been happening within this solar system for thousands of years has been authorized at the highest levels of galactic governance. Please reconsider Daniel 8:14 and tell me what you think. I'm presently seeing prophecy as being more of a nasty sentence than a history of the future via absolute supernatural foreknowledge. Can Freedom and Prophecy Peacefully Coexist?? Nuff Said. Namaste.

    The Nibiru cataclysm is a supposed disastrous encounter between the Earth and a large planetary object (either a collision or a near-miss) which certain groups believe will take place in the early 21st century. Believers in this doomsday event usually refer to this object as Planet X or Nibiru. The idea that a planet-sized object could collide with or pass by Earth in the near future is not supported by any scientific evidence and has been rejected as pseudoscience by astronomers and planetary scientists.[1]

    The idea was first put forward in 1995 by Nancy Lieder, founder of the website ZetaTalk. Lieder describes herself as a contactee with the ability to receive messages from extra-terrestrials from the Zeta Reticuli star system through an implant in her brain. She states that she was chosen to warn mankind that the object would sweep through the inner Solar System in May 2003 (though that date was later abandoned) causing Earth to undergo a pole shift that would destroy most of humanity. The prediction has subsequently spread beyond Lieder's website and has been embraced by numerous Internet doomsday groups, most of which linked the event to the 2012 phenomenon. Although the name "Nibiru" is derived from the works of the late ancient astronaut writer Zecharia Sitchin and his interpretations of Babylonian and Sumerian mythology, Sitchin denied any connection between his work and various claims of a coming apocalypse.

    The idea of the Nibiru encounter originated with Nancy Lieder, a Wisconsin woman who claims that as a girl she was contacted by gray extraterrestrials called Zetas, who implanted a communications device in her brain. In 1995, she founded the website ZetaTalk to disseminate her ideas.[2] Lieder first came to public attention on Internet newsgroups during the build-up to Comet Hale–Bopp's 1997 perihelion. She stated, claiming to speak as the Zetas, that "The Hale-Bopp comet does not exist. It is a fraud, perpetrated by those who would have the teeming masses quiescent until it is too late. Hale-Bopp is nothing more than a distant star, and will draw no closer."[3] She claimed that the Hale-Bopp story was manufactured to distract people from the imminent arrival of a large planetary object, "Planet X", which would soon pass by Earth and destroy civilization.[3] After Hale-Bopp's perihelion revealed it as one of the brightest and longest-observed comets of the last century,[4] Lieder removed the first two sentences of her initial statement from her site, though they can still be found in Google's archives.[3] Her claims eventually made the New York Times.[5]

    Lieder described Planet X as roughly four times the size of the Earth, and said that its closest approach would occur on May 27, 2003, resulting in the Earth's rotation ceasing for exactly 5.9 terrestrial days. This would be followed by the Earth's pole destabilising in a pole shift (a physical pole shift, with the Earth's pole physically moving, rather than a geomagnetic reversal) caused by magnetic attraction between the Earth's core and the magnetism of the passing planet. This in turn would disrupt the Earth's magnetic core and lead to subsequent displacement of the Earth's crust.[6]

    After Lieder, the first person to propagate her Planet X idea was Mark Hazlewood, a former member of the ZetaTalk community, who in 2001 published a book titled Blindsided: Planet X Passes in 2003. Lieder would later accuse him of being a confidence trickster.[7] A Japanese cult called the Pana Wave Laboratory, which blocked off roads and rivers with white cloths to protect itself from electromagnetic attacks, also warned that the world would end in May 2003 after the approach of a tenth planet.[8]

    Roughly a week before the supposed arrival of Planet X, Lieder appeared on KROQ-FM radio in Los Angeles, and advised listeners to put their pets down in anticipation of the event. When asked if she had done so, she replied that she had, and that "The puppies are in a happy place." She also advised that "A dog makes a good meal".[9] After the 2003 date passed without incident, Lieder said that it was merely a "White Lie ... to fool the establishment."[10] She refused to disclose the true date, saying that to do so would give those in power enough time to declare martial law and trap people in cities during the shift, leading to their deaths.[11]

    Though Lieder herself has not specified a new date for the object's return, many groups have taken up her idea and cited their own dates. One frequently cited date was December 21, 2012. This date had many apocalyptic associations, as it was the end of a cycle (baktun) in the long count in the Mayan calendar. Several writers published books connecting the encounter with 2012.[12] Despite that date having passed, many websites still contend that Nibiru/Planet X is en route to Earth.

    Zecharia Sitchin and Sumer

    Although Lieder originally referred to the object as "Planet X", it has become deeply associated with Nibiru, a planet from the works of ancient astronaut proponent Zecharia Sitchin, particularly his book The 12th Planet. According to Sitchin's interpretation of Babylonian religious texts, which contradicts conclusions reached by credited scholars on the subject,[13][14] a giant planet (called Nibiru or Marduk) passes by Earth every 3,600 years and allows its sentient inhabitants to interact with humanity. These beings, which Sitchin identified with the Annunaki of Sumerian myth, would become humanity's first gods.[15] Lieder first made the connection between Nibiru and her Planet X on her site in 1996 ("Planet X does exist, and it is the 12th Planet, one and the same.").[16]

    However, Sitchin, who died in 2010, denied any connection between his work and Lieder's claims. In 2007, partly in response to Lieder's proclamations, Sitchin published a book, The End of Days, which set the time for the last passing of Nibiru by Earth at 556 BC, which would mean, given the object's supposed 3,600-year orbit, that it would return sometime around AD 2900.[17] He did however say that he believed that the Annunaki might return earlier by spaceship, and that the timing of their return would coincide with the shift from the astrological Age of Pisces to the Age of Aquarius, sometime between 2090 and 2370.[18]

    Scientific rejection

    Astronomers reject the idea of Nibiru, and have made efforts to inform the public that there is no threat to Earth.[19] They point out that such an object so close to Earth would be easily visible to the naked eye. A planet such as Nibiru would create noticeable effects in the orbits of the outer planets.[20] Some counter this by claiming that the object has been concealed behind the Sun for several years, though this would be geometrically impossible.[12] Most photographs showing "Nibiru" by the Sun are in fact of lens flares, false images of the Sun created by reflections within the lens.[21]

    Astronomer Mike Brown notes that if this object's orbit were as described, it would only have lasted in the Solar System for a million years or so before Jupiter expelled it, and that there is no way another object's magnetic field could have such an effect on Earth.[22] Lieder's assertions that the approach of Nibiru would cause the Earth's rotation to stop or its axis to shift violate the laws of physics. In his rebuttal of Immanuel Velikovsky's Worlds in Collision, which made the same claim that the Earth's rotation could be stopped and then restarted, Carl Sagan noted that, "the energy required to brake the Earth is not enough to melt it, although it would result in a noticeable increase in temperature: The oceans would [be] raised to the boiling point of water ... [Also,] how does the Earth get started up again, rotating at approximately the same rate of spin? The Earth cannot do it by itself, because of the law of the conservation of angular momentum."[23]

    In a 2009 interview with the Discovery Channel, Mike Brown noted that, while it is not impossible that the Sun has a distant planetary companion, such an object would have to be lying very far from the observed regions of the Solar System to have no detectable gravitational effect on the other planets. A Mars-sized object could lie undetected at 300 AU (10 times the distance of Neptune); a Jupiter-sized object at 30,000 AU. To travel 1000 AU in two years, an object would need to be moving at 2400 km/s – faster than the galactic escape velocity. At that speed, any object would be shot out of the Solar System, and then out of the Milky Way galaxy into intergalactic space.[24]

    Conspiracy theories

    Many believers in the imminent approach of Planet X/Nibiru accuse NASA of deliberately covering up visual evidence of its existence.[25] One such accusation involves the IRAS infrared space observatory, launched in 1983. The satellite briefly made headlines due to an "unknown object" that was at first described as "possibly as large as the giant planet Jupiter and possibly so close to Earth that it would be part of this Solar System".[26] This newspaper article has been cited by proponents of the Nibiru cataclysm, beginning with Lieder herself, as evidence for the existence of Nibiru.[27] However, further analysis revealed that of several initially unidentified objects, nine were distant galaxies and the tenth was "intergalactic cirrus"; none were found to be Solar System bodies.[28]

    Another accusation frequently made by websites predicting the collision is that the U.S. government built the South Pole Telescope (SPT) to track Nibiru's trajectory, and that the object has been imaged optically.[29] However, the SPT (which is not funded by NASA) is a radio telescope, and cannot take optical images. Its South Pole location was chosen due to the low-humidity environment, and there is no way an approaching object could be seen only from the South Pole.[30] The "picture" of Nibiru posted on YouTube was revealed, in fact, to be a Hubble image of the expanding light echo around the star V838 Mon.[29]

    Another conspiracy claim regards a patch of missing data in Google Sky near the constellation of Orion, which has often been cited as evidence that Nibiru has been redacted. However, the same region of sky can still be viewed by thousands of amateur astronomers. A scientist at Google said that the missing data is due to a glitch in the stitching software used to piece the images together.[31] Another piece of claimed evidence drawn from Google Sky is the carbon star CW Leonis, which is the brightest object in the 10 μm infrared sky and is frequently claimed to be Nibiru.[32]


    Believers in Planet X/Nibiru have given it many names since it was first proposed. All are, in fact, names for other real, hypothetical or imaginary Solar System objects that bear little resemblance to Nibiru as described by Lieder or Sitchin.

    Planet X

    Lieder drew the name Planet X from the hypothetical planet once searched for by astronomers to account for discrepancies in the orbits of Uranus and Neptune.[16] In 1894, Bostonian astronomer Percival Lowell became convinced that the planets Uranus and Neptune had slight discrepancies in their orbits. He concluded that they were being tugged by the gravity of another, more distant planet, which he called "Planet X".[33] However, nearly a century of searching failed to turn up any evidence for such an object (Pluto was initially believed to be Planet X, but was later determined to be too small).[34] In 1992, astronomer Myles Standish showed that the supposed discrepancies in the planets' orbits were illusory; the product of an overestimation of the mass of Neptune.[35] Today astronomers accept that Planet X does not exist.[36]

    Hercolubus -- Not to be confused with Helatrobus.

    In 1999, New Age author V. M. Rabolu wrote in Hercolubus or Red Planet that Barnard's star is actually a planet known to the ancients as Hercolubus, which purportedly came dangerously close to Earth in the past, destroying Atlantis, and will come close to Earth again.[37] Lieder subsequently used Rabolu's ideas to bolster her claims.[38]

    Barnard's star has been directly measured to be 5.98 ± 0.003 light years from Earth (35.15 trillion miles).[39] While it is approaching Earth, Barnard's Star will not make its closest approach to the Sun until around 11,700 AD, when it will approach to within some 3.8 light-years.[40] This is only slightly closer than the closest star to the Sun (Proxima Centauri) lies today.


    Believers in Planet X/Nibiru have often confused it with Nemesis,[41] a hypothetical star first proposed by physicist Richard A. Muller. In 1984, Muller postulated that mass extinctions were not random, but appeared to occur in the fossil record with a loose periodicity that ranged from 26–34 million years. He attributed this supposed pattern to a heretofore undetected companion to the Sun, either a dim red dwarf or a brown dwarf, lying in an elliptical, 26-million-year orbit. This object, which he named Nemesis, would, once every 26 million years, pass through the Oort cloud, the shell of over a trillion icy objects believed to be the source of long-period comets that orbit at thousands of times Pluto's distance from the Sun. Nemesis's gravity would then disturb the comets' orbits and send them into the inner Solar System, causing the Earth to be bombarded. However, to date no direct evidence of Nemesis has been found.[42] Though the idea of Nemesis appears similar to the Nibiru cataclysm, they are, in fact, very different, as Nemesis, if it existed, would have an orbital period thousands of times longer, and would never come near Earth itself.[41]

    Sedna or Eris

    Still others confuse Nibiru with Sedna or Eris, trans-Neptunian objects discovered by Mike Brown in 2003 and 2005 respectively.[43][44] However, despite having been described as a "tenth planet" in an early NASA press release,[45] Eris (provisional designation: 2003 UB313) is now classified as a dwarf planet. Only slightly more massive than Pluto,[46] Eris has a well-determined orbit that never takes it closer than 5.5 billion km from the Earth.[47] Sedna is slightly smaller than Pluto,[48] and never comes closer to Earth than 11.4 billion km.[49] Mike Brown believes the confusion results from both the real Eris and the imaginary Nibiru having extremely elliptical orbits.[43]


    Others have tied it to Tyche;[50] the name proposed by John Matese and Daniel Whitmire of the University of Louisiana at Lafayette for an object they believe to be influencing the orbits of comets in the Oort cloud.[51] The name, after the "good sister" of the Greek goddess Nemesis, was chosen to distinguish it from the similar Nemesis hypothesis as, unlike Nemesis (or Nibiru), Matese and Whitmire do not believe that their object poses a threat to Earth.[52] Also, this object, if it exists, would, like Nemesis, have an orbit hundreds of times longer than that proposed for Nibiru, and never come near the inner Solar System.[50]

    Comet Elenin

    Some associated Nibiru with Comet Elenin,[53] a long-period comet discovered by Russian astronomer Leonid Elenin on December 10, 2010.[54] On October 16, 2011, Elenin made its closest approach to the Earth at a distance of 0.2338 AU (34,980,000 km; 21,730,000 mi),[55][56] which is slightly closer than the planet Venus.[57] Nevertheless, in the leadup to its closest approach, claims spread on conspiracy websites concluded that it was on a collision course, that it was as large as Jupiter or even a brown dwarf, and even that the name of the discoverer, Leonid Elenin, was in fact code for ELE, or an Extinction Level Event.[53]

    Although the sizes of comets are difficult to determine without close observation, Comet Elenin is likely to be less than 10 km in diameter.[58] Elenin himself estimates that the comet nucleus is roughly 3–4 km in diameter.[59] This would make it millions of times smaller than the supposed Nibiru. Comet hysteria is not uncommon.[60] Attempts have been made to correlate Elenin's alignments with the 2011 Japan earthquake, the 2010 Canterbury earthquake, and 2010 Chile earthquake; however, even discounting Elenin's tiny size, earthquakes are driven by forces within the earth, and cannot be triggered by the passage of nearby objects.[61] In 2011, Leonid Elenin ran a simulation on his blog in which he increased the mass of the comet to that of a brown dwarf (0.05 solar masses). He demonstrated that its gravity would have caused noticeable changes in the orbit of Saturn years before its arrival in the inner Solar System.[62]

    In August, 2011, Comet Elenin began to disintegrate,[63][64] and by the time of its closest approach in October 2011 the comet was undetected even by large, ground-based telescopes.[65]

    Public reaction

    The impact of the public fear of the Nibiru cataclysm has been especially felt by professional astronomers. Mike Brown now says that Nibiru is the most common pseudoscientific topic he is asked about.[22]

    David Morrison, director of SETI, CSI Fellow and Senior Scientist at NASA's Astrobiology Institute at Ames Research Center, says he receives 20 to 25 emails a week about the impending arrival of Nibiru: some frightened, others angry and naming him as part of the conspiracy to keep the truth of the impending apocalypse from the public, and still others asking whether or not they should kill themselves, their children or their pets.[25][66] Half of these emails are from outside the U.S.[12] "Planetary scientists are being driven to distraction by Nibiru," notes science writer Govert Schilling, "And it is not surprising; you devote so much time, energy and creativity to fascinating scientific research, and find yourself on the tracks of the most amazing and interesting things, and all the public at large is concerned about is some crackpot theory about clay tablets, god-astronauts and a planet that doesn't exist."[1] Prior to the 2012 date, Morrison stated that he hoped that the non-arrival of Nibiru could serve as a teaching moment for the public, instructing them on "rational thought and baloney detection", but doubted that would happen.[25]

    Morrison noted in a lecture recorded on that there was a huge disconnect between the large number of people on the Internet who believed in Nibiru's arrival in 2012 and the majority of scientists who have never heard of it. To date he is the only major NASA scientist to speak out regularly against the Nibiru phenomenon.[66]

    Cultural influence

    A viral marketing campaign for Sony Pictures' 2009 film 2012, directed by Roland Emmerich, which depicts the end of the world in that year, featured a supposed warning from the "Institute for Human Continuity" that listed the arrival of Planet X as one of its doomsday scenarios.[67] Mike Brown attributes a spike in concerned emails and phone calls he has received from the public to this site.[43]

    Lars von Trier's 2011 film Melancholia features a plot in which a planet emerges from behind the Sun onto a collision course with Earth.[68] Announcing his company's purchase of the film, the head of Magnolia Pictures said in a press release, "As the 2012 apocalypse is upon us, it is time to prepare for a cinematic last supper."[69]

    The Nibiru cataclysm plays a key role in the second season of Scooby-Doo! Mystery Incorporated, revealed to be at the heart of the show's ongoing mystery story arc in the episode "Wrath of the Krampus", which also references the works of Sitchin and quotes directly from this Wikipedia article.[70]


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    magamud wrote:New World Capitals 1:00:00

    Published on Dec 1, 2012 Preplanned cities designed as magical seals for controlling demons are on the rise. Are we witnessing the creation of the New World Order capitals?

    Thank-you magamud. I continue to be very conflicted regarding the human predicament -- and regarding various definitions and interpretations of this and that. What is a 'Demon'? What is 'Sin'? Is the 'New World Order' fundamentally evil -- or is the NWO fundamentally mismanaged? Things can appear to be a certain way -- but changing just one key factor can change the whole nature of the beast. I will look at the videos later today. I continue to think that the more power one has -- the more likely it is that they will become corrupted and deranged. My Political and Theological Science-Fiction continues to scare the hell out of me each and every day. I feel corrupted and deranged just by thinking about solar system governance. I continue to be intrigued by the concept of Absolute-Access with Absolutely Zero-Power. This is an application of the Combining-Opposites Principle. I'm trying to think of various and sundry possibilities and probabilities regarding how the solar system might really work -- and regarding what might go terribly wrong. I continue to think that Plum Solar System Jobs should NOT be that desireable. I continue to think that the solar system is managed as a Big Business -- which might not be such a bad model -- provided that no one (human or otherwise) gets misused, abused, hurt, or killed. Solar System Governance might, of necessity, have to be somewhat harsh and arbitrary -- but without becoming unethical and violent. A while ago, someone commented to me that it would've been better to have left everything in the Lord's Hands -- and I'm not sure what they meant by that. Having the Right Lord would be extremely important. I'm also intriqued by the suggested connection between Christ and Satan. If my 2,300 day-year prophetic theory is even somewhat correct concerning Daniel 8:14 -- that it spans 168BC to 2133AD -- how might this affect the way we think about solar system governance?? Thinking about all of this seems to be a HUGE waste of time. I often feel like Pinky or the Brain -- I'm not sure which. Perhaps I should just think about things like this: 1. 2. 3. 4.  4. 5. 6. Wanting to be a Wannabe-Somebody is SO Overrated. We should be happy right where God has placed us -- or so I am told. I really just want things to make sense and work well. I will continue to think that This Present Madness is a Corrupted Idealistic Plan which simply needs to be purified and refined. Good-luck with that -- right??!! I really think such an effort might not be completed until 2133AD. Then, at long-last, the Sanctuary might be finially cleansed, vindicated, and restored to its rightful state. Perhaps this is something to look forward to in my next two or three lives...
    magamud wrote:Great links thx O.  Nothing like pipes to clean out the air.
    I see a lot of double edge sword stuff, two sides of the coin, yin and yang, yadda, yadda stuff.  Perhaps its good one has a sword, a shekel, an esoteric term?  I think the "Fruits" of evil magnetize the fruits of good to come on in to acknowledge the whole.  The A.I. machine efficiency brings in the yangs wang to thrust all this mega goop outta here?  As to why they enjoy savoring the moment?  Now thats Irony and time travel and the essence of Fate.  Good always triumphs evil?  The myth lives in Wormwood and every other million prophecies that every good man has tried to warn the planet about.  Freewill has a consequence.  And what is the price of Liberty?  A meat sack body?  An Eden?  How long shall life support idiocy?

    The idiocy has hollowed out our matrix like cancer.  The illusion is a house of cards...

    No one knows except the Father when he returns.  Like your mortality, it is the way of things.  Big deal or not?

    Largest Pipe Organ in China

    I am coming quickly...

    Last edited by orthodoxymoron on Thu Feb 11, 2016 9:36 am; edited 2 times in total

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    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  orthodoxymoron on Wed Apr 16, 2014 2:12 pm

    Please remember that this thread is a research-project rather than a crusade. I haven't circled the wagons in any way, shape, or form. I guess my strategy is to remain in the worst of it all -- while remaining above it all -- if you know what I mean. You know -- just doing what I'm doing -- regardless of how good or bad things get -- unless they shut me down (or worse). Regarding Sherry Shriner -- you might find this interesting!! Once again, I simply take in a lot of strange information -- with most of it going in one ear, and out the other!! I would love to hear Sherry give a series of studies on Matthew and the Psalms. Sherry says she is the Granddaughter of King David -- and she says Matthew is her favorite biblical book -- yet I haven't heard much quoting or discussion of Matthew and the Psalms. Her show is sort of a Galactic Enquirer -- which is cool -- but I have a very bad and sad feeling about what's really going on with Sherry. I won't talk about what I really think about Sherry Shriner -- and I could say a lot. I listen to all of her shows -- but I take everything she says with a Sea of Salt. I have moved the subject of biblical-prophecy into a science-fictional context -- mostly because those who have dealt with science-fiction are probably better prepared to deal with the complexity and horrific-aspects of the prophetic-zoo!! I think apocalyptic events could occur -- but I would prefer that they didn't. I'm not really into inflicted-plagues and mass-murder!! But be very certain that I seek law and order for this solar system!! This thread is sort of a Secret-Society (because nobody reads it)!! Think of me as being the Resident Internet Researcher-Philosopher at Stargate Command!!

    As you know, I've turned a lot of the madness into smart@$$ science-fiction!! I suspect a very violent, horrific, and sad reality -- yet I never know what to believe or disbelieve -- and there's way too much seriousness and anger connected with controversial subjects. I don't do Orgone -- but I love Organs!! I'm an Organ-Warrior!! Anyway, here's something you might find amusing!!

    Once again, take this thread as being a mental and spiritual exercise of a radical nature. Nobody feeds me information -- and I don't work for anyone. I truly don't know what's really going on. I am extremely confused and disillusioned. I know things are VERY screwed-up in this solar system -- but I know that I don't know the details. What if Archons came from Orion in Antiquity -- with one faction creating humanity to incarnate into -- majorly angering the other factions?? I have no idea if there might be any validity to this sort of thing -- but I suspect that 90% of 'the way we think things are' is utter bullshit (mistakenly or deliberately). What do you think about THIS??!!

    I think Sherry Shriner knows a HUGE amount -- and a lot of it seems to involve First-Hand information. She once spoke of driving onto a high-security base -- without being questioned or stopped! She never seems to be particularly emotional -- regardless of how horrific or controversial the subject matter is. Here is an example of what she talks about on her show.

    Regarding Reptilians -- if we evolved (or were created) from the monkeys and the snakes -- would that really be that much worse than just originating from the monkeys?? As long as we survive physical-death -- and have some sort of a useable-future -- I'm probably OK with that!! Here are some highly upsetting videos and images. I'm not recommending any of this. I'm merely providing them as an aid to your research. I am trying to remain neutral regarding angels, demons, aliens, greys, reptilians, archons, underground-bases, the secret-government, and the secret space program. This doesn't mean my mind is in neutral. It simply means my mind is NOT made-up -- and I wish to be confused by the facts. I'm easily confused...

    "Inch by Inch -- Anything's a Cinch -- with a Blow-Up Alien Love-Doll!!"

    Last edited by orthodoxymoron on Thu Feb 11, 2016 1:17 pm; edited 3 times in total

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    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  orthodoxymoron on Thu Apr 17, 2014 1:24 pm

    mudra wrote:
    New Colonel Philip J. Corso Info Surfaces! - US Gave Russia Advanced Technology To Stop WW3!

    William Birnes of the History Channel revealed in our recent interview that Colonel Philip Corso of "Day After Roswell" fame stated we almost went to war with Russia and that conflict was settled because somehow, the USA gave the Russian Government the technology for the Russian Mig Fighter Jets Radar systems during our interview I have shared here. (dead-link)

    Love Always
    orthodoxymoron wrote:Some say that all of the advanced military-technology and weapons-systems throughout the world (and throughout the solar system??) are owned and operated by ONE Group or Individual. This is frightening for me to think about. If all of the nasty weaponry were not centrally controlled -- we might've blown ourselves up a long time ago. OR -- we might've long since been blown to Kingdom-Come by ET. However -- what if Humanity has been working for Bad-ET for thousands of years -- which might include building a Kick@$$ Space-Fleet for Bad ET (and NOT for Humanity)??!! But what if said Bad-ET is better than the rest of the Bad-ET Factions throughout the universe??!! What if Humanity Lives in a VERY Tough Neighborhood??!!
    Take a very close look at the Entire Life of Colonel Philip J. Corso. His son has said some very interesting things about Colonel Corso (which I have noted elsewhere in this thread). I tend to think that we have a very complex and nasty factional conflict raging in this solar system (which we won't be told about on Fox News)!! I suspect that all factions are mixtures of good and evil -- and I guess I've been conceptualizing a constructive resolution of the War in Heaven -- but don't hold your breath.

    On a more positive note -- it takes the right organist playing the right music on the right organ in the right architectural and acoustical environment to get my attention in the right way. One almost needs to be an organist to properly appreciate organ music. I think I've experienced the greatest elevation while improvising on a fine organ in an empty church. Being an organist for a church service is too nerve-wracking for me. I spent many Sundays just a few feet behind Fred Swann -- one of the greatest organist-choirmasters in the world. The music department of a church is where the action is IMHO. I think organist-choirmasters should have both music and theology degrees -- and be well-paid -- to attract the best and the brightest. I support properly maintaining the existing large churches and cathedrals -- but I do not support a lot of new construction of expensive churches. I'm mainly trying to figure-out how to properly use that which presently exists. A lot of churches were built with nefarious fundraising methods -- and for the wrong reasons -- but now they are built -- so what are we going to do with them? Nature is more beautiful than any church -- but still the churches provide a necessary service. Sometimes I wonder if all of the large and historic churches should be part of some state-church wherein the basic church expenses are paid by the state -- and basic historical liturgical services are offered -- without the high-pressure fundraising aka Salvation4Sale. I'm not opposed to alternative megachurches -- but I think there needs to be a reasonable historical core -- which positively reinforces the past -- to provide a frame of reference. Do you see my point? Good does not always triumph. Most often it seems to work the other way. I support pragmatic-righteousness -- wherein one does the right thing without becoming a lamb to the slaughter in a cold, cruel world. The Price of Freedom is Responsibility. To properly answer the physicality-question we need to know about ALL the varieties of physicality throughout the universe. We also need to know about existence without physicality. I continue to think that whoever created the human-being knew what they were doing -- and that human-physicality should NOT be exterminated. I will continue to explore all of these issues within this thread -- mostly via political and theological science-fiction -- especially when the truth continues to be veiled by varieties of secrecy and deception. I keep trying to positively-reinforce what presently exists within this solar system. I fear that the hatred and resentment will soon result in a helluva lot of bloodshed. I'm sort of attacking and embracing -- simultaneously. I'm trying to look at the church's dirty-linen without hating the church-members. I poke and prod -- but I never circle the wagons and fire the gatling-guns.


    Consider Existentialism: First published Mon Aug 23, 2004; substantive revision Mon Oct 11, 2010

    Like “rationalism” and “empiricism,” “existentialism” is a term that belongs to intellectual history. Its definition is thus to some extent one of historical convenience. The term was explicitly adopted as a self-description by Jean-Paul Sartre, and through the wide dissemination of the postwar literary and philosophical output of Sartre and his associates—notably Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Albert Camus—existentialism became identified with a cultural movement that flourished in Europe in the 1940s and 1950s. Among the major philosophers identified as existentialists (many of whom—for instance Camus and Heidegger—repudiated the label) were Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, and Martin Buber in Germany, Jean Wahl and Gabriel Marcel in France, the Spaniards José Ortega y Gasset and Miguel de Unamuno, and the Russians Nikolai Berdyaev and Lev Shestov. The nineteenth century philosophers, Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche, came to be seen as precursors of the movement. Existentialism was as much a literary phenomenon as a philosophical one. Sartre's own ideas were and are better known through his fictional works (such as Nausea and No Exit) than through his more purely philosophical ones (such as Being and Nothingness and Critique of Dialectical Reason), and the postwar years found a very diverse coterie of writers and artists linked under the term: retrospectively, Dostoevsky, Ibsen, and Kafka were conscripted; in Paris there were Jean Genet, André Gide, André Malraux, and the expatriate Samuel Beckett; the Norwegian Knut Hamsun and the Romanian Eugene Ionesco belong to the club; artists such as Alberto Giacometti and even Abstract Expressionists such as Jackson Pollock, Arshile Gorky, and Willem de Kooning, and filmmakers such as Jean-Luc Godard and Ingmar Bergman were understood in existential terms. By the mid 1970s the cultural image of existentialism had become a cliché, parodized in countless books and films by Woody Allen.

    It is sometimes suggested, therefore, that existentialism just is this bygone cultural movement rather than an identifiable philosophical position; or, alternatively, that the term should be restricted to Sartre's philosophy alone. But while a philosophical definition of existentialism may not entirely ignore the cultural fate of the term, and while Sartre's thought must loom large in any account of existentialism, the concept does pick out a distinctive cluster of philosophical problems and helpfully identifies a relatively distinct current of twentieth- and now twenty-first century philosophical inquiry, one that has had significant impact on fields such as theology (through Rudolf Bultmann, Paul Tillich, Karl Barth, and others) and psychology (from Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss to Otto Rank, R. D. Laing, and Viktor Frankl). What makes this current of inquiry distinct is not its concern with “existence” in general, but rather its claim that thinking about human existence requires new categories not found in the conceptual repertoire of ancient or modern thought; human beings can be understood neither as substances with fixed properties, nor as subjects interacting with a world of objects.

    On the existential view, to understand what a human being is it is not enough to know all the truths that natural science—including the science of psychology—could tell us. The dualist who holds that human beings are composed of independent substances—“mind” and “body”—is no better off in this regard than is the physicalist, who holds that human existence can be adequately explained in terms of the fundamental physical constituents of the universe. Existentialism does not deny the validity of the basic categories of physics, biology, psychology, and the other sciences (categories such as matter, causality, force, function, organism, development, motivation, and so on). It claims only that human beings cannot be fully understood in terms of them. Nor can such an understanding be gained by supplementing our scientific picture with a moral one. Categories of moral theory such as intention, blame, responsibility, character, duty, virtue, and the like do capture important aspects of the human condition, but neither moral thinking (governed by the norms of the good and the right) nor scientific thinking (governed by the norm of truth) suffices.

    “Existentialism”, therefore, may be defined as the philosophical theory which holds that a further set of categories, governed by the norm of authenticity, is necessary to grasp human existence. To approach existentialism in this categorial way may seem to conceal what is often taken to be its “heart” (Kaufmann 1968:12), namely, its character as a gesture of protest against academic philosophy, its anti-system sensibility, its flight from the “iron cage” of reason. But while it is true that the major existential philosophers wrote with a passion and urgency rather uncommon in our own time, and while the idea that philosophy cannot be practiced in the disinterested manner of an objective science is indeed central to existentialism, it is equally true that all the themes popularly associated with existentialism—dread, boredom, alienation, the absurd, freedom, commitment, nothingness, and so on—find their philosophical significance in the context of the search for a new categorial framework, together with its governing norm.

    •1. The Emergence of Existence as a Philosophical Problem◦1.1 Kierkegaard: “The Single Individual”
    ◦1.2 Nietzsche and Nihilism

    •2. “Existence Precedes Essence”◦2.1 Facticity and Transcendence
    ◦2.2 Alienation
    ◦2.3 Authenticity

    •3. Freedom and Value◦3.1 Anxiety, Nothingness, the Absurd
    ◦3.2 The Ideality of Values

    •4. Politics, History, Engagement◦4.1 Heidegger: History as Claim
    ◦4.2 Sartre: Existentialism and Marxism

    •5. Existentialism Today
    •Bibliography◦Works Cited
    ◦Other Readings

    •Other Internet Resources
    •Related Entries


    1. The Emergence of Existence as a Philosophical Problem

    Sartre's existentialism drew its immediate inspiration from the work of the German philosopher, Martin Heidegger. Heidegger's 1927 Being and Time, an inquiry into the “being that we ourselves are” (which he termed “Dasein,” a German word for existence), introduced most of the motifs that would characterize later existentialist thinking: the tension between the individual and the “public”; an emphasis on the worldly or “situated” character of human thought and reason; a fascination with liminal experiences of anxiety, death, the “nothing” and nihilism; the rejection of science (and above all, causal explanation) as an adequate framework for understanding human being; and the introduction of “authenticity” as the norm of self-identity, tied to the project of self-definition through freedom, choice, and commitment. Though in 1946 Heidegger would repudiate the retrospective labelling of his earlier work as existentialism, it is in that work that the relevant concept of existence finds its first systematic philosophical formulation.[1]

    As Sartre and Merleau-Ponty would later do, Heidegger pursued these issues with the somewhat unlikely resources of Edmund Husserl's phenomenological method. And while not all existential philosophers were influenced by phenomenology (for instance Jaspers and Marcel), the philosophical legacy of existentialism is largely tied to the form it took as an existential version of phenomenology. Husserl's efforts in the first decades of the twentieth century had been directed toward establishing a descriptive science of consciousness, by which he understood not the object of the natural science of psychology but the “transcendental” field of intentionality, i.e., that whereby our experience is meaningful, an experience of something as something. The existentialists welcomed Husserl's doctrine of intentionality as a refutation of the Cartesian view according to which consciousness relates immediately only to its own representations, ideas, sensations. According to Husserl, consciousness is our direct openness to the world, one that is governed categorially (normatively) rather than causally; that is, intentionality is not a property of the individual mind but the categorial framework in which mind and world become intelligible.[2]

    A phenomenology of consciousness, then, explores neither the metaphysical composition nor the causal genesis of things, but the “constitution” of their meaning. Husserl employed this method to clarify our experience of nature, the socio-cultural world, logic, and mathematics, but Heidegger argued that he had failed to raise the most fundamental question, that of the “meaning of being” as such. In turning phenomenology toward the question of what it means to be, Heidegger insists that the question be raised concretely: it is not at first some academic exercise but a burning concern arising from life itself, the question of what it means for me to be. Existential themes take on salience when one sees that the general question of the meaning of being involves first becoming clear about one's own being as an inquirer. According to Heidegger, the categories bequeathed by the philosophical tradition for understanding a being who can question his or her being are insufficient: traditional concepts of a substance decked out with reason, or of a subject blessed with self-consciousness, misconstrue our fundamental character as “being-in-the-world.” In his phenomenological pursuit of the categories that govern being-in-the-world, Heidegger became the reluctant father of existentialism because he drew inspiration from two seminal, though in academic circles then relatively unknown, nineteenth-century writers, Sören Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche. One can find anticipations of existential thought in many places (for instance, in Socratic irony, Augustine, Pascal, or the late Schelling), but the roots of the problem of existence in its contemporary significance lie in the work of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.

    1.1 Kierkegaard: “The Single Individual”

    Kierkegaard developed this problem in the context of his radical approach to Christian faith; Nietzsche did so in light of his thesis of the death of God. Subsequent existential thought reflects this difference: while some writers—such as Sartre and Beauvoir,—were resolutely atheist in outlook, others—such as Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel, and Buber—variously explored the implications of the concept “authentic existence” for religious consciousness. Though neither Nietzsche's nor Kierkegaard's thought can be reduced to a single strand, both took an interest in what Kierkegaard termed “the single individual.” Both were convinced that this singularity, what is most my own, “me,” could be meaningfully reflected upon while yet, precisely because of its singularity, remaining invisible to traditional philosophy, with its emphasis either on what follows unerring objective laws of nature or else conforms to the universal standards of moral reason. A focus on existence thus led, in both, to unique textual strategies quite alien to the philosophy of their time—and ours.

    In Kierkegaard, the singularity of existence comes to light at the moment of conflict between ethics and religious faith. Suppose it is my sense of doing God's will that makes my life meaningful. How does philosophy conceive this meaning? Drawing here on Hegel as emblematic of the entire tradition, Kierkegaard, in his book Fear and Trembling, argues that for philosophy my life becomes meaningful when I “raise myself to the universal” by bringing my immediate (natural) desires and inclinations under the moral law, which represents my “telos” or what I ought to be. In doing so I lose my individuality (since the law holds for all) but my actions become meaningful in the sense of understandable, governed by a norm. Now a person whose sense of doing God's will is what gives her life meaning will be intelligible just to the extent that her action conforms to the universal dictates of ethics. But what if, as in case of Abraham's sacrifice of his son, the action contradicts what ethics demands? Kierkegaard[3] believes both that Abraham's life is supremely meaningful (it is not simply a matter of some immediate desire or meaningless tic that overcomes Abraham's ethical consciousness; on the contrary, doing the moral thing is itself in this case his tempting inclination) and that philosophy cannot understand it, thus condemning it in the name of ethics. God's command here cannot be seen as a law that would pertain to all; it addresses Abraham in his singularity. If Abraham's life is meaningful, it represents, from a philosophical point of view, the “paradox” that through faith the “single individual is higher than the universal.” Existence as a philosophical problem appears at this point: if there is a dimension to my being that is both meaningful and yet not governed by the rational standard of morality, by what standard is it governed? For unless there is some standard it is idle to speak of “meaning.”

    To solve this problem there must be a norm inherent in singularity itself, and, in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard tries to express such a norm in his claim that “subjectivity is the truth,” an idea that prefigures the existential concept of authenticity. Abraham has no objective reason to think that the command he hears comes from God; indeed, based on the content of the command he has every reason, as Kant pointed out in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, to think that it cannot come from God. His sole justification is what Kierkegaard calls the passion of faith. Such faith is, rationally speaking, absurd, a “leap,” so if there is to be any talk of truth here it is a standard that measures not the content of Abraham's act, but the way in which he accomplishes it. To perform the movement of faith “subjectively” is to embrace the paradox as normative for me in spite of its absurdity, rather than to seek an escape from it by means of objective textual exegesis, historical criticism, or some other strategy for translating the singularity of my situation into the universal. Because my reason cannot help here, the normative appropriation is a function of my “inwardness” or passion. In this way I “truly” become what I nominally already am. To say that subjectivity is the truth is to highlight a way of being, then, and not a mode of knowing; truth measures the attitude (“passion”) with which I appropriate, or make my own, an “objective uncertainty” (the voice of God) in a “process of highest inwardness.”

    In contrast to the singularity of this movement, for Kierkegaard, stands the crowd: “the crowd is untruth.” The crowd is, roughly, public opinion in the widest sense—the ideas that a given age takes for granted; the ordinary and accepted way of doing things; the complacent attitude that comes from the conformity necessary for social life—and what condemns it to “untruth” in Kierkegaard's eyes is the way that it insinuates itself into an individual's own sense of who she is, relieving her of the burden of being herself: if everyone is a Christian there is no need for me to “become” one. Since it is a measure not of knowing but of being, one can see how Kierkegaard answers those who object that his concept of subjectivity as truth is based on an equivocation: the objective truths of science and history, however well-established, are in themselves matters of indifference; they belong to the crowd. It is not insofar as truth can be established objectively that it takes on meaning, but rather insofar as it is appropriated “passionately” in its very uncertainty. To “exist” is always to be confronted with this question of meaning. The truths that matter to who one is cannot, like Descartes' morale definitif, be something to be attained only when objective science has completed its task.

    1.2 Nietzsche and Nihilism

    For Kierkegaard existence emerges as a philosophical problem in the struggle to think the paradoxical presence of God; for Nietzsche it is found in the reverberations of the phrase “God is dead,” in the challenge of nihilism.

    Responding in part to the cultural situation in nineteenth-century Europe—historical scholarship continuing to erode fundamentalist readings of the Bible, the growing cultural capital of the natural sciences, and Darwinism in particular—and in part driven by his own investigations into the psychology and history of moral concepts, Nietzsche sought to draw the consequences of the death of God, the collapse of any theistic support for morality. Like his contemporary, Fyodor Dostoevsky, whose character, Ivan, in The Brothers Karamazov, famously argues that if God does not exist then everything is permitted, Nietzsche's overriding concern is to find a way to take the measure of human life in the modern world. Unlike Dostoevsky, however, Nietzsche sees a complicity between morality and the Christian God that perpetuates a life-denying, and so ultimately nihilistic, stance. Nietzsche was not the first to de-couple morality from its divine sanction; psychological theories of the moral sentiments, developed since the eighteenth century, provided a purely human account of moral normativity. But while these earlier theories had been offered as justifications of the normative force of morality, Nietzsche's idea that behind moral prescriptions lies nothing but “will to power” undermined that authority. On the account given in On the Genealogy of Morals, the Judeo-Christian moral order arose as an expression of the ressentiment of the weak against the power exercised over them by the strong. A tool used to thwart that power, it had over time become internalized in the form of conscience, creating a “sick” animal whose will is at war with its own vital instincts. Thus Nietzsche arrived at Kierkegaard's idea that “the crowd is untruth”: the so-called autonomous, self-legislating individual is nothing but a herd animal that has trained itself to docility and unfreedom by conforming to the “universal” standards of morality. The normative is nothing but the normal.

    Yet this is not the end of the story for Nietzsche, any more than it was for Kierkegaard. If the autonomous individual has so far signified nothing but herd mentality—if moral norms arose precisely to produce such conformists—the individual nevertheless has the potential to become something else, the sick animal is “pregnant with a future.” Nietzsche saw that in the nineteenth century the “highest values” had begun to “devalue themselves.” For instance, the Christian value of truth-telling, institutionalized in the form of science, had undermined the belief in God, disenchanting the world and excluding from it any pre-given moral meaning. In such a situation the individual is forced back upon himself. On the one hand, if he is weakly constituted he may fall victim to despair in the face of nihilism, the recognition that life has no instrinsic meaning. On the other hand, for a “strong” or creative individual nihilism presents a liberating opportunity to take responsibility for meaning, to exercise creativity by “transvaluing” her values, establishing a new “order of rank.” Through his prophet, Zarathustra, Nietzsche imagined such a person as the “overman” (Übermensch), the one who teaches “the meaning of the earth” and has no need of otherworldly supports for the values he embodies. The overman represents a form of life, a mode of existence, that is to blossom from the communalized, moralized “last man” of the nineteenth century. He has understood that nihilism is the ultimate meaning of the moral point of view, its life-denying essence, and he reconfigures the moral idea of autonomy so as to release the life-affirming potential within it.

    Thus, for Nietzsche, existence emerges as a philosophical problem in his distinction between moral autonomy (as obedience to the moral law) and an autonomy “beyond good an evil.” But if one is to speak of autonomy, meaning, and value at all, the mode of being beyond good and evil cannot simply be a lawless state of arbitrary and impulsive behavior. If such existence is to be thinkable there must be a standard by which success or failure can be measured. Nietzsche variously indicates such a standard in his references to “health,” “strength,” and “the meaning of the earth.” Perhaps his most instructive indication, however, comes from aesthetics, since its concept of style, as elaborated in The Gay Science, provides a norm appropriate to the singularity of existence. To say that a work of art has style is to invoke a standard for judging it, but one that cannot be specified in the form of a general law of which the work would be a mere instance. Rather, in a curious way, the norm is internal to the work. For Nietzsche, existence falls under such an imperative of style: to create meaning and value in a world from which all transcendent supports have fallen away is to give unique shape to one's immediate inclinations, drives, and passions; to interpret, prune, and enhance according to a unifying sensibility, a ruling instinct, that brings everything into a whole that satisfies the non-conceptual, aesthetic norm of what fits, what belongs, what is appropriate.

    As did Kierkegaard, then, Nietzsche uncovers an aspect of my being that can be understood neither in terms of immediate drives and inclinations nor in terms of a universal law of behavior, an aspect that is measured not in terms of an objective inventory of what I am but in terms of my way of being it. Neither Kierkegaard nor Nietzsche, however, developed this insight in a fully systematic way. That would be left to their twentieth-century heirs.

    2. “Existence Precedes Essence”

    Sartre's slogan—“existence precedes essence”—may serve to introduce what is most distinctive of existentialism, namely, the idea that no general, non-formal account of what it means to be human can be given, since that meaning is decided in and through existing itself. Existence is “self-making-in-a-situation” (Fackenheim 1961:37). In contrast to other entities, whose essential properties are fixed by the kind of entities they are, what is essential to a human being—what makes her who she is—is not fixed by her type but by what she makes of herself, who she becomes.[4] The fundamental contribution of existential thought lies in the idea that one's identity is constituted neither by nature nor by culture, since to “exist” is precisely to constitute such an identity. It is in light of this idea that key existential notions such as facticity, transcendence (project), alienation, and authenticity must be understood.

    At first, it seems hard to understand how one can say much about existence as such. Traditionally, philosophers have connected the concept of existence with that of essence in such a way that the former signifies merely the instantiation of the latter. If “essence” designates what a thing is and “existence” that it is, it follows that what is intelligible about any given thing, what can be thought about it, will belong to its essence. It is from essence in this sense—say, human being as rational animal or imago Dei—that ancient philosophy drew its prescriptions for an individual's way of life, its estimation of the meaning and value of existence. Having an essence meant that human beings could be placed within a larger whole, a kosmos, that provided the standard for human flourishing. Modern philosophy retained this framework even as it abandoned the idea of a “natural place” for man in the face of the scientific picture of an infinite, labyrinthine universe. In what looks like a proto-existential move, Descartes rejected the traditional essential definitions of man in favor of a radical, first-person reflection on his own existence, the “I am.” Nevertheless, he quickly reinstated the old model by characterizing his existence as that of a substance determined by an essential property, “thinking.” In contrast, Heidegger proposes that “I” am “an entity whose what [essence] is precisely to be and nothing but to be” (Heidegger 1985:110; 1962:67). Such an entity's existing cannot, therefore, be thought as the instantiation of an essence, and consequently what it means to be such an entity cannot be determined by appeal to pre-given frameworks or systems—whether scientific, historical, or philosophical.

    2.1 Facticity and Transcendence

    Of course, there is a sense in which human beings do instantiate essences, as Heidegger's phrase already admits.[5] But what matters for existential thought is the manner of such instantiation, the way of existing. What this means can be seen by contrasting human existence with the modes of being Heidegger terms the “available” (or “ready-to-hand,” zuhanden) and the “occurrent” (or “present-at-hand,” vorhanden). Entities of the first sort, exemplified by tools as they present themselves in use, are defined by the social practices in which they are employed, and their properties are established in relation to the norms of those practices. A saw is sharp, for instance, in relation to what counts as successful cutting. Entities of the second sort, exemplified by objects of perceptual contemplation or scientific investigation, are defined by the norms governing perceptual givenness or scientific theory-construction. An available or occurrent entity instantiates some property if that property is truly predicated of it. Human beings can be considered in this way as well. However, in contrast to the previous cases, the fact that natural and social properties can truly be predicated of human beings is not sufficient to determine what it is for me to be a human being. This, the existentialists argue, is because such properties are never merely brute determinations of who I am but are always in question. Who I am depends on what I make of my “properties”; they matter to me in a way that is impossible for merely available and occurrent entities. As Heidegger puts it, existence is “care” (Sorge): to exist is not simply to be, but to be an issue for oneself. In Sartre's terms, while other entities exist “in themselves” (en soi) and “are what they are,” human reality is also “for itself” (pour soi) and thus is not exhausted by any of its determinations. It is what it is not and is not what it is (Sartre 1992:112).

    Human existence, then, cannot be thought through categories appropriate to things: substance, event, process. There is something of an internal distinction in existence that undermines such attempts, a distinction that existential philosophers try to capture in the categories of “facticity” and “transcendence.” To be is to co-ordinate these opposed moments in some way, and who I am, my essence, is nothing but my manner of co-ordinating them. In this sense human beings make themselves in situation: what I am cannot be separated from what I take myself to be. In Charles Taylor's phrase, human beings are “self-interpreting animals” (Taylor 1985:45), where the interpretation is constitutive of the interpreter. If such a view is not to collapse into contradiction the notions of facticity and transcendence must be elucidated. Risking some oversimplification, they can be approached as the correlates of the two attitudes I can take toward myself: the attitude of third-person theoretical observer and the attitude of first-person practical agent.

    Facticity includes all those properties that third-person investigation can establish about me: natural properties such as weight, height, and skin color; social facts such as race, class, and nationality; psychological properties such as my web of belief, desires, and character traits; historical facts such as my past actions, my family background, and my broader historical milieu; and so on.[6] I am not originally aware of my facticity in this third-person way; rather, it is manifest in my moods as a kind of burden, the weight of “having to be.” However, I can adopt a third-person or objectifying stance toward my own being, and then these aspects of my facticity may appear precisely as that which defines or determines who I am. From an existential point of view, however, this would be an error—not because these aspects of my being are not real or factual, but because the kind of being that I am cannot be defined in factual, or third-person, terms.[7] These elements of facticity cannot be said to belong to me in the way that the color of an apple belongs to the apple, for as belonging to me, as “determining” me, they have always already been interpreted by me. Though third-person observation can identify skin color, class, or ethnicity, the minute it seeks to identify them as mine it must contend with the distinctive character of the existence I possess. There is no sense in which facticity is both mine and merely a matter of fact, since my existence—the kind of being I am—is also defined by the stance I take toward my facticity. This is what existential philosophers call “transcendence.”

    Transcendence refers to that attitude toward myself characteristic of my practical engagement in the world, the agent's perspective. An agent is oriented by the task at hand as something to be brought about through its own will or agency. Such orientation does not take itself as a theme but loses itself in what is to be done. Thereby, things present themselves not as indifferent givens, facts, but as meaningful: salient, expedient, obstructive, and so on. To speak of “transcendence” here is to indicate that the agent “goes beyond” what simply is toward what can be: the factual—including the agent's own properties—always emerges in light of the possible, where the possible is not a function of anonymous forces (third-person or logical possibility) but a function of the agent's choice and decision.[8] Just as this suddenly empty pen is either a nettlesome impediment to my finishing this article, or a welcome occasion for doing something else, depending on how I determine my behavior in relation to it, so too my own factic properties—such as irrascibility, laziness, or bourgeois workaholism—take on meaning (become functioning reasons) on the basis of how I endorse or disavow them in the present action.

    Existentialists tend to describe the perspective of engaged agency in terms of “choice,” and they are sometimes criticized for this. It may be—the argument runs—that I can be said to choose a course of action at the conclusion of a process of deliberation, but there seems to be no choice involved when, in the heat of the moment, I toss the useless pen aside in frustration. Can its being useless be traced back to my “choice” to be frustrated? But the point in using such language is simply to insist that in the first-person perspective of agency I cannot conceive myself as determined by anything that is available to me only in third-person terms. Behind the existentialist's insistence that facticity and transcendence remain irreducible aspects of one and the same being is the insight that, for a being who can say “I,” the third-person perspective on who one is has no more authority than the first-person (agent's) perspective.[9]

    Because existence is co-constituted by facticity and transcendence, the self cannot be conceived as a Cartesian ego but is embodied being-in-the-world, a self-making in situation. It is through transcendence—or what the existentialists also refer to as my “projects”—that the world is revealed, takes on meaning; but such projects are themselves factic or “situated”—not the product of some antecedently constituted “person” or intelligible character but embedded in a world that is decidedly not my representation. Because my projects are who I am in the mode of engaged agency (and not like plans that I merely represent to myself in reflective deliberation), the world in a certain sense reveals to me who I am. For reasons to be explored in the next section, the meaning of my choice is not always transparent to me. Nevertheless, because it necessarily reveals the world in a certain way, that meaning, my own “identity,” can be discovered by what Sartre calls “existential psychoanalysis.” By understanding an individual's patterns of behavior—that is, by reconstructing the meaningful world that such behavior reveals—one can uncover the “fundamental project” or basic choice of oneself that gives distinctive shape to an individual life. Sartre's view represents a kind of compromise between the first- and third-person perspectives: like the latter, it objectifies the person and treats its open-ended practical horizons as in a certain sense closed; like the former, however, it seeks to understand the choices from the inside, to grasp the identity of the individual as a matter of the first-person meaning that haunts him, rather than as a function of inert psychic mechanisms with which the individual has no acquaintance.[10]

    2.2 Alienation

    The anti-Cartesian view of the self as in situation yields the familiar existential theme of the “alienated” self, the estrangement of the self both from the world and from itself. In the first place, though it is through my projects that world takes on meaning, the world itself is not brought into being through my projects; it retains it otherness and thus can come forth as utterly alien, as unheimlich. Sometimes translated as “uncanny,” this Heideggerian word's stem (Heim, “home”) points, instead, to the strangeness of a world in which I precisely do not feel “at home.” (see the section on The Ideality of Values below). This experience, basic to existential thought, contrasts most sharply with the ancient notion of a kosmos in which human beings have a well-ordered place, and it connects existential thought tightly to the modern experience of a meaningless universe.

    In the second place, the world includes other people, and as a consequence I am not merely the revealer of the world but something revealed in the projects of those others. Thus who I am is not merely a function of my own projects, but is also a matter of my “being-for-others.” Sartre (1992:340-58) brings out this form of alienation in his famous analysis of “the Look.” So long as I am engaged unreflectively in a certain practice I am nothing but that first-person perspective which constitutes things as having a distinctive salience in light of what I am doing. I am absorbed in the world and do not experience myself as having an “outside”; that is, I do not understand my action through some third-person description, as an instance of some general behavior. However, when I become aware of being looked at (that is, when my subjectivity is invaded by the subjectivity of another for whom I am merely part of the world, an item for her projects ), I become aware of having a “nature,” a “character,” of being or doing something. I am not merely looking through a keyhole; I am a voyeur. I cannot originally experience myself as something—a voyeur, for instance; it is the other who gives rise to this mode of my being, a mode that I acknowledge as mine (and not merely the other's opinion of me) in the shame in which I register it. It is because there are others in the world that I can take a third-person perspective on myself; but this reveals the extent to which I am alienated from a dimension of my being: who I am in an objective sense can be originally revealed only by the Other. This has implications for existential social theory (see the section on Sartre: Existentialism and Marxism below).

    Finally, the self-understanding, or project, thanks to which the world is there for me in a meaningful way, already belongs to that world, derives from it, from the tradition or society in which I find myself. Though it is “me,” it is not me “as my own.” My very engagement in the world alienates me from my authentic possibility. This theme is brought out most clearly by Heidegger: the anti-Cartesian idea that the self is defined first of all by its practical engagement entails that this self is not properly individual but rather indisinguishable from anyone else (das Man) who engages in such practices: such a “they-self” does what “one” does. The idea is something like this: Practices can allow things to show up as meaningful—as hammers, dollar bills, or artworks—because practices involve aims that carry with them norms, satisfaction conditions, for what shows up in them. But norms and rules, as Wittgenstein has shown, are essentially public, and that means that when I engage in practices I must be essentially interchangeable with anyone else who does: I eat as one eats; I drive as one drives; I even protest as one protests. To the extent that my activity is to be an instance of such a practice, I must do it in the normal way. Deviations can be recognized as deviations only against this norm, and if they deviate too far they can't be recognized at all.[11] Thus, if who I am is defined through existing, this “who” is normally pre-defined by what is average, by the roles available to me in my culture, and so on. The “I” that gets defined is thereby “anonymous,” or “anyone”; self-making is largely a function of not distinguishing myself from others.

    If there is nevertheless good sense in talking of the singularity of my existence, it will not be something with which one starts but something that gets achieved in recovering oneself from alienation or lostness in the “crowd.” If the normative is first of all the normal, however, it might seem that talk about a norm for the singularity of existence, a standard for thinking about what is my ownmost just as I myself, would be incoherent. It is here that the idea of “authenticity” must come into focus.

    2.3 Authenticity

    By what standard are we to think our efforts “to be,” our manner of being a self? If such standards traditionally derive from the essence that a particular thing instantiates—this hammer is a good one if it instantiates what a hammer is supposed to be—and if there is nothing that a human being is, by its essence, supposed to be, can the meaning of existence at all be thought? Existentialism arises with the collapse of the idea that philosophy can provide substantive norms for existing, ones that specify particular ways of life. Nevertheless, there remains the distinction between what I do “as” myself and as “anyone,” so in this sense existing is something at which I can succeed or fail. Authenticity—in German, Eigentlichkeit—names that attitude in which I engage in my projects as my own (eigen).

    What this means can perhaps be brought out by considering moral evaluations. In keeping my promise I act in accord with duty; and if I keep it because it is my duty, I also act morally (according to Kant) because I am acting for the sake of duty. But existentially there is still a further evaluation to be made. My moral act is inauthentic if, in keeping my promise for the sake of duty, I do so because that is what “one” does (what “moral people” do). But I can do the same thing authentically if, in keeping my promise for the sake of duty, acting this way is something I choose as my own, something to which, apart from its social sanction, I commit myself. Similarly, doing the right thing from a fixed and stable character—which virtue ethics considers a condition of the good—is not beyond the reach of existential evaluation: such character may simply be a product of my tendency to “do what one does,” including feeling “the right way” about things and betaking myself in appropriate ways as one is expected to do. But such character might also be a reflection of my choice of myself, a commitment I make to be a person of this sort. In both cases I have succeeded in being good; only in the latter case, however, have I succeeded in being myself.[12]

    Thus the norm of authenticity refers to a kind of “transparency” with regard to my situation, a recognition that I am a being who can be responsible for who I am. In choosing in light of this norm I can be said to recover myself from alienation, from my absorption in the anonymous “one-self” that characterizes me in my everyday engagement in the world. Authenticity thus indicates a certain kind of integrity—not that of a pre-given whole, an identity waiting to be discovered, but that of a project to which I can either commit myself (and thus “become” what it entails) or else simply occupy for a time, inauthentically drifting in and out of various affairs. Some writers have taken this notion a step further, arguing that the measure of an authentic life lies in the integrity of a narrative, that to be a self is to constitute a story in which a kind of wholeness prevails, to be the author of oneself as a unique individual (Nehamas 1998; Ricoeur 1992). In contrast, the inauthentic life would be one without such integrity, one in which I allow my life-story to be dictated by the world. Be that as it may, it is clear that one can commit oneself to a life of chamealeon-like variety, as does Don Juan in Kierkegaard's version of the legend. Even interpreted narratively, then, the norm of authenticity remains a formal one. As with Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith, one cannot tell who is authentic by looking at the content of their lives.[13]

    Authenticity defines a condition on self-making: do I succeed in making myself, or will who I am merely be a function of the roles I find myself in? Thus to be authentic can also be thought as a way of being autonomous. In choosing “resolutely”—that is, in commiting myself to a certain course of action, a certain way of being in the world—I have given myself the rule that belongs to the role I come to adopt. The inauthentic person, in contrast, merely occupies such a role, and may do so “irresolutely,” without commitment. Being a father authentically does not necessarily make me a better father, but what it means to be a father has become explicitly my concern. It is here that existentialism locates the singularity of existence and identifies what is irreducible in the first-person stance. At the same time, authenticity does not hold out some specific way of life as a norm; that is, it does not distinguish between the projects that I might choose. Instead, it governs the manner in which I am engaged in such projects—either as “my own” or as “what one does,” transparently or opaquely.

    Thus existentialism's focus on authenticity leads to a distinctive stance toward ethics and value-theory generally. The possibility of authenticity is a mark of my freedom, and it is through freedom that existentialism approaches questions of value, leading to many of its most recognizable doctrines.

    Last edited by orthodoxymoron on Thu Feb 11, 2016 1:25 pm; edited 4 times in total

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    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  orthodoxymoron on Thu Apr 17, 2014 1:57 pm

    At this point, I think I need to reflect upon what I've posted thus far. Will you join me? This is tough-stuff! I understand why many people reject theology and philosophy -- and choose football, beer, and skirt-chasing instead. Should they be damned to hell for all eternity?? Would this be Unrighteous-Judgment with Extreme-Prejudice?? What Would Camus Do?? Existentialism continued:

    3. Freedom and Value

    Existentialism did not develop much in the way of a normative ethics; however, a certain approach to the theory of value and to moral psychology, deriving from the idea of existence as self-making in situation, are distinctive marks of the existentialist tradition. In value theory, existentialists tend to emphasize the conventionality or groundlessness of values, their “ideality,” the fact that they arise entirely through the projects of human beings against the background of an otherwise meaningless and indifferent world. Existential moral psychology emphasizes human freedom and focuses on the sources of mendacity, self-deception, and hypocricy in moral consciousness. The familiar existential themes of anxiety, nothingness, and the absurd must be understood in this context. At the same time, there is deep concern to foster an authentic stance toward the human, groundless, values without which no project is possible, a concern that gets expressed in the notions of “engagement” and “commitment.”[14]

    3.1 Anxiety, Nothingness, the Absurd

    As a predicate of existence, the concept of freedom is not initially established on the basis of arguments against determinism; nor is it, in Kantian fashion, taken simply as a given of practical self-consciousness. Rather, it is located in the breakdown of direct practical activity. The “evidence” of freedom is a matter neither of theoretical nor of practical consciousness but arises from the self-understanding that accompanies a certain mood into which I may fall, namely, anxiety (Angst, angoisse). Both Heidegger and Sartre believe that phenomenological analysis of the kind of intentionality that belongs to moods does not merely register a passing modification of the psyche but reveals fundamental aspects of the self. Fear, for instance, reveals some region of the world as threatening, some element in it as a threat, and myself as vulnerable. In anxiety, as in fear, I grasp myself as threatened or as vulnerable; but unlike fear, anxiety has no direct object, there is nothing in the world that is threatening. This is because anxiety pulls me altogether out of the circuit of those projects thanks to which things are there for me in meaningful ways; I can no longer “gear into” the world. And with this collapse of my practical immersion in roles and projects, I also lose the basic sense of who I am that is provided by these roles. In thus robbing me of the possibility of practical self-identification, anxiety teaches me that I do not coincide with anything that I factically am. Further, since the identity bound up with such roles and practices is always typical and public, the collapse of this identity reveals an ultimately first-personal aspect of myself that is irreducible to das Man. As Heidegger puts it, anxiety testifies to a kind of “existential solipsism.” It is this reluctant, because disorienting and dispossessing, retreat into myself in anxiety that yields the existential figure of the outsider, the isolated one who “sees through” the phoniness of those who, unaware of what the breakdown of anxiety portends, live their lives complacently identifying with their roles as though these roles thoroughly defined them. While this sort of stance may be easy to ridicule as adolescent self-absorption, it is also solidly supported by the phenomenology (or moral psychology) of first-person experience.

    The experience of anxiety also yields the existential theme of the absurd, a version of what was previously introduced as alienation from the world (see the section on Alienation above). So long as I am gearing into the world practically, in a seamless and absorbed way, things present themselves as meaningfully co-ordinated with the projects in which I am engaged; they show me the face that is relevant to what I am doing. But the connection between these meanings and my projects is not itself something that I experience. Rather, the hammer's usefulness, its value as a hammer, appears simply to belong to it in the same way that its weight or color does. So long as I am practically engaged, in short, all things appear to have reasons for being, and I, correlatively, experience myself as fully at home in the world. The world has an order that is largely transparent to me (even its mysteries are grasped simply as something for which there are reasons that are there “for others,” for “experts,” merely beyond my limited horizon). In the mood of anxiety, however, it is just this character that fades from the world. Because I am no longer practically engaged, the meaning that had previously inhabited the thing as the density of its being now stares back at me as a mere name, as something I “know” but which no longer claims me. As when one repeats a word until it loses meaning, anxiety undermines the taken-for-granted sense of things. They become absurd. Things do not disappear, but all that remains of them is the blank recognition that they are—an experience that informs a central scene in Sartre's novel Nausea. As Roquentin sits in a park, the root of a tree loses its character of familiarity until he is overcome by nausea at its utterly alien character, its being en soi. While such an experience is no more genuine than my practical, engaged experience of a world of meaning, it is no less genuine either. An existential account of meaning and value must recognize both possibilities (and their intermediaries). To do so is to acknowledge a certain absurdity to existence: though reason and value have a foothold in the world (they are not, after all, my arbitrary invention), they nevertheless lack any ultimate foundation. Values are not intrinsic to being, and at some point reasons give out.[15]

    Another term for the groundlessness of the world of meaning is “nothingness.” Heidegger introduced this term to indicate the kind of self- and world-understanding that emerges in anxiety: because my practical identity is constituted by the practices I engage in, when these collapse I “am” not anything. In a manner of speaking I am thus brought face-to-face with my own finitude, my “death” as the possibility in which I am no longer able to be anything. This experience of my own death, or “nothingness,” in anxiety can act as a spur to authenticity: I come to see that I “am” not anything but must “make myself be” through my choice. In commiting myself in the face of death—that is, aware of the nothingness of my identity if not supported by me right up to the end—the roles that I have hitherto thoughtlessly engaged in as one does now become something that I myself own up to, become responsible for. Heidegger termed this mode of self-awareness—awareness of the ultimate nothingness of my practical identity—“freedom,” and Sartre developed this existential concept of freedom in rich detail. This is not to say that Heidegger's and Sartre's views on freedom are identical. Heidegger, for instance, will emphasize that freedom is always “thrown” into an historical situation from which it draws its possibilities, while Sartre (who is equally aware of the “facticity” of our choices) will emphasize that such “possibilities” nevertheless underdetermine choice. But the theory of radical freedom that Sartre develops is nevertheless directly rooted in Heidegger's account of the nothingness of my practical identity.

    Sartre (1992:70) argues that anxiety provides a lucid experience of that freedom which, though often concealed, characterizes human existence as such. For him, freedom is the dislocation of consciousness from its object, the fundamental “nihilation” or negation by means of which consciousness can grasp its object without losing itself in it: to be conscious of something is to be conscious of not being it, a “not” that arises in the very structure of consciousness as being for-itself. Because “nothingness” (or nihilation) is just what consciousness is, there can be no objects in consciousness, but only objects for consciousness.[16] This means that consciousness is radically free, since its structure precludes that it either contain or be acted on by things. For instance, because it is not thing-like, consciousness is free with regard to its own prior states. Motives, instincts, psychic forces, and the like cannot be understood as inhabitants of consciousness that might infect freedom from within, inducing one to act in ways for which one is not responsible; rather, they can exist only for consciousness as matters of choice. I must either reject their claims or avow them. For Sartre, the ontological freedom of existence entails that determinism is an excuse before it is a theory: though through its structure of nihilation consciousness escapes that which would define it—including its own past choices and behavior—there are times when I may wish to deny my freedom. Thus I may attempt to constitute these aspects of my being as objective “forces” which hold sway over me in the manner of relations between things. This is to adopt the third-person stance on myself, in which what is originally structured in terms of freedom appears as a causal property of myself. I can try to look upon myself as the Other does, but as an excuse this flight from freedom is shown to fail, according to Sartre, in the experience of anguish.

    For instance, Sartre writes of a gambler who, after losing all and fearing for himself and his family, retreats to the reflective behavior of resolving never to gamble again. This motive thus enters into his facticity as a choice he has made; and, as long as he retains his fear, his living sense of himself as being threatened, it may appear to him that this resolve actually has causal force in keeping him from gambling. However, one evening he confronts the gaming tables and is overcome with anguish at the recognition that his resolve, while still “there,” retains none of its power: it is an object for consciousness but is not (and never could have been) something in consciousness that was determining his actions. In order for it to influence his behavior he has to avow it afresh, but this is just what he cannot do; indeed, just this is what he hoped the original resolve would spare him from having to do. He will have to “remake” the self who was in the original situation of fear and threat. At this point, perhaps, he will try to relieve himself of freedom by giving in to the urge to gamble and chalking it up to “deeper” motives that overcame the initial resolve, problems from his childhood perhaps. But anguish can recur with regard to this strategy as well—for instance, if he needs a loan to continue gambling and must convince someone that he is “as good as his word.” The possibilities for self-deception in such cases are endless.

    As Sartre points out in great detail, anguish, as the consciousness of freedom, is not something that human beings welcome; rather, we seek stability, identity, and adopt the language of freedom only when it suits us: those acts are considered by me to be my free acts which exactly match the self I want others to take me to be. We are “condemned to be free,” which means that we can never simply be who we are but are separated from ourselves by the nothingness of having perpetually to re-choose, or re-commit, ourselves to what we do. Characteristic of the existentialist outlook is the idea that we spend much of lives devising strategies for denying or evading the anguish of freedom. One of these strategies is “bad faith.” Another is the appeal to values.

    3.2 The Ideality of Values

    The idea that freedom is the origin of value—where freedom is defined not in terms of acting rationally (Kant) but rather existentially, as choice and transcendence—is the idea perhaps most closely associated with existentialism. So influential was this general outlook on value that Karl-Otto Apel (1973:235) came to speak of a kind of “official complementarity of existentialism and scientism” in Western philosophy, according to which what can be justified rationally falls under the “value-free objectivism of science” while all other validity claims become matters for an “existential subjectivism of religious faith and ethical decisions.” Positivism attempted to provide a theory of “cognitive meaning” based on what it took to be the inner logic of scientific thought, and it relegated questions of value to cognitive meaninglessness, reducing them to issues of emotive response and subjective preference. While it does not explain evaluative language solely as a function of affective attitudes, existential thought, like positivism, denies that values can be grounded in being—that is, that they can become the theme of a scientific investigation capable of distinguishing true (or valid) from false values.[17] In this regard Sartre speaks of the “ideality” of values, by which he means not that they have some sort of timeless validity but that they have no real authority and cannot be used to underwrite or justify my behavior. For Sartre, “values derive their meaning from an original projection of myself which stands as my choice of myself in the world.” But if that is so, then I cannot, without circularity, appeal to values in order to justify this very choice: “I make my decision concerning them—without justification and without excuse” (Sartre 1992:78). This so-called “decisionism” has been a hotly contested legacy of existentialism and deserves a closer look here.

    How is it that values are supposed to be grounded in freedom? By “value” Sartre means those aspects of my experience that do not merely causally effectuate something but rather make a claim on me: I do not just see the homeless person but encounter him as “to be helped”; I do not just hear the other's voice but register “a question to be answered honestly”; I do not simply happen to sit quietly in Church but “attend reverently”; I do not merely hear the alarm clock but am “summoned to get up.” Values, then, as Sartre writes, appear with the character of demands and as such they “lay claim to a foundation” or justification (Sartre 1992:76). Why ought I help the homeless, answer honestly, sit reverently, or get up? Sartre does not claim that there is no answer to these questions but only that the answer depends, finally, on my choice of “myself” which cannot in turn be justfied by appeal to a value. As he puts it, “value derives its being from its exigency and not its exigency from its being.” The exigency of value cannot be grounded in being itself, since it would thereby lose its character as an ought; it would “cease even to be value” since it would have the kind of exigency (contrary to freedom) possessed by a mere cause. Thus, against then-current value-theoretical intuitionism, Sartre denies that value can “deliver itself to a contemplative intuition which would apprehend it as being value and thereby would derive from it its right over my freedom.” Instead, “it can be revealed only to an active freedom which makes it exist as a value by the sole fact of recognizing it as such” (Sartre 1992:76).

    For instance, I do not grasp the exigency of the alarm clock (its character as a demand) in a kind of disinterested perception but only in the very act of responding to it, of getting up. If I fail to get up the alarm has, to that very extent, lost its exigency. Why must I get up? At this point I may attempt to justify its demand by appeal to other elements of the situation with which the alarm is bound up: I must get up because I must go to work. From this point of view the alarm's demand appears—and is—justified, and such justification will often suffice to get me going again. But the question of the foundation of value has simply been displaced: now it is my job that, in my active engagement, takes on the unquestioned exigency of a demand or value. But it too derives its being as a value from its exigency—that is, from my unreflective engagement in the overall practice of going to work. Ought I go to work? Why not be “irresponsible”? If a man's got to eat, why not rather take up a life of crime? If these questions have answers that are themselves exigent it can only be because, at a still deeper level, I am engaged as having chosen myself as a person of a certain sort: respectable, responsible. From within that choice there is an answer of what I ought to do, but outside that choice there is none—why should I be respectable, law-abiding?—for it is only because some choice has been made that anything at all can appear as compelling, as making a claim on me. Only if I am at some level engaged do values (and so justification in terms of them) appear at all. The more I pull out of engagement toward reflection on and questioning of my situation, the more I am threatened by ethical anguish—“which is the recognition of the ideality of values” (Sartre 1992:76). And, as with all anguish, I do not escape this situation by discovering the true order of values but by plunging back into action. If the idea that values are without foundation in being can be understood as a form of nihilism, the existential response to this condition of the modern world is to point out that meaning, value, is not first of all a matter of contemplative theory but a consequence of engagement and commitment.

    Thus value judgments can be justified, but only relative to some concrete and specific project. The “pattern of behavior” of the typical bourgeois defines the meaning of “respectability” (Sartre 1992:77), and so it is true of some particular bit of behavior that it is either respectable or not. For this reason I can be in error about what I ought to do. It may be that something that appears exigent during the course of my unreflective engagement in the world is something that I ought not to give in to. If, thanks to my commitment to the Resistance, a given official appears to me as to be shot, I might nevertheless be wrong to shoot him—if, for instance, the official was not who I thought he was, or if killing him would in fact prove counter-productive given my longer-term goals. Sartre's fictional works are full of explorations of moral psychology of this sort. But I cannot extend these “hypothetical” justifications to a point where some purely theoretical consideration of my obligations—whether derived from the will of God, from Reason, or from the situation itself—could underwrite my freedom in such a way as to relieve it of responsibility. For in order for such considerations to count I would have to make myself the sort of person for whom God's will, abstract Reason, or the current situation is decisive. For existentialists like Sartre, then, I am “the one who finally makes values exist in order to determine [my] actions by their demands.”[18]

    Commitment—or “engagement”—is thus ultimately the basis for an authentically meaningful life, that is, one that answers to the existential condition of being human and does not flee that condition by appeal to an abstract system of reason or divine will. Yet though I alone can commit myself to some way of life, some project, I am never alone when I do so; nor do I do so in a social, historical, or political vaccuum. If transcendence represents my radical freedom to define myself, facticity—that other aspect of my being—represents the situated character of this self-making. Because freedom as transcendence undermines the idea of a stable, timeless system of moral norms, it is little wonder that existential philosophers devoted scant energy to questions of normative moral theory. However, because this freedom is always socially (and thereby historically) situated, it is equally unsurprising that their writings are greatly concerned with how our choices and commitments are concretely contextualized in terms of political struggles and historical reality.

    4. Politics, History, Engagement

    For the existentialists engagement is the source of meaning and value; in choosing myself I in a certain sense make my world. On the other hand, I always choose myself in a context where there are others doing the same thing, and in a world that has always already been there. In short, my acting is situated, both socially and historically. Thus, in choosing myself in the first-person singular, I am also choosing in such a way that a first-person plural, a “we,” is simultaneously constituted. Such choices make up the domain of social reality: they fit into a pre-determined context of roles and practices that go largely unquestioned and may be thought of as a kind of collective identity. In social action my identity takes shape against a background (the collective identity of the social formation) that remains fixed. On the other hand, it can happen that my choice puts this social formation or collective identity itself into question: who I am to be is thus inseperable from the question of who we are to be. Here the first-person plural is itself the issue, and the action that results from such choices constitutes the field of the political.

    If authenticity is the category by which I am able to think about what it means to “exist,” then, the account of authenticity cannot neglect the social, historical, and political aspects of that existence. Thus it is not merely because twentieth-century existentialism flourished at a time when European history appeared to collapse and political affairs loomed especially large that existential philosophers devoted much attention to these matters; rather, the demand for an account of the “situation” stems from the very character of existence itself, which, unlike the classical “rational subject,” is what it is only in relation to its “time.” This is not to say, however, that existential philosophers are unanimous in their account of the importance of historical factors or in their estimation of the political in relation to other aspects of existence. Emmanuel Levinas, for example, whose early work belonged within the orbit of existential philosophy, opposed to the “horizontal” temporality of political history a “vertical” or eschatological temporality that radically challenged all historical meaning, while Sartre, in contrast, produced a version of Marxist historical materialism in which existentialism itself became a mere “ideology.” But we cannot stop to examine all such differences here. Instead, we shall look at the positions of Heidegger and Sartre, who provide opposing examples of how an authentic relation to history and politics can be understood.

    4.1 Heidegger: History as Claim

    For Heidegger, to exist is to be historical. This does not mean that one simply finds oneself at a particular moment in history, conceived as a linear series of events. Rather, it means that selfhood has a peculiar temporal structure that is the origin of that “history” which subsequently comes to be narrated in terms of a series of events. Existential temporality is not a sequence of instants but instead a unified structure in which the “future” (that is, the possibility aimed at in my project) recollects the “past” (that is, what no longer needs to be done, the completed) so as to give meaning to the “present” (that is, the things that take on significance in light of what currently needs doing). To act, therefore, is, in Heidegger's terms, to “historize” (geschehen), to constitute something like a narrative unity, with beginning, middle, and end, that does not so much take place in time as provides the condition for linear time. To exist “between birth and death,” then, is not merely to be present in each of a discrete series of temporal instants but to consitute oneself in the unity of a history, and authentic existence is thus one in which the projects that give shape to existence are ones to which I commit myself in light of this history. Though it belongs to, and defines, a “moment,” choice cannot be simply “of the moment”; to be authentic I must understand my choice in light of the potential wholeness of my existence.

    That this choice has a political dimension stems from the fact that existence is always being-with-others. Though authenticity arises on the basis of my being alienated, in anxiety, from the claims made by norms belonging to the everyday life of das Man, any concrete commitment that I make in the movement to recover myself will enlist those norms in two ways. First, what I commit myself to will always be derived from some “possibility of Dasein that has been there” (Heidegger 1962:438): I cannot make my identity from whole cloth; I will always understand myself in terms of some way of existing that has been handed down within my tradition.[19] I “choose my hero” (Heidegger 1962:437) by, for instance, committing myself to a philosophical life, which I understand on the model of Socrates, or to a religious life, which I understand on the model of St. Francis. The point is that I must understand myself in terms of something, and these possibilities for understanding come from the historical heritage and the norms that belong to it. Heidegger thinks of this historical dimension as a kind of “fate” (Schicksal): not something inevitable that controls my choice but something that, inherited from my historical situation, claims me, holds a kind of authority for me.

    The second way in which the everyday norms of das Man are enlisted in authentic choice stems from the fact that when I commit myself to my “fate” I do so “in and with my ‘generation’” (Heidegger 1962:436). The idea here seems roughly to be this: To opt for a way of going on is to affirm the norms that belong to it; and because of the nature of normativity (rules) it is not possible to affirm norms that would hold only for me. There is a kind of publicity and scope in the normative such that, when I choose, I establish a standard for others as well. Similarly, Heidegger holds that the sociality of my historizing restricts what can be a genuine “fate” or choice for me. Acting is always with others—more specifically, with a “community” or a “people” (Volk)—and together this “co-historizing” responds to a “destiny” (Geschick) which has guided our fates in advance (Heidegger 1962:436). Not everything is really possible for us, and an authentic choice must strive to respond to the claim that history makes on the people to whom one belongs, to seize its “destiny.” Along this communitarian axis, then, existential historicality can open out onto the question of politics: who are “we” to be?

    Heidegger suggests that it was this concept of historicality that underwrote his own concrete political engagement during the period of National Socialism in Germany. Disgusted with the political situation in Weimar Germany and characterizing it as especially irresolute or inauthentic, Heidegger looked upon Hitler's movement as a way of recalling the German people back to their “ownmost” possibility—i.e., a way for Germany to constitute itself authentically as an alternative to the political models of Russia and the United States. Heidegger's choice to intervene in university politics at this time was thus both a choice of himself—in which he chose his hero: Plato's “philosopher-king” (see Arendt 1978)—and a choice for his “generation.” Much is controversial about Heidegger's engagement for National Socialism (not least whether he drew the appropriate consequences from his own concept of authenticity), but it provides a clear example of a kind of existential politics that depends on an ability to “tell time”—that is, to sense the imperatives of one's factic historical situation. Heidegger later became very suspicious of this sort of existential politics. Indeed, for the idea of authenticity as resolute commitment he substituted the idea of a “letting-be” (Gelassenheit) and for engagement the stance of “waiting.” He came to believe that the problems that face us (notably, the dominance of technological ways of thinking) have roots that lie deeper than can be addressed through politics directly. He thus famously denied that democracy was sufficient to deal with the political crisis posed by technology, asserting that “only a god can save us” (Heidegger 1981:55, 57). But even here, in keeping with the existential notion of historicity, Heidegger's recommendations turn on a reading of history, of the meaning of our time.

    4.2 Sartre: Existentialism and Marxism

    A very different reading, and a very different recommendation, can be found in the work of Sartre. The basis for Sartre's reading of history, and his politics, was laid in that section of Being and Nothingness that describes the birth of the social in the “Look” of the other. In making me an object for his projects, the other alienates me from myself, displaces me from the subject position (the position from which the world is defined in its meaning and value) and constitutes me as something. Concretely, what I am constituted “as” is a function of the other's project and not something that I can make myself be. I am constituted as a “Frenchman” in and through the hostility emanating from that German; I am constituted as a “man” in the resentment of that woman; I am constituted as a “Jew” on the basis of the other's anti-semitism; and so on. This sets up a dimension of my being that I can neither control nor disavow, and my only recourse is to wrench myself away from the other in an attempt to restore myself to the subject-position. For this reason, on Sartre's model, social reality is in perpetual conflict—an Hegelian dialectic in which, for ontological reasons, no state of mutual recognition can ever be achieved. The “we”—the political subject—is always contested, conflicted, unstable.

    But this instability does have a certain structure, one which Sartre, steeped in the Marxism of inter-war French thought (Alexandre Kojève, Jean Hyppolite), explored in terms of a certain historical materialism. For social relations take place not only between human beings but also within institutions that have developed historically and that enshrine relations of power and domination. Thus the struggle for who will take the subject position is not carried out on equal terms. As Simone de Beauvoir demonstrated in detail in her book, The Second Sex, the historical and institutional place of women is defined in such a way that they are consigned to a kind of permanent “object” status—they are the “second” sex since social norms are defined in male terms. This being so, a woman's struggle to develop self-defining projects is constrained by a permanent institutional “Look” that already defines her as “woman,” whereas a man need not operate under constraints of gender: he feels himself to be simply “human,” pure subjectivity. Employing similar insights in reflection on the situations of ethnic and economic oppression, Sartre sought a way to derive political imperatives in the face of the groundlessness of moral values entailed by his view of the ideality of values.

    At first, Sartre argued that there was one value—namely freedom itself—that did have a kind of universal authority. To commit oneself to anything is also always to commit oneself to the value of freedom. In “Existentialism is a Humanism” Sartre tried to establish this by way of a kind of transcendental argument, but he soon gave up that strategy and pursued the more modest one of claiming that the writer must always engage “on the side of freedom.” According to the theory of “engaged literature” expounded in What is Literature?, in creating a literary world the author is always acting either to imagine paths toward overcoming concrete unfreedoms such as racism and capitalist exploitation, or else closing them off. In the latter case, he is contradicting himself, since the very idea of writing presupposes the freedom of the reader, and that means, in principle, the whole of the reading public. Whatever the merits of this argument, it does suggest the political value to which Sartre remained committed throughout his life: the value of freedom as self-making.

    This commitment finally led Sartre to hold that existentialism itself was only an “ideological” moment within Marxism, which he termed “the one philosophy of our time which we cannot go beyond” (Sartre 1968:xxxiv). As this statement suggests, Sartre's embrace of Marxism was a function of his sense of history as the factic situation in which the project of self-making takes place. Because existing is self-making (action), philosophy—including existential philosophy—cannot be understood as a disinterested theorizing about timeless essences but is always already a form of engagement, a diagnosis of the past and a projection of norms appropriate to a different future in light of which the present takes on significance. It therefore always arises from the historical-political situation and is a way of intervening in it. Marxism, like existentialism, makes this necessarily practical orientation of philosophy explicit.

    From the beginning existentialism saw itself in this activist way (and this provided the basis for the most serious disagreements among French existentialists such as Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Camus, many of which were fought out in the pages of the journal founded by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Les Temps modernes). But the later Sartre came to hold that a philosophy of self-making could not content itself with highlighting the situation of individual choice; an authentic political identity could only emerge from a theory that situated such choice in a practically oriented analysis of its concrete situation. Thus it appeard to him that the “ideology of existence” was itself merely an alienated form of the deeper analysis of social and historical reality provided by Marx's dialectical approach. In focusing on the most important aspects of the material condition in which the existential project of self-making takes place—namely, economic relations under conditions of scarcity—Marx's critique of capital offered a set of considerations that no “philosophy of freedom” could ignore, considerations that would serve to orient political engagement until such time as “there will exist for everyone a margin of real freedom beyond the production of life” (Sartre 1968:34). Marxism is unsurpassable, therefore, because it is the most lucid theory of our alienated situation of concrete unfreedom, oriented toward the practical-political overcoming of that unfreedom.

    Sartre's relation to orthodox Marxism was marked by tension, however, since he held that existing Marxism had abandoned the promise of its dialectical approach to social reality in favor of a dogmatic “apriorism” that subsumed historical reality under a blanket of lifeless abstractions. He thus undertook his Critique of Dialectical Reason to restore the promise of Marxism by reconceiving its concept of praxis in terms of the existential notion of project. What had become a rigid economic determinism would be restored to dialectical fluidity by recalling the existential doctrine of self-making: it is true that man is “made” by history, but at the same time he is making that very history. This attempt to “reconquer man within Marxism” (Sartre 1968:83)—i.e., to develop a method which would preserve the concrete details of human reality as lived experience—was not well received by orthodox Marxists. Sartre's fascination with the details of Flaubert's life, or the life of Baudelaire, smacked too much of “bourgeois idealism.” But we see here how Sartre's politics, like Heidegger's, derived from his concept of history: there are no “iron-clad laws” that make the overthrow of capitalism the inevitable outcome of economic forces; there are only men in situation who make history as they are made by it. Dialectical materialism is the unsurpassable philosophy of those who choose, who commit themselves to, the value of freedom. The political claim that Marxism has on us, then, would rest upon the ideological enclave within it: authentic existence as choice.

    Authentic existence thus has an historical, political dimension; all choice will be attentive to history in the sense of contextualizing itself in some temporally narrative understanding of its place. But even here it must be admitted that what makes existence authentic is not the “correctness” of the narrative understanding it adopts. Authenticity does not depend on some particular substantive view of history, some particular theory or empirical story. From this point of view, the substantive “histories” adopted by existential thinkers as different as Heidegger and Sartre should perhaps be read less as scientific accounts, defensible in third-person terms, than as articulations of the historical situation from the perspective of what that situation is taken to demand, given the engaged commitment of their authors. They stand, in other words, less as justifications for their authors' existential and political commitments than as themselves a form of politics: invitations to others to see things as the author sees them, so that the author's commitment to going on a certain way will come to be shared.

    5. Existentialism Today

    As a cultural movement, existentialism belongs to the past. As a philosophical inquiry that introduced a new norm, authenticity, for understanding what it means to be human—a norm tied to distinctive, post-Cartesian concept of the self as practical, embodied, being-in-the-world—existentialism has continued to play an important role in contemporary thought, in both the continental and analytic traditions. The Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, as well as societies devoted to Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Jaspers, Beauvoir, and other existential philosophers, provide a forum for ongoing work—both of a historical, scholarly nature and of more systematic focus—that derives from classical existentialism, often bringing it into confrontation with more recent movements such as structuralism, deconstruction, hermeneutics, and feminism. In the area of gender studies Judith Butler (1990) draws importantly on existential sources, as does Lewis Gordon (1995) in the area of race theory. Interest in a narrative conception of self-identity—for instance, in the work of Charles Taylor (1999), Paul Ricoeur, David Carr (1986), or Charles Guignon—has its roots in the existential revision of Hegelian notions of temporality and its critique of rationalism. Hubert Dreyfus (1979) developed an influential criticism of the Artificial Intelligence program drawing essentially upon the existentialist idea, found especially in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, that the human world, the world of meaning, must be understood first of all as a function of our embodied practices and cannot be represented as a logically structured system of representations. Calling for a “new existentialism,” John Haugeland (1998) has explored the role of existential commitment in scientific practices as truth-tracking practices. In a series of books, Michael Gelven (1990, 1997) has reflected upon the distinctions between existential, moral, and epistemological or logical dimensions of experience, showing how the standards appropriate to each intertwine, without reducing to any single one. A revival of interest in moral psychology finds many writers who are taking up the question of self-identity and responsibility in ways that recall the existential themes of self-making and choice—for instance, Christine Korsgaard (1996) appeals crucially to notions of “self-creation” and “practical identity”; Richard Moran (2001) emphasizes the connection between self-avowal and the first-person perspective in a way that derives in part from Sartre; and Thomas Nagel has followed the existentialist line in connecting meaning to the consciousness of death. Even if such writers tend to proceed with more confidence in the touchstone of rationality than did the classical existentialists, their work operates on the terrain opened up by the earlier thinkers. In addition, after years of being out of fashion in France, existential motifs have once again become prominent in the work of leading thinkers. Foucault's embrace of a certain concept of freedom, and his exploration of the “care of the self,” recall debates within existentialism, as does Derrida's recent work on religion without God and his reflections on the concepts of death, choice, and responsibility. In very different ways, the books by Cooper (1999) and Alan Schrift (1995) suggest that a re-appraisal of the legacy of existentialism is an important agenda item of contemporary philosophy. In some sense, existentialism's very notoriety as a cultural movement may have impeded its serious philosophical reception. It may be that what we have most to learn from existentialism still lies before us.


    The bibliography is divided into two sections; taken together, they provide a representative sample of existentialist writing. The first includes books that are cited in the body of the article. The second contains supplementary reading, including works that have been mentioned in the article, selected works by some of the figures mentioned in the first paragraph of the article, certain classical readings in existentialism, and more recent studies of relevance to the issues discussed. The bibliography is, somewhat arbitrarily, limited to works in English, and no attempt at comprehensiveness has been made. For detailed bibliographies of the major existentialists, including critical studies, the reader is referred to the entries devoted to the individual philosophers. I invite readers to suggest new and noteworthy sources for inclusion here.

    Works Cited
    Apel, K.-O., 1973. “The Apriori of the Communication Community and the Foundation of Ethics,” in Towards a Transformation of Philosophy. Tr. Glyn Adey and David Frisby. London: Routledge.
    Arendt, H., 1978. “Heidegger at Eighty,” in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy. Ed. Michael Murray. New Haven: Yale University Press.
    Beauvoir, S., 1989. The Second Sex (1949). Tr. H. M. Parshley. New York: Vintage Books.
    Butler, J., 1990. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, New York: Routledge.
    Carr, D., 1986. Time, Narrative, and History, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
    Cooper, D., 1999. Existentialism, Oxford: Blackwell.
    Crowell, S., 2001. Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning: Paths Toward Transcendental Phenomenology, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
    Crowell, S., 2004. “Authentic Historicality,” in Space, Time, and Culture. Ed. David Carr and Cheung Chan-Fai. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
    Dreyfus, H., 1979. What Computers Can't Do: The Limits of Artificial Intelligence, New York: Harper Colophon.
    Dreyfus, H., and J. Haugeland, 1978. “Husserl and Heidegger: Philosophy's Last Stand,” in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy. Ed. Michael Murray. New Haven: Yale University Press.
    Fackenheim, E., 1961. Metaphysics and Historicity, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.
    Fell, J., 1979. Heidegger and Sartre: An Essay on Being and Place, New York: Columbia University Press.
    Gordon, L., 1995. Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press.
    Gelven, M., 1997. The Risk of Being: What is Means to Be Good and Bad, University Park: Penn State Press.
    Gelven, M., 1990. Truth and Existence: A Philosophical Inquiry, University Park: Penn State Press.
    Guignon, C., 1993. “Authenticity, Moral Values, and Psychotherapy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.
    Hannay, A., 1982. Kierkegaard, London: Routledge.
    Haugeland, J., 1998. Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
    Heidegger, M., 1962. Being and Time. Tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper and Row.
    Heidegger, M., 1985. History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena. Tr. Theodore Kisiel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
    Heidegger, M., 1998. “Letter on Humanism,” in Pathmarks. Ed. William McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    Heidegger, M., 1981. “'Only a God Can Save Us': The Spiegel Interview (1966),” in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker. Ed. Thomas Sheehan. Chicago: Precedent Publishing.
    Jaspers, K., 1968. Reason and Existenz, New York: Noonday Press.
    Kaufmann, W., 1968. Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, Cleveland: Meridian Books.
    Korsgaard, C., 1996. The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.
    MacIntyre, A., 1967. “Existentialism,” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. III. Ed. Paul Edwards. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.
    Marcel, G., 1968. The Philosophy of Existentialism, New York: Citadel Press.
    Merleau-Ponty, M., 1962. Phenomenology of Perception. Tr. Colin Smith. New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
    Moran, R., 2001. Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self Knowledge, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Natanson, M., 1968. Literature, Philosophy, and the Social Sciences, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
    Nehamas, A., 1998. The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault, Berkeley: University of California Press.
    Ricoeur, P., 1992. Oneself as Another. Tr. Kathleen Blamey. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
    Sartre, J.-P., 1992. Being and Nothingness. Tr. Hazel Barnes. New York: Washington Square Press.
    Sartre, J.-P., 1968. Search for a Method. Tr. Hazel Barnes. New York: Vintage Books.
    Schrift, A., 1995. Nietzsche's French Legacy: A Genealogy of Poststructuralism, New York: Routledge.
    Spiegelberg, H., 1984. The Phenomenological Movement, 3rd ed. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
    Taylor, C., 1985. “Self-Interpreting Animals,” in Philosophical Papers I: Human Agency and Language. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.
    Taylor, C., 1989. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
    Warnock, M., 1967. Existentialist Ethics, London: Macmillan and Co, Ltd.
    Zaner, R., and D. Ihde (eds.), 1973. Phenomenology and Existentialism, New York: Capricorn Books

    Other Readings
    Arendt, H., 1998. The Human Condition (1958). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
    Aron, R., 1969. Marxism and the Existentialists, New York: Harper and Row.
    Barnes, H., 1967. An Existentialist Ethics, New York: Knopf.
    Barrett, W., 1962. Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy (1958), Garden City: Doubleday.
    Buber, M., 1978. Between Man and Man. Tr. Ronald Gregor Smith. New York: Macmillan.
    Buber, M., 1970. I and Thou. Tr. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Scribner.
    Bultmann, R., 1987. Faith and Understanding. Tr. Louise Pettibone Smith. Philadelphia: Fortress Press.
    Bultmann, R., 1957. History and Eschatology, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
    Busch, T., 1999. Circulating Being: From Embodiment to Incorporation (Essays on Late Existentialism), New York: Fordham University Press.
    Camus, A., 1955. The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays. Tr. Justin O'Brien. New York: Knopf.
    Camus, A., 1988. The Stranger. Tr. Matthew Ward. New York: Knopf.
    Collins, J., 1952. The Existentialists: A Critical Study, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company.
    Dostoevsky, F., 1976. The Brothers Karamazov: The Constance Garnett translation revised by Ralph E. Matlaw. New York: Norton.
    Earnshaw, S., 2006. Existentialism: A Guide for the Perplexed, London: Continuum.
    Flynn, T., 2006. Existentialism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Flynn, T., 1997. Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason, vol. 1, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
    Gordon, H., 1999. Dictionary of Existentialism, New York: Greenwood Press.
    Gordon, L., 1997. Existence in Black: An Anthology of Black Existential Philosophy, New York: Routledge.
    Gordon, L., 2000. Existentia Africana: Understanding Africana Existential Thought, London: Routledge.
    Grene, M., 1948. Dreadful Freedom: A Critique of Existentialism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
    Guignon, C., 2003. The Existentialists: Critical Essays on Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre, New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
    Guignon, C., and D. Pereboom (eds.), “Introduction: The Legacy of Existentialism,” in Existentialism: Basic Writings. Indianapolis: Hackett.
    Guignon, C., and D. Pereboom (eds.), Existentialism: Basic Writings, Indianapolis: Hackett.
    Jaspers, K., 1968. Reason and Existenz. Tr. William Earle. New York: Noonday Press.
    Judt, T., 1992. Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals 1944–1956, Berkeley: University of California Press.
    Kant, I., 1960. Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. Tr. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson. New York: Harper & Row.
    Kierkegaard, S., 1971. Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Tr. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    Kierkegaard, S., 1983. Fear and Trembling. Tr. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    Kruks, S., 1990. Situation and Human Existence: Freedom, Subjectivity, and Society, London: Unwin Hyman.
    Marcel, G., 1949. Being and Having. Tr. Katherine Farrer. London: Westminster.
    McBride, W. (ed.), 1997. The Development and Meaning of Twentieth Century Existentialism, New York: Garland. Publishers
    Merleau-Ponty, M., 1973. Adventures of the Dialectic. Tr. Joseph Bien. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
    Merleau-Ponty, M., 1962. The Phenomenology of Perception. Tr. Colin Smith. New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
    Natanson, M., 1986. Anonymity: A Study in the Philosophy of Alfred Schutz, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
    Nietzsche, F., 1969. On the Genealogy of Morals. Tr. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books.
    Nietzsche, F., 1974. The Gay Science. Tr. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books.
    Nietzsche, F., 1975. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In The Portable Nietzsche. Tr. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Viking Press.
    Olafson, F., 1967. Principles and Persons: An Ethical Interpretation of Existentialism, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press.
    Ortega y Gasset, J., 1985. Revolt of the Masses. Tr. Anthony Kerrigan. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
    Poster, M., 1975. Existential Marxism in Postwar France: From Sartre to Althusser, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    Ricoeur, P., 1970. Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, New Haven: Yale University Press.
    Reynolds, J., 2006. Understanding Existentialism. London: Acumen.
    Sartre, J.-P., 1967. Baudelaire. Tr. Martin Turnell. New York: New Directions.
    Sartre, J.-P., 1976. Critique of Dialectical Reason I: Theory of Practical Ensembles (1960). Tr. Alan Sheridan-Smith. London: Verso.
    Sartre, J.-P., 2007. Existentialism is a Humanism. Tr. Carol Macomber. New Haven: Yale University Press.
    Sartre, J.-P., 1959. Nausea. Tr. Lloyd Alexander. New York: New Directions.
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    Solomon, R. (ed.), 1974. Existentialism, New York: Random House.
    Stewart, J. (ed.), 1998. The Debate Between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
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    Unamuno, M., 1954. The Tragic Sense of Life. Tr. J.E. Crawford Flitch. New York: Dover.
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    Wild, J., 1963. The Challenge of Existentialism (1955), Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

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    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  orthodoxymoron on Fri Apr 18, 2014 12:58 am

    I wonder if anyone has noticed the contrast between the first seventeen books of the Bible -- and the book Patriarchs and Prophets by Ellen White?? I much prefer the Ellen White version!! I realize that the biblical-scholars would go nuts at such a statement -- yet I much prefer the picture of God revealed in Patriarchs and Prophets!! On the other hand -- comparing Isaiah, Matthew, Job, Mark, Psalms, Luke, Proverbs, John, Ecclesiastes, and Acts -- with Desire of Ages by Ellen White -- is a toss-up in my mind!! When I take those listed biblical-books, and the two Ellen White books -- as a unified whole -- they are quite harmonious and eloquent!! This doesn't mean that I don't have serious problems with them!! It's just that the basic editorial content is quite fine -- even though it's quite old!! We use old theology books -- yet we use new science books!! Why?? I still like the idea of combining theology, science, and science-fiction (in equal parts)!! I wish to make it clear that I'm not out to get the Jews, Catholics, Muslims, Atheists, Agnostics, New-Agers, et al. I just think that the strategy of the God of This World has been to keep them divided and fighting -- for legitimate or illegitimate reasons. I'll continue to poke and prod just about everyone -- making everyone hate me -- and hopefully making everyone think!! I'm also NOT out to get Ancient Angelic Relatives -- rebellious or loyal. I simply wish for things to function properly in this solar system. I think there might have to be some sort of a HUGE Trial -- to review the soul-histories of everyone -- over thousands (or millions) of years. Some of us might have to go to jail for a very long time -- but I presently oppose any cruel, unusual, or capital punishment (especially regarding eternal-torment or soul-extermination). Prison-Labor and Prison-Education (of a reasonable nature) might be necessary -- but no racks or burnings please!! Remember, this thread is an experiment. It is NOT a Line in the Sand.

    I have heard that Satan laughs at the stupidity of humanity -- and taunts the Creator with the folly of the Created. I had extended conversation with a very articulate critic of humanity and religion. I don't know who they really were -- but we got along rather well -- though I generally disagreed with them -- even though their arguments were quite tight and precise. They could take one -- step by step -- right off the cliff -- with reasonable and persuasive arguments at each step -- but with the net-result being rather devastating!! Once again, one biblical strategy is to read the Bible straight-through -- over and over -- saying and doing whatever makes sense (and whatever works) -- even if this contradicts or conflicts with scripture!! That might be heresy -- but sometimes heresy turns into orthodoxy!! Please study this thread as a whole -- rather than chopping it to pieces!! I realize that it is full of holes -- but it is intended to create a safe-haven for alternative-thinking relative to historical politics and religion!! I know very little about the City-States, the United-Nations, and the Moon -- yet I think it might be very important to understand how they really work (individually -- and as a group)!! I'm very passive in my research -- despite any appearances to the contrary. I'm simply very unhappy and miserable -- and I'm trying to be happy -- by understanding and resolving the worst problems known to mankind. Unfortunately -- this just seems to make things worse for all concerned (and unconcerned)!! If I were handed the Keys to the Kingdom -- I would delegate everything -- and just facilitate and observe. It's fun to imagine and speculate -- but I think the governance realities in this solar system are quite dark and dire. I really do.

    I keep getting the feeling that historical and contemporary politics and religion have been (and are) cover-stories for something very complex and nasty -- which none of the various factions wished to have known by the commoners -- for legitimate and illegitimate reasons. I continue to think that wrestling with historical and contemporary politics and religion is a necessary gateway and prerequisite for dealing with forbidden-knowledge. Historical and contemporary politics and religion are probably necessary to properly formulate 'clean-sheet of paper' politics and religion. I guess this is why I'm attempting to communicate some reasonable form of minimalist-traditionalist politics and religion -- NOT because I wish to be backward -- but precisely because I wish to be progressive in an evolutionary and sustainable manner. Mishandling forbidden-knowledge could send our civilization into a New Dark-Ages -- and I wish I were kidding. Once again -- I do NOT wish to cram the New-Views down the throats of the general-public. I don't necessarily wish to 'wake people up' or 'shut people up'. I don't discuss this madness in 'real-life'. I suspected a lot of this stuff decades ago -- but I didn't pursue it. I looked the other way -- and kept my mouth shut -- about a lot of things. I frankly continue to do so -- believe it, or not.

    Should I stop questioning -- and start praising???

    Or should I stick to this sort of religious expression??

    I sometimes wonder what a church would be like which consisted mostly of 1. The Latin Mass. 2. The 1928 'Book of Common Prayer'. 3. Gothic Architecture. 4. Sacred Classical Music. Do you see my point?? I'm NOT saying this is the way things should be -- but wouldn't this be a minimalist-traditionalist approach which might unite a lot of Anglicans and Catholics? What would Jews and Seventh-day Adventists think of such an approach if services were offered on the Seventh-Day Saturday-Sabbath? What would the Evangelicals say? Am I a Seventh-day Sedavacantist??!! I truly do not know what I'm talking about -- and I continue to beat upon the rocks of I know not what -- but I mean well -- as a completely ignorant fool. Should I continue to wonder about a Roman Empire and Church essentially beginning in 168BC and extending to 2133AD -- at which point the Sanctuary Would be Completely Cleansed?? I don't usually play numbers-games -- but my hypothetical United States of the Solar System might not gain traction until the end of this hypothetical prophetic period. But really, 2133AD might mark the termination of the human race. I'm very worried about our future. My line of conjecture is resulting in endless and unspeakable anguish. I wish someone would set me straight -- and disprove my theories -- so I might have at least a single day of peace. The problem is that my most absurd thinking is making a helluva lot of sense -- and I wish that it didn't. I have been told that an attempted theocracy would be followed by an extermination. Again, what if the Millenium began in 1133AD? What if the Atonement really consists of the punishment of the human-race for the Original and Unpardonable Sin?? What if the Sacrifice of the Mass is symbolic of the Perpetual Punishment of Humanity?? What if the Final Application of the Atonement is the Extermination of the Human-Race?? Once again -- please set me straight. I do NOT wish for my theories to be legitimized. I wish for them to be absolutely wrong. However, I believe it irresponsible to NOT consider all of the possibilities concerning the most important subjects imaginable. What was the Central-Ceremony of Ancient-Egypt?? What is the connection between this Central-Ceremony and the Latin-Mass -- if any??? Of what did a Pre-Human and Pre-Edenic Liturgy Consist?? What is the place of the Ark of the Covenant and Solomon's Temple in all of this??? What about the concept of the Teachings of Jesus (Isis??) in Ancient Egypt?? What about Christocentric-Egyptology?? What Would Gerald Massey Say??

    magamud wrote:
    Fantastic posts O....

    Afraid of the Dark?

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    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  orthodoxymoron on Fri Apr 18, 2014 3:36 pm

    Thank-you magamud. The two, three, or four centuries prior to the Birth of Christ are of special interest to me -- especially regarding the relationship of Egypt, Rome, and Israel. I've watched the 1963 version of Cleopatra -- but not the 1945 or 1999 versions. Perhaps I'll watch them tomorrow. But maybe I'll watch Hangar 18 first!!

    Hangar 18 involves a U.F.O. cover-up following an incident aboard the space shuttle. The orbiter is launching a satellite, which collides with an unidentified object passing close by. The space collision kills a fellow astronaut who was in the bay at that time, however, the entire incident is witnessed by astronauts Price and Bancroff. Upon returning to Earth, both men slowly investigate what they know happened in space — and which the government authorities try their best to hide. The damaged spacecraft however, has been recovered after it is observed making a controlled landing in the Arizona desert. Although the aliens on board die, the government technicians begin their foray into trying to understand the extremely delicate processes which operate the complex ship. On board the craft, the technician team makes three discoveries. The first is an unknown woman in some sort of stasis, who later awakens in the back of an ambulance screaming (leading moviegoers to believe she may have been an abductee). The second is the fact that symbols found on certain control panels are the same as symbols which reside here on Earth, albeit in ancient places. The third is the fact that the aliens have been here before—as the team discovers some type of surveillance footage noting power installations, military installations, and major cities worldwide. Meanwhile, with their persistence in trying to uncover the truth, both Bancroff and Price are marked for death by the government. In an escape from agents, Bancroff manages to get away, but Price is killed. All is not lost, as Bancroft finally manages to make his way to Hangar 18 — the namesake hangar of the movie where the alien craft is being disclosed and studied. In an attempt to cut their losses and maintain secrecy, government agents remote control a jet filled with explosives into the hangar—a desperate move aimed at killing off all involved in the on site cover-up. After the explosion, an announcement is presented in the form of a news bulletin regarding the sudden explosion of the hangar, and a congressional hearing scheduled to hear evidence concerning the activities in Hangar 18; it is revealed that Bancroft and the small team of scientists survived the explosion, due to being inside the alien ship when the plane hit. They have also discovered that the ship contains plans for the alien invasion of earth. Notice the Alien Surveillance in the First Video!! Perhaps this is one reason why they might want to exterminate us!!

    Jenetta wrote:Published April 18th/2014

    As the government continues down their path of oppressive tactics in order to ensure a compliant population, the Obama administration has recently recruited the helps of all parents alike in the search for domestic terrorism.  The only problem is that the government claims that parent’s own “confrontational” kids could be the source of potential American destruction.

    White House Tells Parents: Children Could Be Terrorists!

    The news comes directly from the White House where White House counterterrorism and Homeland Security adviser Lisa Monaco expresses the need for parents to keep and ever-diligent eye on their children.  Monaco urges parents to monitor closely for “confrontational” behavior as it may be indicative of future terrorism.

    In effort to spread the panic a bit more, she even went so far as to insist that parents watch for, “sudden personality changes in their children at home.”  Despite puberty probably being the largest contributor to such an outcome, the government remains adamant in their directions.

    After hypothetically asking exactly what parents should look for, she answered her own question by stating, “For the most part, they’re not related directly to plotting attacks. They’re more subtle. For instance, parents might see sudden personality changes in their children at home—becoming confrontational.”

    Recruiting parents as their own surveillance agents, Monaco explains that, “the government is rarely in a position to observe these early signals.”  Expressing the need to seek out, “homegrown extremism,” as soon as possible, parents play a crucial role in the identification of terrorist children.

    Since Obama has taken office, the government agenda to transform the definition of “domestic terrorism,” has become somewhat of a priority.  Including characteristics that cover much of the population, it seems that those being deemed the most dangerous are coincidentally the direct opposition to the left.

    Proving that those who don’t agree with the progressive agenda are unfairly being labeled terrorists was Harry Reid just yesterday.  Declaring that the anyone in support of Nevada rancher Cliven Bundy was effectively a, “domestic terrorist,” their agenda has become transparently clear.

    Giving just one last hard-hitting example of government bias, Infowars reports, “A Homeland Security study leaked in 2012 upped the ante even further, demonizing Americans who are “suspicious of centralized federal authority,” and “reverent of individual liberty” as “extreme right-wing” terrorists.”

    One can only speculate that as the government shifts its focus upon American citizens, it leaves our beloved country vulnerable to potential foreign attacks.  Despite this being the case, it appears that the government is more worried about remaining in control rather than not initiating a civil war.

    What do you guys think – is this ridiculous? And what does it say about the current state of our government? Let us know in a comment below.

    As it is below; so it is above
    What continues to amaze me is the gratuitous-violence in movies, video-games, and television -- which seems to be fine -- and given a pass -- while the most trivial and innocent things are cracked down upon!! I've experienced some of this madness first-hand!! It's as if they WANT All Hell to Break Loose -- so they can REALLY crack down!! It seems as if they brain-wash the people with violence in the mass-media -- and then antagonize them in real-life -- to create a perfect-storm of discontent -- just waiting to be explosively-ignited by some planned 'unforeseen' event!! It wouldn't surprise me if those who are tasked with 'cracking-down' eventually 'crack-down' upon each-other as the heat keeps getting turned up!! The people need to remain cool, calm, and collected -- no matter what -- and just keep exposing the crime, corruption, murder, and mayhem. It wouldn't surprise me if the current New World Order Powers That Be are replaced by more ethical and competent New World Order Powers That Be -- with a fine-tuning and responsible-reformation of the Way Things Are. I continue to suspect that this world is a corrupted-version of an idealistic-plan. Think of the contrast between Renate Richter and Klaus Adler in Iron Sky!! Just a Thought.

    I'm interested in all of this -- yet I feel tense, ill, disoriented, and despondent as I attempt to sort things out. My mind seems to be frozen. Perhaps I am one of the Chosen-Frozen! Perhaps I should join Pious-Zombies Anonymous! None of this madness is a marketable job skill -- and I really do not wish to lead the unsuspecting general public into this quicksand of insanity. I can understand why many people choose to just do the happy-clappy thing -- and skip all of the heavy and negative stuff. I guess that's why I spent four years at the Crystal Cathedral. On the other hand -- I was simultaneously attending Walter Martin's Sunday School Class -- attending Sabbath-School (Graham Maxwell, Jack Provonsha, Fritz Guy, et al) and Church at Loma Linda (Louis Venden and Distinguished Company) -- looking at Christology Books at the Claremont Library -- attending Whole Life Expos -- visiting Focus on the Family -- visiting The Vinyard (John Wimber) -- listening to Christian Radio -- watching TBN -- buying books at the Bhodi Tree -- visiting Hollywood Presbyterian Church (Lloyd John Ogilvie) -- attending Organ Masterclasses (Marie Clare Alain, Peter Hereford) -- visiting Calvary Chapel (Chuck Smith) -- visiting Fullerton Evangelical Free Church (Chuck Swindoll) -- etc, etc, etc. I eventually burned-out and dropped-out. I'm still down and out. Ignorance is Bliss -- and Possibly a Virtue. Trust and Obey? As a Denominational Employee -- to Avoid Unemployment -- one must Trust and Obey!

    The silence and hostility toward me continues to bother me greatly. This makes me extremely suspicious of all-concerned. What is everyone hiding??? What if it's in no one's best-interest for me to know the truth, the whole-truth, and nothing but the truth about who I am, and what I've done -- going way, way, way back??!! Once again -- I am very wary of disclosure-events, regime-changes, currency-resets, apocalyptic-salvation, etc. I think everything is carefully researched and scripted -- and that very little is left to chance. I don't necessarily have a problem with that basic concept and methodology -- but it seems as if this process is highly corrupt.

    Has anyone considered using the books of Norman Vincent Peale and Robert Harold Schuller as an Unchurch for the Unchurched?? You know -- just reading the books -- without thinking about the big churches and personalities associated with the books?! Come as you are in the family car -- to your favorite view-point -- and read the books!! No Church. No Television. Just Books. Think about it. There's more to this concept than you might think. Just forget about Peale and Schuller -- and concentrate on the content of the books. Some of the long-time members of the Crystal Cathedral told me that things were better before they televised the services. They also told me that Dr. Schuller's first book -- Move Ahead with Possibility Thinking -- was his best book. His associate, Dr. Bruce Larson wrote some very fine books!

    Regarding Easter and the Sabbath -- why is the SUN so important??!! I keep thinking there's an ancient and universal Sabbath-Concept which we don't know about. If there is a somewhat harsh and sinister God of This World -- I suspect that they rewrote and changed a lot of things to enhance their particular agenda. I keep thinking that they were somehow placed in power in this solar system by the Galactic Powers That Be -- legitimately or illegitimately -- and that they subsequently went rogue -- and became enemies of both Divinity and Humanity. Just a theory -- mind you. BTW -- What if the Ancient Egyptian Deity was (and is) the God of This World??!! You think I'm crazy -- don't you??!! But just because I'm crazy and unmarketable -- doesn't mean that I'm wrong -- does it??!!

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    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  orthodoxymoron on Fri Apr 18, 2014 5:12 pm

    I could probably sit through the most intense discussions at the Vatican or in the City of London -- and I doubt that it would phase me. I doubt that it would make me any more depressed than I already am. I'd probably be able to follow the discussions -- but I certainly would not be able to make intelligent comments. Silence is Golden -- especially when one is a Completely Ignorant Fool. You didn't wish to talk to me. Perhaps someday I won't wish to talk to you. BTW -- the other day, someone drove by my house with a completely-blank white license-plate. I figured that was probably a bad thing. Regardless of how much BS you encounter -- Just Know That the Truth is Out There -- Way Out There!! Now I'm going to listen to another exciting episode of Sherry Shriner -- to try to cheer myself up!! Consider the Origins of the Eucharist:

    Church teaching[1][2][3] places the origin of the Eucharist in the Last Supper of Jesus with his disciples, at which he is believed to have taken bread and given it to his disciples, telling them to eat of it, because it was his body, and to have taken a cup and given it to his disciples, telling them to drink of it because it was the cup of the covenant in his blood.[4]

    The earliest extant written account of a Christian eucharistia (Greek: thanksgiving) is that in the First Epistle to the Corinthians (around AD 55),[5] in which Paul the Apostle relates "eating the bread and drinking the cup of the Lord" in the celebration of a "Supper of the Lord" to the Last Supper of Jesus some 25 years earlier.[6] Paul considers that in celebrating the rite they were fulfilling a mandate to do so.[7] The Acts of the Apostles presents the early Christians as meeting for “the breaking of bread” as some sort of ceremony.[8]

    Writing around the middle of the second century, Justin Martyr gives the oldest description of something that can be recognised as the rite that is in use today.[9] Earlier sources, the Didache,1 Clement and Ignatius of Antioch provide glimpses of the what Christians were doing in their eucharists. Later sources, Tertullian and the Apostolic Tradition, offer some details from around the year 200.[10] Once the Church "went public" after the conversion of Constantine the Great in the second decade of the fourth century, it was clear that the Eucharist was established as a central part of Christian life.[10]

    Contemporary scholars debate whether Jesus meant to institute a ritual at his Last Supper;[11] whether the Last Supper was an actual historical event in any way related to the undisputed early "Lord's Supper" or "Eucharist".[12] and have asked if the Eucharist had its origins in a pagan context, where dinners to memorialize the dead were common.

    New Testament accounts

    In the New Testament there are four accounts of the institution of the Eucharist, the earliest by St Paul in his first letter to the Corinthians[13] which links it back to the Last Supper and three in the Synoptic Gospels in the context of that same meal.[14]

    1 Corinthians 11:23-26

    Mark 14:22-25

    Matthew 26:26-29

    Luke 22:14-20

    In vv 17-22 Paul criticises abuses of the Lord's Supper prevalent in Corinth, he continues: For I received from the Lord what I also handed on to you, that the Lord Jesus on the night when he was betrayed took a loaf of bread, and when he had given thanks, he broke it and said, ‘This is my body that is for you. Do this in remembrance of me.’ In the same way he took the cup also, after supper, saying, ‘This cup is the new covenant in my blood. Do this, as often as you drink it, in remembrance of me.’ For as often as you eat this bread and drink the cup, you proclaim the Lord’s death until he comes.

    While they were eating, he took a loaf of bread, and after blessing it he broke it, gave it to them, and said, ‘Take; this is my body.’ Then he took a cup, and after giving thanks he gave it to them, and all of them drank from it. He said to them, ‘This is my blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many. Truly I tell you, I will never again drink of the fruit of the vine until that day when I drink it new in the kingdom of God.’

    While they were eating, Jesus took a loaf of bread, and after blessing it he broke it, gave it to the disciples, and said, ‘Take, eat; this is my body.’ Then he took a cup, and after giving thanks he gave it to them, saying, ‘Drink from it, all of you; for this is my blood of the covenant, which is poured out for many for the forgiveness of sins. I tell you, I will never again drink of this fruit of the vine until that day when I drink it new with you in my Father’s kingdom.’

    When the hour came, he took his place at the table, and the apostles with him. He said to them, ‘I have eagerly desired to eat this Passover with you before I suffer; for I tell you, I will not eat it until it is fulfilled in the kingdom of God.’ Then he took a cup, and after giving thanks he said, ‘Take this and divide it among yourselves; for I tell you that from now on I will not drink of the fruit of the vine until the kingdom of God comes.’

    Then he took a loaf of bread, and when he had given thanks, he broke it and gave it to them, saying, ‘This is my body, which is given for you. Do this in remembrance of me.’ And he did the same with the cup after supper, saying, ‘This cup that is poured out for you is the new covenant in my blood.

    Matthew obviously follows Mark's account. Luke's version differs at so many points from the Markan that some scholars believe it stems from another source. John, although he does not include an "Institution Narrative", includes an account of a supper on the night Jesus was betrayed, including a footwashing scene.[15] Chapters 13-17 of the Gospel of John attribute to Jesus a series of teachings and prayers at his Last Supper, but does not mention any meal rituals. On the other hand, John 6, in particular verses such as 6:55-56 ("For my flesh is food indeed, and my blood is drink indeed. He who eats my flesh and drinks my blood abides in me, and I in him"), is widely interpreted as an allusion to the Eucharist.[16] Peculiarities in phrasing as compared to the Synoptics are thought to reflect the liturgical tradition of the Johannine community.[17] A passage found in Luke records a command, found also in Paul, to his disciples, to "do this as my memorial" [15] without specifying whether it should be performed annually, like the Passover, or more frequently.

    The text of the Lucan version is uncertain. A number of commentators conclude that the second half of 22:19 and all of 22:20 are later interpolations.[18] In 1926 E.C. Ratcliff declared: "The textus receptus indeed includes the command, but the passage in which it occurs is an interpolation of the Pauline account; and whatever view be taken of the Lucan text, the command is no part of the original".[19] However, C.P.M. Jones writing in 1978 comments "Many scholars (e.g. ...) have returned to the support of the longer text,..." [20] and the same position was taken by the majority of editors of the United Bible Societies Greek New Testament.[21] The attribution to Jesus of the words 'This do in memory of Me'." is therefore possible, but not certain. Jeremias says "Do this in remembrance of me " would better be translated "That God may remember me.", but Richardson objects that the "presence of one particular meaning must not be taken to exclude other shades of meaning, nuances and overtones".[22]

    Acts, Corinthians and Jude

    The New Testament recounts a number of practices of religious table fellowship that would later be considered eucharistic. Paul the Apostle responded to abuses at a meal that the Corinthian Christians had at their meetings and that he did not deem worthy to be called "a Supper of the Lord" (κυριακὸν δεῖπνον).[23] He appeals to them to celebrate it worthily, since otherwise they would be answerable for the body and blood of the Lord, and elsewhere in the same letter, writes: "You cannot drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of demons. You cannot partake of the table of the Lord and the table of demons."[24]

    Paul had first evangelized the inhabitants of Corinth, in Greece, in 51/52 CE. Paul's nascent congregation there was made up of pagan, not Jewish, converts (1 Corinthians 12:2). All first-generation Christians were necessarily converts, either pagan or Jewish. They had written him regarding numerous matters of concern(1 Corinthians 7:1). Criticizing what he had heard of their meetings, at which they had communal meals, one paragraph in Paul's response reminded them about what he asserted he had "received from the Lord" and had "passed on" about Jesus' actions and directives at his Last Supper. The ambiguities some find in that wording has generated reams of books, articles and opinions about the Origins of Eucharist. The Last Supper (a one-off event) and the eucharist (a periodically repeated rite) are not the same thing.[25] Clearly the religious table fellowship tradition had been going on in the Early Christian Church, antedating Paul's conversion, unless the contention is made that Paul invented it.

    In his 1994 book, A Feast of Meanings: Eucharistic Theologies from Jesus through Johannine Circles, Bruce Chilton wrote that Paul "indeed 'received from the Lord' (1 Corinthians 11:23, through Cephas (Galatians 1:18), what he 'handed over' (1 Corinthians 11:23) to his hearers. … He reminds his hearers of what he already had taught as authoritative, a teaching 'from the Lord' and presumably warranted by the earliest 'pillars': in that sense, what he hands on is not his own, but derives from his highest authority, 'the Lord' (11:23)."[26] Eugene LaVerdiere wrote: "That is how Paul introduced the tradition, presenting himself as a link in the chain of Eucharistic tradition. He received (paralambano) the tradition of Eucharist in the early 40s while in the community at Antioch. He handed it on (paradidomi) to the Corinthians in the year 51 when first proclaiming the gospel to them. Like Paul, the Corinthians also were to become a link in the chain of Eucharistic tradition, handing on to others what Paul handed on to them. Several years later, circa 54, Paul reminded them of this in 1 Corinthians."[27]

    There are three references in Acts to "the breaking of bread" by early Christians at Jerusalem and by St Paul on his visit to Troas.[28] The letters of Paul and the Acts of the Apostles make it clear that early Christianity believed that this institution included a mandate to continue the celebration as an anticipation in this life of the joys of the banquet that was to come in the Kingdom of God. The term "Agape" or "Love-feast" appears in the Jude 12: "These are blemishes on your love feasts, as they boldly carouse together, looking after themselves".

    Scholars of the Jesus Seminar generally regard the gospel accounts of the Last Supper as cult legend, that is, a story that accounts for some ritual practice in the Jesus movement.[29]

    Early Christianity

    In the three hundred years after Jesus' crucifixion, Christian practices and beliefs regarding the Eucharist took definitive shape as central to Christian worship. At first, they spread through word of mouth, but within a generation Christians had begun writing about Jesus and about Christian practice, the Eucharist included. The theology of the Eucharist and its role as a sacrament developed during this period.

    Basing himself on the First Apology and the Dialogue with Trypho of Justin Martyr writing around 150 AD, K.W. Noakes deduces the following liturgical structure was in use at that time:

    1.Scripture Readings and Homily.
    2.Intercessions and Kiss-of-Peace.
    3.Bread and Cup are brought to the President.
    4.Eucharistic Prayer (flexible) but following a fixed pattern with congregational “Amen”
    5.Distribution of the elements by the deacons to those present and absent.

    This corresponds in general outline to the structure of the rite as used today and is the earliest known example. The theology is as follows: the bread and wine are transformed into the Flesh and Blood of Jesus; they are the pure sacrifice spoken of by Malachi (1:11) and the eucharistic prayer itself is both a thanksgiving for creation and redemption and an anamnesis (Greek: memorial) of the passion (and possibly the incarnation).[9]

    Information from the intervening period is scanty.[30] Both the author of 1 Clement (about 96) and Ignatius of Antioch(about 108) are concerned that due order be maintained.;[31][32] "Give heed to keep one Eucharist. For there is one flesh of our Lord Jesus Christ, and one cup unto union with His blood. There is one altar, as there is one bishop, together with the presbytery and deacons, my fellow-servants; that whatsoever you do, you may do according unto God" (Letter to the Philadelphians,4). The dating of the Didache is contentious, dates from the middle of the first century to the early third century have been suggested,[33] but it may well be from the same period as 1 Clement and Ignatius. It states that the unbaptized left the assembly before the Eucharist proper began "Let none eat or drink of your Eucharist but such as have been baptized into the name of the Lord, for of a truth the Lord hath said concerning this, Give not that which is holy unto dogs.".[34] A composite of several documents, it includes ritual prayers and a mention of what it calls the εὐχαριστία (Thanksgiving or Eucharist). According to the overwhelming consensus among scholars, the section beginning at 10.1 is a reworking of the Birkat hamazon the prayer that ends the Jewish ritual meal.[35] Also, there is one possible pagan reference to an early morning celebration from about the year 112 in a letter of the younger Pliny to the emperor Trajan.[36]

    Evidence from a slightly later period comes from Irenaeus and from the Apostolic Tradition. In his debate with gnostics who favoured an immaterial religion, the former affirms: "Whenever, then, the mixed cup and the bread that has been made receive the word of God, the Eucharist becomes the body of Christ, and by it the substance of our flesh is nourished and sustained".[37] The Apostolic Tradition[38] poses a number of critical problems including the question as to whether the liturgies were ever used. However, the editors of The Study of Liturgy conclude that "it is clearly use the document as evidence for early third-century Rome".[39] It contain what must be considered a complete prayer of consecration including a version of the Institution narrative.

    It is clear from the New Testament evidence that some primitive Christian ceremonies involved a full meal and the word "agape"(love-feast) is used. At some point these died out possbly as a result of increasing numbers[40] and possibly due to abuses. Writing shortly after Justin, Tertullian describes "love feasts".[41] Clement of Alexandria (c.150-211/216) distinguished so-called "Agape" meals of luxurious character from the agape (love) "which the food that comes from Christ shows that we ought to partake of".[42] Accusations of gross indecency were sometimes made against the form that these meals sometimes took.[43] Clement of Alexandria also mentions abuses,Stromata III,2, and the editor comments: "The early disappearance of the Christian agapæ may probably be attributed to the terrible abuse of the word here referred to, by the licentious Carpocratians".

    Augustine of Hippo also objected to the continuance in his native North Africa of the custom of such meals, in which some indulged to the point of drunkenness, and he distinguished them from proper celebration of the Eucharist: "Let us take the body of Christ in communion with those with whom we are forbidden to eat even the bread which sustains our bodies."[44] He reports that even before the time of his stay in Milan, the custom had already been forbidden there.[45] Canons 27 and 28 of the Council of Laodicea (364) restricted the abuses.[46]

    Early liturgies

    The Didache gives in chapter 9 prayers for use in celebrating what it calls the Eucharist, involving a cup and broken bread, and in chapter 10 another prayer for use "after you are filled". Scholars disagree on whether these texts concern a Eucharist in the proper sense.[47]

    No other Eucharistic formularies are known before the 3rd century.[48]:77 The earliest extant texts of an anaphora (the central part of the Eucharistic liturgy, known also as the Eucharistic Prayer) include the Anaphora of Addai and Mari, the Anaphora of the Apostolic Tradition and the Egyptian form of the Liturgy of Saint Basil.[49] The earliest text that is similar to the Roman Canon is that quoted in De Sacramentis of Ambrose[48]:140 (see History of the Roman Canon).

    Contemporary scholars and evolution of the Eucharist

    The gap of some twenty years between the date of the Last Supper and the writing of I Corinthians and the even longer period before the Gospels were written have led to doubts as to their historical reliability and the suggestion that they reflect the concerns and situation of the early christians at the time of writing rather than reporting objectively events which occurred decades before.[50] They therefore try to decide where the distinct components of the later rite originated by examining possible cultural elements, both Jewish and Hellenic, which already existed in the period under study. The underlying debate is over the relative contributions of Paul and Jesus and the possible intervention of other factors. One key consideration in this is the problems of the Jewish prohibition of drinking blood (see below).

    Professor Robert J. Daly, S.J., argues that Jesus did indeed institute the Eucharist, though it took generations and centuries of guidance from the Holy Spirit for the Eucharist to reach its current form. "What Jesus did at the Last Supper is obviously at least the generative moment of the institution of the Eucharist." But it was not the Eucharist as we know it. "The Eucharist that Christians now celebrate is what the Church, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit of the risen Jesus, and over the course of generations and centuries, learned to do as it celebrated table fellowship with its risen Lord."[51]

    On the other hand, Bruce Chilton suggests that we can find in the New Testament six different ways of celebrating what Christians came to call the Eucharist, and can locate each of these in its own specific socio-religio-political setting. This would seem to make irrelevant a number of time-honored scholarly approaches, fundamental to which were, first, the "literally true" vs. "literary fictions" debate, and, second, the assumption that there was a unified line of development from the established Eucharist of later centuries back close to the time of the historical Jesus.[52]

    The six Eucharists in the New Testament, according to Bruce Chilton:

    Jesus' Table Fellowship

    The "Last Supper"

    Petrine Christianity

    The Circle of James

    Paul and the Synoptics


    Jesus joined with his followers in meals that were designed to anticipate the coming of God's kingdom. The meals were characterized by a readiness to accept the hospitality and the produce of Israel at large. A willingness to provide for the meals, to join in the fellowship, to forgive and to be forgiven, was seen by Jesus as a sufficient condition for eating in his company and for entry into the kingdom. Jesus' approach to purity qualification was distinctive in its inclusiveness. For Jesus, the primary markers of purity, the primary requirements for table fellowship in the kingdom were: Israel as forgiven and willing to provide of its own produce.

    Jesus sought to influence or reform purity practices associated with the Temple. In his meals, as he shared wine, he started referring to it as the equivalent of the blood of an animal shed in sacrifice, and in sharing bread, claiming that its value was that of sacrificial flesh. "Here was a sacrifice of sharings which the authorities could not control, and which the nature of Jesus' movement made it impossible for them to ignore. Jesus' meals after his failed occupation of the Temple became a surrogate of sacrifice, the second type of Eucharist."

    In this stage of Eucharistic development, the berakhah prayer of Judaism seems to have become a principal model of Eucharist. Bread took precedence over wine, and, as Acts 1:12-26, 2:46, and 3:14:37 clearly describe, a double domestication took place. Instead of seeking the hospitality of others, as the itinerant Jesus seemed to do, adherents of the movement, under the leadership of Peter and/or the Twelve, gathered in the homes of colleagues where they "broke bread at home and ate their food with glad and generous hearts, praising God and having the goodwill of all the people" (Acts 2:46-47). In addition, apparently they also acknowledged the validity of sacrifice in the Temple. In doing this they changed the nature of the meal and the memory of what Jesus had said at that meal. For example, there is no mention of wine, nor does there, in this account of the earliest Christian gatherings, seem to have been any sense of being in tension with the officials of Judaism or its religious practices.

    The tendency to domestication is here pursued further, for the Eucharist is now seen as a Seder meal, open only to Jews in a state of purity, and to be celebrated only once a year, at Passover, in Jerusalem, as prescribed in Exodus 12:48. The effect of this Jacobean program—a possible antecedent to the later Quartodeciman practice?—"was to integrate Jesus' movement fully within the liturgical institutions of Judaism, to insist upon the Judaic identity of the movement and upon Jerusalem as its governing center," but without actually replacing Israel's Seder.

    Paul vehemently resisted Jacobean claims. He also emphasized the link between Jesus' death and the Eucharist, and he accepts what Chilton calls the Hellenistic refinement of the Petrine type that presented the Eucharist as a sacrifice for sin. This is also what we find in the Synoptic Gospels which use words to suggest that Jesus' blood is shed in the interests of the communities for which those Gospels were composed: for the "many" (in Damascus?) Matthew 26:28 and (in Rome?) Mark 14:24: on behalf of "you" (in Antioch?) Luke 22:20.

    Jesus identifies himself in John 6 as the manna, now developed to construe the Eucharist as a mystery in which Jesus, not literally but sacramentally, offers/gives his own personal body and blood in Eucharist. This would probably not be a totally new idea to Hellenistic Christians who followed synoptic practice. But Johannine practice now makes this meaning explicit. It was, as is characteristic of the Fourth Gospel, an unambiguous, clear break with Judaism. For with this development, Eucharist has become a "sacrament" understandable only in Hellenistic terms, and involving "a knowing conflict with the ordinary understanding of what Judaism might and might not include."

    Eucharist and its relation to the Last Supper

    Paul F. Bradshaw argues in Eucharistic Origins that it is not until after the 1st century and much later in some areas that the Eucharist and the Last Supper became placed in a relation of dependence: many Eucharists did not relate to the Paschal mystery and/or the Last Supper.[53] On the other hand, in the middle of the 1st century Paul the Apostle explicitly placed the celebration of the Lord's Supper in relation to what Jesus did on the night he was handed over, in giving his disciples bread with the words "This is my body" and, after the supper, giving them the cup with a similar declaration about his blood.[13][54]

    John Dominic Crossan suggests that there are two traditions "as old as we can trace them" of the eucharist, that of Paul, reflecting the Antioch Church's tradition, and that of the Didache, the first document to give explicit instruction regarding prayers to be said at a celebration that it called the Eucharist.

    The cup/bread liturgy of the Didache, from the Jerusalem tradition, does not mention Passover, or Last Supper, or Death of Jesus/blood/body, and the sequence is meal + thanksgiving ritual. For Crossan, it is dispositive that even late in the first century C.E., at least some (southern?) Syrian Christians could celebrate a Eucharist of bread and wine with absolutely no hint of Passover meal, Last Supper or passion symbolism built into its origins or development. I cannot believe that they knew about those elements and studiously avoided them. I can only presume that they were not there for everyone from the beginning, that is, from solemn formal and final institution by Jesus himself.[55]

    Paul's first letter to the Corinthians, in the context of correcting the habits of the Corinthians serves to reestablish "the Pre-Pauline tradition, ritual of bread/body + meal + ritual of cup/blood." [56] Hellenized Jew Paul references a Greek weekly Lord's Supper, which is not an annual Jewish Passover meal, and does not have the participants giving thanks ("Eucharistia"), rather the purpose is to proclaim Jesus' death until he comes again, in the manner of Hellenic societies formed "to hold meals in remembrance of those who had died and to drink a cup in honor of some god."[57] Some authors would consider Paul to be the "Founder" of the Eucharist in a pagan context appealing to the Jewish prohibition against drinking blood, the pervasive history of Greek memorial dining societies, and Paul's own hellenistic background."[58] Paul, however, explicitly stated that he was rehearsing a Christian tradition, something that he himself had "received" and had already "handed on" to the Corinthians.[59]

    Both sequences underline the primary importance of the Shared Meal to historical 1st century Christian ritual. Crossan maintains that table fellowship was central to Jesus' ministry in that was infamous for violating codes of honor to eat freely with outsiders, termed "sinners and tax collectors" in the Gospels. Jesus presumably taught at the table, as was customary. This emphasis on table fellowship is reflected in the large number of eating scenes in early Christian art.[60] In the Jerusalem tradition, of James and Peter, the meal is of higher importance than blood and body since the Didache fails to mention them. Both traditions reflect the pitfalls of a shared meal among social unequals, namely freeloading. The Didache says in 12:3-4, "If (a traveler) wants to settle with you and is an artisan, he must work for his living. If, however, he has no trade, use your judgment in taking steps for him to live with you as a Christian without being idle."[61] Paul, in 2 Thessalonians 3:10 says: "If anyone is not willing to work, let him not eat." In Crossan's view, "both stipulations must presume a communal share-meal or they make no sense."[62]

    Crossan's Preliminary Stages

    Five Preliminary stages to "2000 years of eucharistic theology" and "Last Supper iconography", according to Crossan[63]

    1. Graeco-Roman formal meal

    2. Jesus' practice

    3a. Didache 10

    3b. Didache 9

    4. 1 Corinthians

    5. Mark

    deipnon (supper, main meal), then symposion

    a meal that later and in retrospect was recognized as having been their last one together

    Give thanks, no reference to Passover, Last Supper, or Death of Jesus

    Eucharist, no reference to Passover, Last Supper, or Death of Jesus

    Lord's Supper

    Passover Meal

    Bread course followed by ritual libation followed by wine course

    Open Commensality - radical social egalitarianism in seating for meal

    Common Meal followed by Thanks to the Father, no ritual with bread or cup

    Common meal, ritual with Cup (thanks for the Holy Vine of David) and Bread (thanks for the life and knowledge of Jesus)

    Bread/body, Thanks, Common Meal, Cup/blood

    During meal, first Bread/body, then Cup/blood and Thanks

    No ritual

    No mention of the death of Jesus

    No mention of the death of Jesus

    Passion Remembrance in both cup and bread

    No command for repetition and remembrance

    Problem of the historical Jewish prohibition against blood-drinking

    See also: Council of Jerusalem

    In a 10,000 word analysis[64] in the Biblical Theology Bulletin of 2002, Michael J. Cahill surveys the state of scholarly literature from some seventy cited sources, dating from the 1950s to the present, on the question of the likelihood of a Jewish Jesus proposing the drinking of blood in the Eucharist. [65]

    After examining the various theories that have been suggested, he concludes:

    The survey of opinion, old and new, reveals wide disagreement with a fundamental divide between those who can accept that the notion of drinking blood could have a Jewish origin and those who insist that this is a later development to be located in the Hellenistic world. What both sides share is an inability to proffer a rationally convincing argument that can provide a historical explanation for the presence of this particular component of the Eucharistic rite. Those who hold for the literal institution by Jesus have not been able to explain plausibly how the drinking of blood could have arisen in a Jewish setting. In fact, this difficulty has been turned into an argument for authenticity. For example, Jeremiah [sic] quotes Dalman: "Exactly that which seems scandalous will be historical" (170-71). W. D. Davies draws attention to the fact that Dalman also argued that the Pauline version of the institution arose in a gentile environment to eliminate the difficulties presented by the more direct Markan form (246). It would appear to be obvious that the difficulties would have been greater in a Jewish environment. Davies' conclusion is apt: "When such divergent conclusons [sic] have been based upon the same evidence any dogmatism would be foolish" (246). On the other hand, I have earlier argued that previous suggestions supporting the non-Jewish source have been vitiated by vague generalities or by association with inappropriate pagan rituals.

    Possible cultural influences

    Jewish ritual meal practice

    Scholars have associated Jesus' Last Supper and the 1st-century Eucharist practices with three Second Temple Jewish meal practices: the kiddush blessing with wine, and the chaburah fellowship and the Passover Seder meal,.


    The Johannine Supper, Ratcliff has suggested,[66] was the Jewish ordinance known as Kiddush, the details of which involved the leader of the mixed-sex ceremony taking a cup of wine, sanctifying it by reciting a thanksgiving blessing, and passing it around. There was a similar blessing and breaking of bread.[66] Kiddush is the "Jewish benediction and prayer recited over a cup of wine immediately before the meal on the eve of the sabbath or of a festival.[67] After reciting the kiddush the master of the house sips from the cup, and then passes it to his wife and to the others at the table; then all wash their hands, and the master of the house blesses the bread, cuts it, and passes a morsel to each person at the table.[68]

    Ratcliff wrote: "Though the kiddush accounts for the '[Johannine]' Last Supper, it affords no explanation on the origin of the eucharist . . . the Last Supper and the Sabbath-Passover Kiddush was therefore no unusual occurrence. It represented consistent practice since Jesus had first formed the group. It is from this practice, rather than from any direct institution from Jesus, that the eucharist derives its origin. The practice was too firmly established for the group to abandon it, when its Master had been taken away; the primitive apostolic eucharist is no other than the continuation of Jesus's chaburah meal. This is the 'breaking of bread' of Acts ii. 42."[66]

    Joachim Jeremias disputed the view that the Last Supper was kiddush,[69] because the Kiddush was always associated with the Sabbath, and even if there was a Passover kiddush, it would have taken place immediately before the seder, not the day before.


    The chaburah (also 'haburah', pl 'chaburoth') is not the name of a rite, rather it was the name of a group of male friends who met at regular intervals (weekly for Dix) for conversation and a formal meal appurtenant to that meeting.[70][71] Nothing is said about them in the Bible but scholars have been able to discover some things about them from other sources. The corporate meeting of a chaburah usually took the form of a supper, held at regular intervals, often on the eve of sabbaths or holy days. Each member of the society contributed towards the provision of this common meal.

    The form of the supper was largely the same as the chief meal of the day in every pious Jewish household. Each kind of food was blessed when it was first brought to the table. At the end of the meal came the grace after meals - the Blessing or Benediction as it was called. This long prayer was said by the host or father of the family in the name of all who had eaten the meal. On important occasions, and at a chaburah supper, it was recited over a special cup of wine known quite naturally as "the cup of blessing." At the end of the Thanksgiving prayer this cup was sipped by the leader and then by each of those present. The chaburah supper was concluded by the singing of a psalm, after which the meeting broke up.[70][71]

    Jeremias also disputed that the Last Supper was a chaburah meal, interposing the objection that the chaburah was a "duty" meal, held appurtenant to a formal occasion such as a 'bris' or a betrothal.[72]

    Passover Seder

    Passover commemorates God's saving of his chosen people, the Israelites, who, according to Exodus 12:1-29, were spared death through the blood of lambs. The Passover Seder involves four cups of wine.

    Whether the Last Supper was a Passover Meal (as the chronology of the Synoptic Gospels would suggest) or not (as St John), it is clear that the Eucharist was instituted at Passover time, and Christian writers from Saint Paul (1 Corinthians 5:7) onwards have stressed that the death of Christ was the fulfilment of the sacrifice foreshadowed by the Passover."[73]

    Enrico Mazza has argued that the view that the Last Supper was a Passover meal "remains a theological interpretation. The historical fact is that the Last Supper was not a Passover celebration and, consequently, that its liturgy was not that of the Jewish Passover."[74]

    Joachim Jeremias, having rejected the previous two possible backgrounds for the Last Supper argues forcibly that is was a Passover Seder while recognising that there are difficulties. His case may be summed as follows.

    Was the Last Supper a Passover Seder? according to Joachim Jeremias[75]

    Ten factors substantiating Passover

    Nine factors in objection to Passover actions that would be in violation of ritual regulations

    Two further objections

    * The Last Supper took place in Jerusalem it extended into the night
    it was a small gathering
    they reclined instead of sitting at table
    a dish preceded the breaking of bread
    red wine was drunk
    when Judas went out, the disciples thought he was going to distribute money to the poor, a Passover custom
    the meal closed with a hymn - the Paschal Hallel
    the interpretative words spoken over the bread and wine look like an extension of the Passover Haggadah
    and the fact that, Jesus did not go to Bethany for the night, but stayed within the area of Greater Jerusalem and made His way to Gethsemane -

    * the walk to Gethsemane the carrying of arms
    the night session of the Sanhedrin and the condemnation
    the rending of the High Priest's garments
    the participation of the Jews in the Roman trial
    the coming of Simon of Cyrene from the country
    the execution itself
    the purchase of linen
    the preparation of spices and the burial

    * The absence of any reference to the lamb in the accounts of the Supper. The problem of how the annual Passover of the Jews changed into the weekly Eucharist [Holy Communion] of the Christians

    Greek and other ritual meal practice

    The spread of Christianity outside the Jewish communities has led some scholars to investigate whether Hellenistic practices influenced the development of Eucharistic rites, especially in view of the Jewish prohibition of drinking blood (see above).

    Deipnon, libation and symposion

    During the Second Temple period, Hellenic practices were adopted by Jews after the conquests of Alexander the Great. By the 2nd century BC, Jesus Ben Sirach described Jewish feasting, with numerous parallels to Hellenic practice, without disapproval.[76][77] Gentile and Jewish practice was that the all-male participants reclined at table on their left elbows, and after a benediction given by the host (in the case of a Jewish meal), would have a deipnon (late afternoon or evening meal) of bread with various vegetables, perhaps some fish or even meat if the meal was extravagant.

    Among the Greeks, a ritual libation, or sacrificial pouring out of wine, followed, with another benediction or blessing, leading to the 'symposion' (as in Plato's Symposium) or wine-drinking course and entertainment. Thus was established an order of breaking bread and drinking wine. Cups of wine were even passed from diner to diner as a way to pass responsibility for speaking next. "Plutarch spoke in the highest terms of the bonds created by the shared wine bowl. His words are echoed by Paul who spoke of the sharing of bread and wine as the act that created the one body, that is to say, it was a community-creating ritual." [78]

    Dennis E. Smith says that the earliest Christians worshiped at table in their hosts' dining rooms.[79] and that the earliest Christians shaped the traditions about Jesus to fit that setting.[77] In his study Dining Posture in Ancient Rome: Bodies, Values, and Status concerning practice at the meals designated in Latin by the word "convivium", equivalent to "deipnon" and/or "symposion" in Greek,[80] The number of participants at such meals in private houses, as opposed to other specially designated places, would be at most a dozen.[81] The symposium after the meal was the time for teaching and conversation, for the singing of hymns, for the contributions of those who prophesied or spoke in tongues.[77]

    Mystery cults

    Parallel to the religious duties to god and state, "the Hellenic world also fostered a number of 'underground' religions, which countless thousands of people found intellectually and emotionally satisfying."[82] They were known as the "mysteries," because their adherents took oaths never to reveal their rites to the uninitiated. Several honored young male gods born of a divine father and human mother, resurrected after a heroic death. In some of these secret religions "celebrants shared a communal meal in which they symbolically ate the flesh and drank the blood of their god."[82]

    Dionysus cult

    Early Christianity spread through a Hellenized populace. Jewish feast practices had taken on Hellenic forms as noted above. Dionysus was "god of 'the vine' - representing wine, the most universally popular beverage in the ancient world." [83] Barry Powell suggests that Christian notions of eating and drinking the "flesh" and "blood" of Jesus were influenced by the cult of Dionysus.[84] In contrast, the ancient Greek tragedy, The Bacchae, a ritual involving the wine of Dionysus is not drunk, but poured out as a libation. In the Greek novel, Leucippe and Clitophon by Achilles Tatius, Dionysus is said to have given a sheperd of Tyre his first wine. When Dionysus shows the grape cluster where he got the wine from, Tatius parodies the Christian eucharist rite.[85]


    In the chapter "Totem-Sacrifices and Eucharists" of his 1920 book Pagan and Christian Creeds, Edward Carpenter advanced the theory that the Christian Eucharist arose from an almost universal practice of a tribe occasionally eating the animal that it identified with, a practice that he saw as developing into ceremonial eatings of shared food by lamas in Nepal and Tibet, ancient Egyptians, Aztecs, Peruvians, Chinese and Tartars. He concluded: "These few instances are sufficient to show the extraordinarily wide diffusion of Totem-sacraments and Eucharistic rites all over the world."[86]

    Pre-Pauline confluence of Greek and Jewish traditions and agapé

    By the time the Roman conquest, Jews practiced festive dining in essentially the same form as the Greeks, with a dinner (deipnon) followed by the symposium proper, where guests drank wine and enjoyed entertainment or conversation. There were, to be sure, cultic differences, such as a berakhah over the wine cup instead of the Greeks' libation to Dionysus. But eating together was a central activity for Jewish religious groups such as Pharisees and Essenes.

    "Thanksgiving" (in Greek, "εὐχαριστία" [eucharistia]) is probably to be regarded as the Greek equivalent of the Hebrew "ברכה" [berakhah, berakah], the Jewish "blessing" (in Greek, "εὐλογία" [eulogia]) "addressed to God at meals for and over the food and drink. It is in this sense that the term was originally used in connection with the common meal of the early Christian community, at which the 'blessing' or 'thanksgiving' had special reference to Jesus Christ."[87]

    One formulation had it that "(t)he eucharistia was the berakhah without the chaburah supper, and the agape is the chaburah meal without the berakhah.[88]

    Agape feast

    "ὁ θεòς ἀγάπη ἐστίν" God Is Love is seen on a stele in Mount Nebo. The Eucharistic celebrations of the early Christians were embedded in, or simply took the form of, a meal. These were often called Agape Feasts, although terminology varied in the first few centuries along with other aspects of practice. Agape is one of the Greek words for love, and so "agape feasts" are also referred to in English as "love-feasts".

    This Hellenic ritual was apparently a full meal, with each participant bringing a contribution to the meal according to their means. Perhaps predictably enough, it could at times deteriorate into merely an occasion for eating and drinking, or for ostentatious displays by the wealthier members of the community of the type criticised by Paul in 1 Corinthians 11:20–22.


    1.^ Catechism of the Catholic Church, "The institution of the Eucharist"
    2.^ John Anthony McGuckin, The Encyclopedia of Eastern Orthodox Christianity (Wiley-Blackwell 2011 ISBN 978-1-4051-8539-4), Eucharist article by MC Steenberg vol. 1, p. 231
    3.^ Colin Buchanan, The A to Z of Anglicanism (Scarecrow Press 2009 ISBN 978-0-8108-6842-7), p. 107
    4.^ Enrico Mazza, Celebration of the Eucharist: The Origin of the Rite and the Development of Its Interpretation (Liturgical Press 1999 ISBN 978-0-8146-6170-3), p. 19 Quotation concerning the origin: "The Christian Eucharist has its origin in the Last Supper. There, Jesus took bread, blessed God, broke the bread, and gave it to his disciples, telling them to take it and eat of it, because it was his body. In the same way, after they had eaten, he took the cup, gave thanks, and gave it to his disciples, telling them all to take it and drink of it, because it was the cup of the covenant in his blood. At the end he said: "Do this in remembrance of me."
    5.^ Murphy-O'Connor, Jerome (1996). "The First Letter to the Corinthians". In Raymond E. Brown, Joseph A. Fitzmeyer, Roland E. Murphy. The New Jerome Biblical Commentary. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. pp. 799. ISBN 0-13-614934-0.. See also First Epistle to the Corinthians#Time and Place
    6.^ 1 Corinthians 11:17-34
    7.^ Encyclopædia Britannica, s.v. Eucharist
    8.^ Dix, dom Gregory (1949), The Shape of the Liturgy, London: DacrePress, p. 63
    9.^ a b Noakes, K.W. (1979), "The Eucharist: 2 From the Apostolic Fathers to Irenaeus", in Jones, Cheslyn; & others, The Study of Liturgy, London: SPCK, p. 171f
    10.^ a b Wainwright, Geoffrey (1979), "General Introduction: 1 The Periods of Liturgical History", in Jones, Cheslyn; & others, The Study of Liturgy, London: SPCK, p. 35
    11.^ Crossan, John Dominic, The Historical Jesus, pp 360-367
    12.^ Bradshaw, Paul, 'Eucharistic Origins (London, SPCK, 2004) ISBN 0-281-05615-3, p. 10.
    13.^ a b 1 Corinthians 11:23-25
    14.^ Matthew 26:26-28, Mark 14:22-24, Luke 22:17-20
    15.^ a b Funk, Robert (1993). The Five Gospels. San Francisco: HarpereCollins. pp. 387. ISBN [[Special:BookSources/1-06-063040-X|1-06-063040-X]].
    16.^ For instance, John 6, The Eucharist, and Protestant Objections; The Institution of the Eucharist in Scripture, etc.
    17.^ Perkins, Pheme (1996). "The Gospel According to John". In Raymond E. Brown, Joseph A. Fitzmeyer, Roland E. Murphy. The New Jerome Biblical Commentary. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. pp. 962. ISBN 0-13-614934-0.
    18.^ Karris, Robert J. (1996). "The Gospel According to Luke". In Raymond E. Brown, Joseph A. Fitzmeyer, Roland E. Murphy. The New Jerome Biblical Commentary. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. pp. 715. ISBN 0-13-614934-0.).
    19.^ Encyclopaedia Britannica 13th Edition (1926) art. Eucharist
    20.^ Jones, C.P.M. (1979), "The Eucharist in 1. - The New Testament", in Jones, Cheslyn; & others, The Study of Liturgy, London: SPCK, p. 163
    21.^ Metzger, Bruce M. (1971), A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament, London, p. 173ff, ISBN 3-438-06010-8
    22.^ Richardson, Alan (1961), An Introduction to the Theology of the New Testament, London: SCM, p. 368
    23.^ 1 Corinthians 11:20 Not τὸ κυριακὸν δεῖπνον, and so, in this context, "the Lord's supper" means "a supper of the Lord" rather than "the supper of the Lord".
    24.^ 1 Corinthians 10:21, a passage that scholars have referred to celebration of the Eucharist, e.g. [ Easton's Bible Dictionary on "Cup"]
    25.^ Meier, John, "The Eucharist and the Last Supper: Did it Happen?" Theology Digest 42 (Winter, 1995) 335-51, at 347.
    26.^ A Feast of Meanings: Eucharistic Theologies from Jesus through Johannine Circles, by Bruce Chilton 1994 ISBN 90-04-09949-2 p. 110
    27.^ The Eucharist in the New Testament and the Early Church By Eugene LaVerdiere, 1996 ISBN 0-8146-6152-1 p.31
    28.^ Acts 20:7
    29.^ Funk, Robert, and the Jesus Seminar, "The Acts of Jesus" Harper Collins, 1998, p. 16
    30.^ Noakes, K.W. (1979), "The Eucharist: 2 From the Apostolic Fathers to Irenaeus", in Jones, Cheslyn; & others, The Study of Liturgy, London: SPCK, p. 170
    31.^ "Let that eucharist alone be considered valid which is celebrated in the presence of the bishop, or of him to whom he shall have entrusted it. ... It is not lawful either to baptize, or to hold a love-feast without the consent of the bishop."
    32.^ Smyrnaeans, 8
    33.^ Stevenson, J. (1965), A New Eusebius, London: SPCK, p. 399
    34.^ Didache, 9:5
    35.^ The Didache: Its Jewish Sources and Its Place in Early Judaism and Christianity by Hubertus Waltherus Maria van de Sandt, David Flusser pp 311–2
    36.^ Epp.X.96 Stevenson, J. (1965), A New Eusebius, London: SPCK, pp. 13–15
    37.^ Against the Heresias V.ii.3, quoted Heron, Alasdair I.C. Table and Tradition Philadelphia: Westminster Press(1983), p.64
    38.^ [1]
    39.^ The Editors (1979), "General Introduction 7 The Apostolic Tradition", in Jones, Cheslyn; & others, The Study of Liturgy, London: SPCK, p. 171f
    40.^ Dix,dom Gregory. The Shape of the Liturgy, p.84f
    41.^ Apology, 39; De Corona Militis, 3.

    Yet about the modest supper-room of the Christians alone a great ado is made. Our feast explains itself by its name. The Greeks call it agapè, i.e., affection. Whatever it costs, our outlay in the name of piety is gain, since with the good things of the feast we benefit the needy; not as it is with you, do parasites aspire to the glory of satisfying their licentious propensities, selling themselves for a belly-feast to all disgraceful treatment,—but as it is with God himself, a peculiar respect is shown to the lowly. If the object of our feast be good, in the light of that consider its further regulations. As it is an act of religious service, it permits no vileness or immodesty. The participants, before reclining, taste first of prayer to God. As much is eaten as satisfies the cravings of hunger; as much is drunk as befits the chaste. They say it is enough, as those who remember that even during the night they have to worship God; they talk as those who know that the Lord is one of their auditors. After manual ablution, and the bringing in of lights, each [Or, perhaps—“One is prompted to stand forth and bring to God, as every one can, whether from the Holy Scriptures, or of his own mind”—i.e. according to his taste.] is asked to stand forth and sing, as he can, a hymn to God, either one from the holy Scriptures or one of his own composing,—a proof of the measure of our drinking. As the feast commenced with prayer, so with prayer it is closed.

    42.^ Paedagogus II, 1
    43.^ "Sed majoris est Agape, quia per hanc adolescentes tui cum sororibus dormiunt, appendices scilicet gulae lascivia et luxuria" (Tertullian, De Jejuniis, 17, quoted in Gibbons: Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire).
    44.^ Letter 22, 1:3
    45.^ Confessions, 6.2.2
    46.^ The Council of Laodicea in Phrygia Pacatiana
    47.^ Bradshaw, Paul (2004). Eucharistic origins. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press. p. 25. ISBN 0-19-522221-0.
    48.^ a b Senn, Frank C, (1997). Christian Liturgy, Catholic and Evangelical. Augsburg Fortress. ISBN 0-8006-2726-1.
    49.^ "Anaphora" in Cross, F. L., ed., The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church (Oxford University Press 2005 ISBN 978-0-19-280290-3)
    50.^ Dan O. Via jr Foreword to What is Redaction Criticism? by Norman Perrin. London:SPCK(1970) p.vii
    51.^ Daly, Robert J., S. J., 'Eucharistic origins: from the new testament to the liturgies of the golden age." Theological Studies March , 2005
    52.^ Daly, Robert J., S.J., 'Eucharistic origins: from the new testament to the liturgies of the golden age." Theological Studies March 2005
    53.^ Bradshaw, Paul, Eucharistic Origins (London, SPCK, 2004) ISBN 0-281-05615-3, p. 10.
    54.^ "The earliest reference to the Eucharist is in Paul's first letter to the Corinthians (1Corinthians 11:23-24) where he attributes its institution to the actions and words of Jesus at the Last Supper" (Culham Institute: Knowledge Content in Religious Education: Christianity – A Guide For Teachers New To Religious Education)
    55.^ Crossan, John Dominic, "The Historical Jesus" HarperCollins 1992 p 364
    56.^ Crossan, John Dominic "The Birth of Christianity, Harper/Collins, 2002, p. 436
    57.^ Funk, ibid. at 139-140
    58.^ Funk, Robert, and the Jesus Seminar, "The Acts of Jesus" Harper Collins, 1998, p. 139
    59.^ Raymond F. Collins, Daniel J. Harrington, First Corinthians (Michael Glazier, Inc. 1999), pp. 425-426
    60.^ Crossan, John Dominic. The essential Jesus. Edison: Castle Books. 1998.
    61.^ English translation
    62.^ Crossan, Ibid.
    63.^ Crossan, John Dominic, The Historical Jesus," pp 360-367
    64.^ Drinking blood at a kosher Eucharist? The sound of scholarly silence
    65.^ For instance, Hyam Maccoby proposes that "Paul, not Jesus, was the originator of the eucharist, and that the eucharist itself is not a Jewish, but an essentially Hellenistic rite, showing principal affinities not with the Jewish qiddush, but with the ritual meal of the mystery religions." John M. G. Barclay "stresses the anomalous nature of Paul. If Paul's status were to be determined on the single issue of the drinking of blood, it would have to be conceded that Paul simply moves off the scale." A. N. Wilson, whose work, Cahill says, synthesizes scholarly trends, distinguishes between the Jewishness of Jesus and Paul: "... the idea that a pious Jew such as Jesus would have spent his last evening on earth asking his disciples to drink a cup of blood, even symbolically, is unthinkable". He sees no problem, however, in proposing "the genius of Paul," "Paul's fertile brain," as the source of the Christian Eucharist incorporating the blood-drinking element. Cahill writes: "It is instructive to recall the context in which the drinking of blood was acceptable. First-century folk who participated in mystery cult rituals were no more tolerant of cannibalism than we are. There is no evidence that, in itself, drinking of blood was not revolting for them, generally speaking. Yet, we find it in religious ritual. The reason is that they were drinking the blood of an animal that had been numinized in some way and had come to be identified with the god. Drinking the blood of a god was acceptable." Otfried Hofius, argues for the authenticity of the passage in 1 Corinthians where Paul speaks of the Eucharist, writing: "A convincing proof that the Apostle has himself encroached on the wording of the tradition delivered to him has not thus far been adduced." David Wenham writes: "Jesus typically uses vivid, almost shocking metaphors (e.g., Matt 18:8, 9/Mark 9:43-48). Furthermore, that the shocking eucharistic words came to be accepted by Jewish Christians (including Matthew) may suggest that they were not quite as unacceptable as Vermes supposes or that they had a strong claim to authenticity, since they would not easily have been accepted if they were not in the Jewish Christian tradition." John Meier, too, insists on Jesus' propensity to use "shocking symbols", in reference to the words of the institution narrative and in his "deliberate flouting of certain social conventions". He gives particular attention to "a subversive aphorism of Jesus," referring to "Let the dead bury their dead."
    66.^ a b c Ratcliff, E.C., Encyclopaedia Britannica [13th edition] (1926), Eucharist (vol. 8, p. 793)
    67.^ Encyclopaedia Britannica Online.
    68.^ Adler, Cyrus & Dembitz, Lewis N., The Jewish Encyclopedia (1911) ḲIDDUSH
    69.^ Joachim Jeremias, Die Abendmahlsworte Jesu (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960, first ed. 1935): ET: The Eucharistic Words of Jesus [with author's revisions to 1964 ed.] (London: SCM. 1966: repr., Philadelphia: Westminster. 1977)
    70.^ a b Dix, Gregory, The Shape of the Liturgy, p 50
    71.^ a b Rev. Dr. Frank Peake, Manual: The Evolution of the Eucharist
    72.^ Jeremias, Joachim, Die Abendmahlsworte Jesu (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960, first ed. 1935): ET: The Eucharistic Words of Jesus [with author's revisions to 1964 ed.] (London: SCM. 1966: repr., Philadelphia: Westminster. 1977)
    73.^ Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church (Oxford University Press 2005 ISBN 978-0-19-280290-3), article Passover
    74.^ The Celebration of the Eucharist: The Origin of the Rite and the Development of Its Interpretation [Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999] pp. 25-26
    75.^ Eucharistic Sacrifice in the New Testament
    76.^ Sirach 31:12-32:13
    77.^ a b c From Symposium to Eucharist: The Banquet in the Early Christian World. By Dennis E. Smith. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003.
    79.^ (Smith, Dennis The Greco-Roman Banquet as a Social Institution 2003)
    80.^ While some scholars speak of "convivium" as equivalent to "symposion" – e.g. "the convivium, a Roman equivalent to the symposium with drinking, entertainment and conversation" (Women and Meals in Antiquity), the ancient writers, such as Cicero (De senectute, 45), who are quoted in Lewis and Short (Lewis and Short: convivium) apply it to the whole meal, "deipnon" and "symposion". Still more important in the present context is the fact that Tertullian speaks of the Lord's Supper (the Pauline "κυριακὸν δεῖπνον") precisely as the "dominicum convivium" (see Ad uxorem 2:4:2, and translation).
    81.^ "The term convivium labels a late afternoon or evening meal taking place in a domestic dining room or garden, hosted by the proprietor of the residence, involving some combination of family members and guests numbering anywhere from a very few up to perhaps a dozen (nine is an ideal but not necessarily standard number), and ordinarily employing a single triclinium, the three-sided arrangement of couches commonly used for dining during the period of this study. ... "civic" dining, which occurred on special occasions such as festivals, was publicly sponsored or paid for by a single donor, and might involve large numbers of people spread over many triclinia in the public spaces of cities and towns; or, alternatively, involved a college of priests or magistrates whose meals might be paid for publicly or by an endowment, and might occur in specially designated spaces." (Matthew B. Roller: Dining Posture in Ancient Rome: Bodies, Values, and Status, Introduction)
    82.^ a b Harris, Stephen L. 'Understanding the Bible' Fourth Edition p 286
    83.^ Harris, Stephen L., Understanding the Bible. (Mayfield Publishing Company 4th ed.) p 287.ISBN 1-55934-655-8
    84.^ Powell, Barry B., Classical Myth Second ed. With new translations of ancient texts by Herbert M. Howe. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1998.
    85.^ Reardon, B.P., Collected Ancient Greek Novels (University of California Press 2nd ed.) p 192.
    86.^ Edward Carpenter, Pagan and Christian Creeds (1920), pp. 54-68
    87.^ Ratcliff, E.C., Encyclopaedia Britannica [1944 (13th) edition], Eucharist (vol. 8, p. 793)
    88.^ Dix, Gregory, The Shape of the Liturgy, p 99

    "Kiss Me You Fool!!!"

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    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  orthodoxymoron on Sat Apr 19, 2014 4:11 pm

    It might be "fun" to silently study what I've already posted for a couple of years -- without saying or doing anything. No internet posting. No phone-calls. No conversation. No books. Absolutely nothing. What would those who monitor me put in their reports??!! Would this make me more or less of a problem (or potential problem) than I am presently?? It would probably take more self-control than I presently possess!! I have a hunch that I know very little compared with literally tens of millions of people throughout the world. This is just a very-passive mind-game to me. Frankly, me dear -- I don't give a damn. I'm not into digging and pleading. I probably simply wish to leave everyone to their own devices -- while being left alone.

    Just a note about the Last Supper image seen below (and other potentially offensive images within this thread): I seek to provide a somewhat safe-haven of expression -- and I also wish to provide a cross-section of editorial content (whether I agree with it or not). It was hoped that this would stimulate discussion (which might include outrage) -- but this hasn't really happened to any significant degree. Just for the record -- that Zombie-Supper image deeply offends me (even though I have posted similar images previously). I'm simply trying to look at things from a lot of new angles (for me anyway).
    magamud wrote: study

    Thank-you magamud. I look closely at everything you post -- but I don't necessarily comment on everything. What worries me is that we might not live in a nice and peaceful universe -- and that the creation of humanity was an attempt to make things better -- which isn't working. What if this solar system is such a mess that NO ONE can make it better -- regardless of whether they are good, bad, human, or otherwise??!! I know we've been lied to -- and stolen from -- but what if some of what seems to be reprehensible has been necessary -- on some abstract level??!! What if a Reptilian-Human Nazi-Mason-Jesuit Agent-Attorney-Queen presides over a Reptilian-Human Nazi-Mason-Jesuit Galactic-Empire??!! If true -- what if such a state of affairs is simply the way things work -- regardless of whether we like it or not??!! What if we are stuck with a Queen A (Gabriel?) v Queen B (Michael?) v Queen C (Lucifer?) Galactic Star War in Heaven??!! What if the Nice-Queen quickly becomes the Mean-Queen once they Gain the Reigns -- and Reign??!! What if Politics and Religion as We Know It are a necessary cover for some Really Nasty Politics and Religion as We DON'T Want to Know It??!! I keep joking about becoming some sort of an insider in a future-life -- but I doubt that this would make me happy -- or that it would make things better. We might simply be VERY lucky if things don't get a helluva lot worse. We might be lucky to simply survive. I will continue to positively-reinforce and positively-rearrange that which presently exists within this solar system -- in my imagination and within this website -- even though it will probably be an inconsequential exercise in futility. I will continue to conceptualize Ancient Egyptian Deities in Conflict Within This Solar System -- regardless of whether this is the case or not. It's getting much more difficult to keep secrets and cover things up in the internet-age. In a way this might be good (for cleaning-up corruption) -- but in another way it might be bad (by informing us how bad things really are -- and consequently driving a lot of us insane).

    BTW -- did anyone watch Hangar 18? I thought it was quite good -- especially for 1980. It reminded me of Capricorn One. Did you notice that they called the Aliens 'The Missing-Link'??!! They said that the Aliens were a lot like us!! What have I been speculating about??!! Anyway, now I think I might watch Roswell.

    Beginning at a 30-year reunion for members of a military nuclear bomb unit, flashbacks are presented that follow the attempts of Major Jesse Marcel to discover the truth about strange debris found on a local rancher's field in July of 1947. Told by his superiors that what he has found is nothing more than a downed weather balloon, Marcel maintains his military duty until the weight of the truth, however out of this world it may be, forces him to piece together what really occurred. Adapted from real-life events portrayed in the book _UFO Crash at Roswell_ by Kevin Randle and Donald Schmitt.

    Once again, I assume that those who view this thread are further down the rabbit-hole than I am. There's a time and a place for everything. My goal is to know everything -- and to say and do nothing -- other than what I'm saying and doing within this website. I've been told that, at some point, all hell will break loose -- which wouldn't surprise me at all -- but I certainly don't wish to make things worse. Completely Ignorant Fools Should Stay Cool. My Dad Kept the Stars Cool. He Really Did. One More Thing. Consider thinking of nearly ALL Science-Fiction as occurring within this solar system. Consider developing a Solar System View to replace your World View. This is about survival rather than happiness. Things might be worse than we think -- and later than we think. "I Thought We Had More Time." Perhaps It's Time to Cram for the Final-Exam. You Might Wish to Use This Thread as a Study-Guide.

    What if this "Man" is an Undercover Archangelic Queen of Heaven??!!

    I just keep wondering what it might be like to have priority-access to everyone and everything in the solar system -- yet have absolutely zero power?! What if one were able to witness any document, file, or meeting -- no matter how sensitive -- on condition of remaining silent -- before, during, and after the encounter?? Would this sort of thing help or hurt?? I have no idea. Imagine the Secret Government Guy with the Fedora (Parcher) in A Beautiful Mind being such an individual. Did you notice the angel in his office?? Did you see my point?? To me -- this would be both a Dream-Job and a Nightmare-Job. Just having such an individual present -- who everyone knows -- and everyone knows knows -- yet everyone knows that they're not talking to anyone -- might make humans or otherwise think twice or thrice before doing something corrupt or stupid. Just a Thought. I suspect that such an individual presently exists -- but that they are anything but powerless...

    orthodoxymoron wrote:
    Mercuriel wrote:
    Brook wrote:Why would a Pope canonize a Saint that would predict the demise of not only the Church and seat of the Pope itself...but most notably seat the Antichrist ?

    Only If It was planned like that way back then My Dear Sister - Only if It was planned that way...

    Simply put - Its not so hard to predict or prophesy something especially if one has the control necesary to MAKE SURE It occurs...

    The more I think about prophecy, the more I agree with what you just said, Mercuriel. God, Satan, Lucifer -- or Somebody -- seems to have been making this solar system exactly the way they have wanted it to be -- rather than just a bunch of stupid-humans getting in each others way. I'm not celebrating the resignation of the Pope. I wouldn't celebrate the resignation of the Queen. I wouldn't celebrate the resignation of the President. We'll still be faced with the same Underlying Bullshit. What worries me is that we might not be able to escape the darkness which exists -- not just in this solar system -- but possibly throughout the universe. This view is completely opposite of what I grew-up believing -- but my faith has been BADLY Shaken -- and I don't see much chance of regaining my faith during the remainder of this incarnation. I just read an article in The Wall Street Journal about a Jewish Hedge-Fund Manager who is an Atheist -- yet collects rare and expensive Jewish Ceremonial Items. I get the impression that there are a lot of people in this category. They're not buying the traditional-story -- but they still need a sense of identity which comes from some sort of association with religion. I guess I'm sort of a New-Age Happy-Clappy Anglican-Adventist-Agnostic -- who is (as Beren keeps pointing-out) quite confused.
    Here's another variation on my Biblical Study List:

    1. Deuteronomy (The Old Testament Law of God -- In Context). Read Every Sunday in One Sitting.
    2. Psalms (A 'Man After God's Own Heart' -- Talks to God). Read Every Monday in One Sitting.
    3. Daniel (Old Testament Prophecy). Read Every Tuesday in One Sitting.
    4. Matthew (God in Human-Flesh -- and a seemingly New Law of God). Read Every Wednesday in One Sitting.
    5. Hebrews (A Biblical-Review -- combined with the claim that 'Christianity is Better' -- and the only New Testament Sanctuary Discussion). Read Every Thursday in One Sitting.
    6. Revelation (New Testament Prophecy -- which seems to be a lot like Old Testament Prophecy -- only more abstract, violent, and nasty). Read Every Friday in One Sitting.
    7. Rest on the Saturday Seventh-Day Sabbath.

    I think I might start another thread to examine all of the above. But really, I am so afraid, miserable, and confused that I really don't wish to dig my grave any deeper -- especially after being given the suggestion that I might write my memoirs. Perhaps I should at least say my prayers. Notice that the Old Testament Books of the Bible abruptly end around 450BC. Why don't we have Old Testament Books of the Bible from 450BC to at least the Birth of Christ?? Is this when a Changing of the Guard began (around 450BC)?? I have speculated that the Roman-Empire (Pagan and Papal) really kicked-in with Antiochus IV Epiphanes in 168BC -- and might continue to 2133AD -- if the 2300 days-years of Daniel 8:14 span this period. This is my speculation -- and I am not aware of any scholars who hold to this interpretation. It seems as if someone wanted to minimize Babylonian, Egyptian, and Grecian history -- and supplant it with Judeo-Christian history -- for whatever reasons. The Power-Struggling and Deception I am sensing DEEPLY sickens me. I know that recorded history is nasty and violent -- but I suspect that the REAL history is Beyond Comprehension. I suspect that everything we know is HIGHLY Sugar-Coated. Are Rome and Jerusalem really two sides of the same coin?? Is Saturday v Sunday really a Straw-Man Argument -- or is it simply a Red-Herring created by the Woman in Scarlet?? I keep thinking in terms of services being offered SEVEN days a week -- with no preference given to ANY day -- and with NO pressure applied for anyone to attend any religious services. I get the sinking-feeling that this suggestion is considered to be the Wrong Answer by some VERY powerful humans and other-than-humans. I highly recommend religious participation -- even though I do not presently attend church. I've probably spent more time in religious services than most religious people do in a couple of lifetimes.

    I'm presently trying to see things from as many perspectives as possible -- but I'm not making much progress. Sorry about that. It might be nice to get paid to go through this hell -- but if I got paid, then I'd be a sell-out -- right??? I am extremely disillusioned with nearly everyone. I've been talking with someone who I deeply respect, and who is highly ethical -- yet when I speak of the mass-murder in the Old-Testament and the Book of Revelation -- that all seems to be justified by this individual. We continue to kill unborn babies who are completely normal and healthy, we justify biblical-atrocities, we support drugs and surgery conventional-medicine over preventive and natural medicine, we support senseless wars, we ignore the dark realities of the international drug-business, etc, etc, etc. Sometimes I think we really deserve to go to hell. In fact, perhaps we're already there. The AED suggested that might be the case. In the movie Roswell Martin Sheen suggests that the best approach to the ET and UFO subject is to be NEUTRAL. Remember what I said regarding my discussions with the AED?? I tried very hard to be NEUTRAL. But perhaps I could've been more NEUTRAL. During our first discussion, I noticed the AED seeming to signal with his hand to unseen assistants -- sort of like 'come-on guys -- go get him' -- or so it seemed to me. I even suggested that every word of our discussions were probably being listened-to and recorded. Often, when I said something especially controversial, the AED repeated what I had just said -- as if to make sure the others took note of what I'd just said. The AED said we were somehow related -- but I don't wish to say more than that. I've elaborated a bit more -- elsewhere in this thread. You notice that I haven't been shouting this from the rooftops or from atop the Seven Hills of Rome or Jerusalem. I'd really like to get to the point where I am completely relaxed and detached regarding all of this madness. Then someone might actually tell me the Real Truth. The scary part is that I don't think I'll be a bit surprised when 'they' finally get around to telling me. Now, I'm going to try to cheer myself up by watching Asteroid.

    I'm still attempting to understand the relationship between the American System and the Kingdom of God. I have been contemplating an integration of the United Nations, the City-States, and the Moon -- just to see where that line of thinking leads. Don't look now -- but this solar system might be at war with the rest of the universe. What if the Roman Catholic Church mediates between a Rebellious Human Race and an Offended--Angry--Jealous Universe?! No matter what happens -- my plans are to just keep doing what I'm doing. Today, I'm thinking about a hypothetical experimental church at St. Ouen which is limited to the Latin Mass, Sacred Classical Music, and the 1928 Book of Common Prayer -- with services and classes offered daily -- year round. What might emerge?? What Would the Catholics Say?? What Would the Protestants Say?? What Would the Muslims Say?? What Would the Jews Say?? What Would the Hindus Say?? What Would the Orthodox Say?? What Would the Athiests Say?? What Would the Agnostics Say?? What Would the Pope Say?? What Would the Queen Say?? What Would the President Say?? What Would the Queen of Heaven Say?? What if One God Created ALL of the Governments and Religions of the World??? What if One Satan Created ALL of the Governments and Religions of the World??? I continue to think that the REAL Truth would drive most of us insane -- which is the major reason why I am so passive in my quest for the truth. BTW -- I'd love to spend some quality time with the Pope Emeritus. I'd say very little -- if anything. I'd probably just silently shake his hand -- while slightly bowing -- and then sit down and silently listen. When he was finished speaking -- I'd probably silently shake his hand while slightly bowing -- and then turn and slowly walk away. I continue to wonder how much change the church could endure without destroying itself?! The proper reform of the church seems to be a key element in saving the world. The utter destruction of the church would probably precipitate the utter destruction of the world. Think about it. I believe in the existence of supernatural-phenomenon -- yet I never know the true nature of supernatural-events -- regarding whether they are good, evil, staged, etc. Some say that even the Second-Coming of Christ can be staged. I have chosen to focus upon Solar System Governance -- in Theory and Reality -- rather than being Event-Centered. One More Thing. Better Too Pooped to Pope Than Too Pooped to Poop...

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    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  orthodoxymoron on Sun Apr 20, 2014 9:11 am

    I don't know if I'm being deliberately destroyed by supernatural attacks OR if I am destroying myself by my contrarian conjecturing. Whatever the case may be -- I am NOT in any condition to do much of anything (especially in public). It's a constant war -- just to maintain my mediocrity. I still think this thread is worth spending some quality-time with. Thank-you B.B. Again, there is a disconnect between my internet-activities and me-personally. I never allow things to settle internally. I just keep beating myself up with controversial information -- and consequently, I think that I really am supernaturally-targeted -- probably because I'm messing with someone's agenda. I can easily follow and deal-with the most upsetting discussions -- yet my conversational skills are virtually non-existent. I sympathize with the public-puppets. They're quite-skilled and probably-necessary -- but Sheeple-Leaders are somewhat disgusting to me. Don't believe everything you see and hear on a Mumbo-Jumbo-Tron!! Anyway, consider Easter.

    Easter (Old English Ēostre),[nb 1] also called the Pasch[4] or Pascha (the two latter names derived, through Latin: Pascha and Greek Πάσχα Paskha, from Hebrew: פֶּסַח‎ Pesaḥ),[5][6] or Resurrection Sunday,[7][8] is a festival and holiday celebrating the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, described in the New Testament as having occurred three days after his crucifixion by Romans at Calvary.[9][10] It is the culmination of the Passion of Christ, preceded by Lent, a forty-day period of fasting, prayer, and penance.

    The last week of Lent is called Holy Week, and it contains the days of the Easter Triduum, including Maundy Thursday (also known as Holy Thursday), commemorating the Last Supper and its preceding foot washing,[11][12] as well as Good Friday, commemorating the crucifixion and death of Jesus.[13] Easter is followed by a fifty-day period called Eastertide, or the Easter Season, ending with Pentecost Sunday.

    Easter is a moveable feast, meaning it is not fixed in relation to the civil calendar. The First Council of Nicaea (325) established the date of Easter as the first Sunday after the full moon (the Paschal Full Moon) following the March equinox.[14] Ecclesiastically, the equinox is reckoned to be on 21 March (although the astronomical equinox occurs on 20 March in most years), and the "Full Moon" is not necessarily on the astronomically correct date. The date of Easter therefore varies from 22 March to 25 April inclusive. Eastern Christianity bases its calculations on the Julian calendar, whose 21 March corresponds, during the 21st century, to 3 April in the Gregorian calendar, and in which therefore the celebration of Easter varies between 4 April and 8 May.

    Easter is linked to the Jewish Passover by much of its symbolism, as well as by its position in the calendar. In many languages, the words for "Easter" and "Passover" are identical or very similar.[15] Easter customs vary across the Christian world, and include sunrise services, exclaiming the Paschal greeting, clipping the church,[16] and decorating Easter eggs, a symbol of the empty tomb.[17][18][19] The Easter lily, a symbol of the resurrection,[20][21] traditionally decorates the chancel area of churches on this day and for the rest of Eastertide.[22] Additional customs that have become associated with Easter and are observed by both Christians and some non-Christians include egg hunting, the Easter Bunny, and Easter parades.[23][24][25] There are also various traditional Easter foods that vary regionally.

    The modern English term Easter, cognate with modern German Ostern, developed from the Old English word Ēastre or Ēostre.[nb 2] This is generally held to have originally referred to the name of an Anglo-Saxon goddess, Ēostre, a form of the widely attested Indo-European dawn goddess.[nb 3]

    In Greek and Latin, the Christian celebration was and is called Πάσχα, Pascha, words derived, through Aramaic, from the Hebrew term Pesach (פֶּסַח), known in English as Passover, which originally denoted the Jewish festival commemorating the story of the Exodus.[29][30] Already in the 50s of the 1st century, Paul, writing from Ephesus to the Christians in Corinth,[31] applied the term to Christ, and it is unlikely that the Ephesian and Corinthian Christians were the first to hear Exodus 12 interpreted as speaking about the death of Jesus, not just about the Jewish Passover ritual.[32] In most of the non-English speaking world, the feast is known by names derived from Greek and Latin Pascha.[5][33]

    The New Testament teaches that the resurrection of Jesus, which Easter celebrates, is a foundation of the Christian faith.[34] The resurrection established Jesus as the powerful Son of God[35] and is cited as proof that God will judge the world in righteousness.[36][37] God has given Christians "a new birth into a living hope through the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead".[38] Christians, through faith in the working of God are spiritually resurrected with Jesus so that they may walk in a new way of life.[37][39]

    Easter is linked to the Passover and Exodus from Egypt recorded in the Old Testament through the Last Supper and crucifixion that preceded the resurrection.[33] According to the New Testament, Jesus gave the Passover meal a new meaning, as he prepared himself and his disciples for his death in the upper room during the Last Supper.[33] He identified the matzah and cup of wine as his body soon to be sacrificed and his blood soon to be shed. Paul states, "Get rid of the old yeast that you may be a new batch without yeast—as you really are. For Christ, our Passover lamb, has been sacrificed";[40] this refers to the Passover requirement to have no yeast in the house and to the allegory of Jesus as the Paschal lamb.[41]

    One interpretation of the Gospel of John is that Jesus, as the Passover lamb, was crucified at roughly the same time as the Passover lambs were being slain in the temple, on the afternoon of Nisan 14.[42] The scriptural instructions specify that the lamb is to be slain "between the two evenings", that is, at twilight. By the Roman period, however, the sacrifices were performed in the mid-afternoon. Josephus, Jewish War 6.10.1/423 ("They sacrifice from the ninth to the eleventh hour"). Philo, Special Laws 2.27/145 ("Many myriads of victims from noon till eventide are offered by the whole people").

    This interpretation, however, is inconsistent with the chronology in the Synoptic Gospels. It assumes that text literally translated "the preparation of the passover" in John 19:14 refers to Nisan 14 (Preparation Day for the Passover) and not necessarily to Yom Shishi (Friday, Preparation Day for the Passover week Sabbath)[43] and that the priests' desire to be ritually pure in order to "eat the passover"[44] refers to eating the Passover lamb, not to the public offerings made during the days of Unleavened Bread.[45]

    The Last Supper celebrated by Jesus and his disciples was a Passover Seder. The early Christians too would have celebrated this meal to commemorate Jesus' death and subsequent resurrection.  The first Christians, Jewish and Gentile, were certainly aware of the Hebrew calendar,[nb 4] and there is no direct evidence that they celebrated any specifically Christian annual festivals.[46] It was probably as an aspect of Passover that Jewish Christians, the first to do so, celebrated the resurrection of Jesus, dated close to Passover.[29]

    Direct evidence for the Easter festival begins to appear in the mid-2nd century. Perhaps the earliest extant primary source referencing Easter is a mid-2nd-century Paschal homily attributed to Melito of Sardis, which characterizes the celebration as a well-established one.[46] Evidence for another kind of annual Christian festival, the commemoration of martyrs, begins to appear at about the same time as evidence for the celebration of Easter.[47]

    While martyrs' days (usually the individual dates of martyrdom) were celebrated on fixed dates in the local solar calendar, the date of Easter was fixed by means of the local Jewish lunisolar calendar. This is consistent with the celebration of Easter having entered Christianity during its earliest, Jewish period, but does not leave the question free of doubt.[48]

    The ecclesiastical historian Socrates Scholasticus attributes the observance of Easter by the church to the perpetuation of its custom, "just as many other customs have been established", stating that neither Jesus nor his Apostles enjoined the keeping of this or any other festival. Although he describes the details of the Easter celebration as deriving from local custom, he insists the feast itself is universally observed.[49]

    Easter and the holidays that are related to it are moveable feasts, in that they do not fall on a fixed date in the Gregorian or Julian calendars (both of which follow the cycle of the sun and the seasons). Instead, the date for Easter is determined on a lunisolar calendar similar to the Hebrew calendar. The First Council of Nicaea (325) established the date of Easter as the first Sunday after the full moon (the Paschal Full Moon) following the March equinox. Ecclesiastically, the equinox is reckoned to be on 21 March (even though the equinox occurs, astronomically speaking, on 20 March in most years), and the "full moon" is not necessarily the astronomically correct date.

    In Western Christianity, using the Gregorian calendar, Easter always falls on a Sunday between 22 March and 25 April inclusive, within about seven days after the astronomical full moon.[51] The following day, Easter Monday, is a legal holiday in many countries with predominantly Christian traditions.

    Eastern Christianity bases its calculations on the Julian Calendar. Because of the 13-day difference between the calendars between 1900 and 2099, 21 March corresponds, during the 21st century, to 3 April in the Gregorian Calendar. Easter therefore varies between 4 April and 8 May on the Gregorian calendar (the Julian calendar is no longer used as the civil calendar of the countries where Eastern Christian traditions predominate). Also, because the Julian "full moon" is always several days after the astronomical full moon, the eastern Easter is often later, relative to the visible moon's phases, than western Easter.

    Among the Oriental Orthodox some churches have changed from the Julian to the Gregorian calendar and the date for Easter as for other fixed and moveable feasts is the same as in the Western church.[52]

    In 725, Bede succinctly wrote, "The Sunday following the full Moon which falls on or after the equinox will give the lawful Easter."[53] However, this does not reflect the actual ecclesiastical rules precisely. One reason for this is that the full moon involved (called the Paschal full moon) is not an astronomical full moon, but the 14th day of a calendar lunar month. Another difference is that the astronomical equinox is a natural astronomical phenomenon, which can fall on 19, 20 or 21 March, while the ecclesiastical date is fixed by convention on 21 March.[54]

    In applying the ecclesiastical rules, Christian churches use 21 March as the starting point in determining the date of Easter, from which they find the next full moon, etc. The Eastern Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox Churches continue to use the Julian calendar. Their starting point in determining the date of Orthodox Easter is also 21 March, but according to the Julian reckoning, which currently corresponds to 3 April in the Gregorian calendar.

    In addition, the lunar tables of the Julian calendar are four days (sometimes five days) behind those of the Gregorian calendar. The 14th day of the lunar month according to the Gregorian system is only the ninth or tenth day according to the Julian. The result of this combination of solar and lunar discrepancies is divergence in the date of Easter in most years (see table).

    Easter is determined on the basis of lunisolar cycles. The lunar year consists of 30-day and 29-day lunar months, generally alternating, with an embolismic month added periodically to bring the lunar cycle into line with the solar cycle. In each solar year (1 January to 31 December inclusive), the lunar month beginning with an ecclesiastical new moon falling in the 29-day period from 8 March to 5 April inclusive is designated as the paschal lunar month for that year.[55]

    Easter is the third Sunday in the paschal lunar month, or, in other words, the Sunday after the paschal lunar month's 14th day. The 14th of the paschal lunar month is designated by convention as the Paschal full moon, although the 14th of the lunar month may differ from the date of the astronomical full moon by up to two days.[55] Since the ecclesiastical new moon falls on a date from 8 March to 5 April inclusive, the paschal full moon (the 14th of that lunar month) must fall on a date from 21 March to 18 April inclusive.

    The Gregorian calculation of Easter was based on a method devised by the Calabrian doctor Aloysius Lilius (or Lilio) for adjusting the epacts of the moon,[56] and has been adopted by almost all Western Christians and by Western countries which celebrate national holidays at Easter. For the British Empire and colonies, a determination of the date of Easter Sunday using Golden Numbers and Sunday letters was defined by the Calendar (New Style) Act 1750 with its Annexe. This was designed to exactly match the Gregorian calculation.

    Eastern Orthodox Christians use a different computation for the date of Easter than the Western churches. The precise date of Easter has at times been a matter for contention. By the later 2nd century, it was accepted that the celebration of the holiday was a practice of the disciples and an undisputed tradition. The Quartodeciman controversy, the first of several Easter controversies, then arose concerning the date on which the holiday should be celebrated.

    The term "Quartodeciman" refers to the practice of celebrating Easter on Nisan 14 of the Hebrew calendar, "the LORD's passover" (Leviticus 23:5). According to the church historian Eusebius, the Quartodeciman Polycarp (bishop of Smyrna, by tradition a disciple of John the Evangelist) debated the question with Anicetus (bishop of Rome). The Roman province of Asia was Quartodeciman, while the Roman and Alexandrian churches continued the fast until the Sunday following (the Sunday of Unleavened Bread), wishing to associate Easter with Sunday. Neither Polycarp nor Anicetus persuaded the other, but they did not consider the matter schismatic either, parting in peace and leaving the question unsettled.

    Controversy arose when Victor, bishop of Rome a generation after Anicetus, attempted to excommunicate Polycrates of Ephesus and all other bishops of Asia for their Quartodecimanism. According to Eusebius, a number of synods were convened to deal with the controversy, which he regarded as all ruling in support of Easter on Sunday.[57] Polycrates (circa 190), however, wrote to Victor defending the antiquity of Asian Quartodecimanism. Victor's attempted excommunication was apparently rescinded and the two sides reconciled upon the intervention of bishop Irenaeus and others, who reminded Victor of the tolerant precedent of Anicetus.

    Quartodecimanism seems to have lingered into the 4th century, when Socrates of Constantinople recorded that some Quartodecimans were deprived of their churches by John Chrysostom[58] and that some were harassed by Nestorius.[59]

    It is not known how long the Nisan 14 practice continued. But both those who followed the Nisan 14 custom, and those who set Easter to the following Sunday had in common the custom of consulting their Jewish neighbors to learn when the month of Nisan would fall, and setting their festival accordingly. By the later 3rd century, however, some Christians began to express dissatisfaction with the custom of relying on the Jewish community to determine the date of Easter. The chief complaint was that the Jewish communities sometimes erred in setting Passover to fall before the Northern Hemisphere spring equinox.[60][61] The Sardica paschal table[62] confirms these complaints, for it indicates that the Jews of some eastern Mediterranean city (possibly Antioch) fixed Nisan 14 on dates well before the spring equinox on multiple occasions.[63]

    Because of this dissatisfaction with reliance on the Jewish calendar, some Christians began to experiment with independent computations.[nb 5] Others, however, felt that the customary practice of consulting Jews should continue, even if the Jewish computations were in error.

    This controversy between those who advocated independent computations, and those who wished to continue the custom of relying on the Jewish calendar, was formally resolved by the First Council of Nicaea in 325, which endorsed the move to independent computations, effectively requiring the abandonment of the old custom of consulting the Jewish community in those places where it was still used. Epiphanius of Salamis wrote in the mid-4th century:

    ... the emperor ... convened a council of 318 bishops ... in the city of Nicea ... They passed certain ecclesiastical canons at the council besides, and at the same time decreed in regard to the Passover that there must be one unanimous concord on the celebration of God's holy and supremely excellent day. For it was variously observed by people ...[66]

    That the older custom (called "protopaschite" by historians) did not at once die out, but persisted for a time, is indicated by the existence of canons[67] and sermons[68] against it.

    Some scholars have concluded that no detailed method of determining the date of Easter was specified by the Council.[69] In any case, in the years following the council, the computational system that was worked out by the church of Alexandria came to be normative. It took a while for the Alexandrian rules to be adopted throughout Christian Europe, however. The Church of Rome continued to use an 84-year lunisolar calendar cycle from the late 3rd century until 457. It then switched to an adaptation by Victorius of Aquitaine of the Alexandrian rules.[70][71]

    Because this Victorian cycle differed from the Alexandrian cycle in the dates of some of the Paschal Full Moons, and because it tried to respect the Roman custom of fixing Easter to the Sunday in the week of the 16th to the 22nd of the lunar month (rather than the 15th to the 21st as at Alexandria), by providing alternative "Latin" and "Greek" dates in some years, occasional disagreements from the date of Easter as fixed by Alexandrian rules continued.[70][71] The Alexandrian rules were adopted in their entirety in the 6th century. From this time, therefore, all disputes between Alexandria and Rome as to the correct date for Easter cease, as both churches were using identical tables.

    Early Christians in Britain and Ireland also used an 84-year cycle. From the 5th century onward this cycle set its equinox to 25 March and fixed Easter to the Sunday falling in the 14th to the 20th of the lunar month inclusive.[72][73] This 84-year cycle was replaced by the Alexandrian method in the course of the 7th and 8th centuries. Churches in western continental Europe used a late Roman method until the late 8th century during the reign of Charlemagne, when they finally adopted the Alexandrian method. Since 1582, when the Catholic Church adopted the Gregorian calendar while the Eastern Orthodox and most Oriental Orthodox Churches retained the Julian calendar, the date on which Easter is celebrated has again differed.

    The Greek island of Syros, whose population is divided almost equally between Catholics and Orthodox, is one of the few places where the two Churches share a common date for Easter, with the Catholics accepting the Orthodox date—a practice helping considerably in maintaining good relations between the two communities.[74]

    In the 20th century, some individuals and institutions have propounded a fixed date for Easter, the most prominent proposal being the Sunday after the second Saturday in April. Despite having some support, proposals to reform the date have not been implemented.[75] An Orthodox congress of Eastern Orthodox bishops, which included representatives mostly from the Patriarch of Constantinople and the Patriarch of Serbia, met in Constantinople in 1923, where the bishops agreed to the Revised Julian calendar.[76]

    The original form of this calendar would have determined Easter using precise astronomical calculations based on the meridian of Jerusalem.[77][78] However, all the Eastern Orthodox countries that subsequently adopted the Revised Julian calendar adopted only that part of the revised calendar that applied to festivals falling on fixed dates in the Julian calendar. The revised Easter computation that had been part of the original 1923 agreement was never permanently implemented in any Orthodox diocese.[76]

    In the United Kingdom, the Easter Act 1928 set out legislation to allow the date of Easter to be fixed as the first Sunday after the second Saturday in April (or, in other words, the Sunday in the period from 9 to 15 April). However, the legislation has not been implemented, although it remains on the Statute book and could be implemented subject to approval by the various Christian churches.[79]

    At a summit in Aleppo, Syria, in 1997, the World Council of Churches (WCC) proposed a reform in the calculation of Easter which would have replaced the present divergent practices of calculating Easter with modern scientific knowledge taking into account actual astronomical instances of the spring equinox and full moon based on the meridian of Jerusalem, while also following the Council of Nicea position of Easter being on the Sunday following the full moon.[80] The recommended World Council of Churches changes would have sidestepped the calendar issues and eliminated the difference in date between the Eastern and Western churches. The reform was proposed for implementation starting in 2001, but it was not ultimately adopted by any member body.

    In Western Christianity, Easter is preceded by Lent, a period of fasting and penitence in preparation for Easter, which begins on Ash Wednesday and lasts forty days (not counting Sundays). The week before Easter, known as Holy Week, is very special in the Christian tradition. The Sunday before Easter is Palm Sunday, with the Wednesday before Easter being known as Spy Wednesday. The last three days before Easter are Maundy Thursday, Good Friday and Holy Saturday (sometimes referred to as Silent Saturday).

    Palm Sunday, Maundy Thursday and Good Friday respectively commemorate Jesus' entry in Jerusalem, the Last Supper and the Crucifixion. Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, and Holy Saturday are sometimes referred to as the Easter Triduum (Latin for "Three Days"). Many churches begin celebrating Easter late in the evening of Holy Saturday at a service called the Easter Vigil. In some countries, Easter lasts two days, with the second called "Easter Monday".

    The week beginning with Easter Sunday is called Easter Week or the Octave of Easter, and each day is prefaced with "Easter", e.g. Easter Monday, Easter Tuesday, etc. Easter Saturday is therefore the Saturday after Easter Sunday. The day before Easter is properly called Holy Saturday. Eastertide, or Paschaltide, the season of Easter, begins on Easter Sunday and lasts until the day of Pentecost, seven weeks later.

    In Eastern Christianity, the spiritual preparation for Easter begins with Great Lent, which starts on Clean Monday and lasts for 40 continuous days (including Sundays). The last week of Great Lent (following the fifth Sunday of Great Lent) is called Palm Week, and ends with Lazarus Saturday. The Vespers which begins Lazarus Saturday officially brings Great Lent to a close, although the fast continues through the following week. After Lazarus Saturday comes Palm Sunday, Holy Week, and finally Easter itself, and the fast is broken immediately after the Paschal Divine Liturgy.

    The Paschal Vigil begins with the Midnight Office, which is the last service of the Lenten Triodion and is timed so that it ends a little before midnight on Holy Saturday night. At the stroke of midnight the Paschal celebration itself begins, consisting of Paschal Matins, Paschal Hours, and Paschal Divine Liturgy.[81] Placing the Paschal Divine Liturgy at midnight guarantees that no Divine Liturgy will come earlier in the morning, ensuring its place as the pre-eminent "Feast of Feasts" in the liturgical year.

    The liturgical season from Easter to the Sunday of All Saints (the Sunday after Pentecost) is known as the Pentecostarion (the "fifty days"). The week which begins on Easter Sunday is called Bright Week, during which there is no fasting, even on Wednesday and Friday. The Afterfeast of Easter lasts 39 days, with its Apodosis (leave-taking) on the day before Ascension. Pentecost Sunday is the fiftieth day from Easter (counted inclusively).[82]

    The Easter festival is kept in many different ways among Western Christians. The traditional, liturgical observation of Easter, as practised among Roman Catholics, Lutherans, and some Anglicans begins on the night of Holy Saturday with the Easter Vigil. This, the most important liturgy of the year, begins in total darkness with the blessing of the Easter fire, the lighting of the large Paschal candle (symbolic of the Risen Christ) and the chanting of the Exultet or Easter Proclamation attributed to Saint Ambrose of Milan.

    After this service of light, a number of readings from the Old Testament are read. These tell the stories of creation, the sacrifice of Isaac, the crossing of the Red Sea, and the foretold coming of the Messiah. This part of the service climaxes with the singing of the Gloria and the Alleluia and the proclamation of the Gospel of the resurrection. At this time, the lights are brought up and the church bells are rung, according to local custom. A sermon may be preached after the gospel.

    The focus then moves from the lectern to the font. Anciently, Easter was considered the ideal time for converts to receive baptism, and this practice continues within Roman Catholicism and the Anglican Communion. Whether there are baptisms at this point or not, it is traditional for the congregation to renew the vows of their baptismal faith. This act is often sealed by the sprinkling of the congregation with holy water from the font. The Catholic sacrament of Confirmation is also celebrated at the Vigil.

    The Easter Vigil concludes with the celebration of the Eucharist (known in some traditions as Holy Communion). Certain variations in the Easter Vigil exist: Some churches read the Old Testament lessons before the procession of the Paschal candle, and then read the gospel immediately after the Exsultet.

    Some churches prefer to keep this vigil very early on the Sunday morning instead of the Saturday night, particularly churches, to reflect the gospel account of the women coming to the tomb at dawn on the first day of the week. These services are known as the Sunrise service and often occur in outdoor setting such as the church cemetery, yard, or a nearby park.

    The first recorded "Sunrise Service" took place in 1732 among the Single Brethren in the Moravian congregation at Herrnhut, Saxony, in what is now Germany. Following an all-night vigil they went before dawn to the town graveyard, God's Acre, on the hill above the town, to celebrate the Resurrection among the graves of the departed. This service was repeated the following year by the whole congregation and subsequently spread with the Moravian Missionaries around the world, including Old Salem in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.

    Additional celebrations are usually offered on Easter Sunday itself. Typically these services follow the usual order of Sunday services in a congregation, but also typically incorporate more highly festive elements. The music of the service, in particular, often displays a highly festive tone; the incorporation of brass instruments (trumpets, etc.) to supplement a congregation's usual instrumentation is common. Often a congregation's worship space is decorated with special banners and flowers (such as Easter lilies).

    In predominantly Roman Catholic Philippines, the morning of Easter (known in the national language as "Pasko ng Muling Pagkabuhay" or the Pasch of the Resurrection) is marked with joyous celebration, the first being the dawn "Salubong", wherein large statues of Jesus and Mary are brought together to meet, imagining the first reunion of Jesus and his mother Mary after Jesus' Resurrection. This is followed by the joyous Easter Mass.

    In Polish culture, the Rezurekcja (Resurrection Procession) is the joyous Easter morning Mass at daybreak when church bells ring out and explosions resound to commemorate Christ rising from the dead. Before the Mass begins at dawn, a festive procession with the Blessed Sacrament carried beneath a canopy encircles the church. As church bells ring out, handbells are vigorously shaken by altar boys, the air is filled with incense and the faithful raise their voices heavenward in a triumphant rendering of age-old Easter hymns. After the Blessed Sacrament is carried around the church and Adoration is complete, the Easter Mass begins. Another Polish Easter tradition is Święconka, the blessing of Easter baskets by the parish priest on Holy Saturday. This custom is celebrated not only in Poland, but also in the United States by Polish-Americans.

    Easter is the fundamental and most important festival of the Eastern and Oriental Orthodox Churches:

    This is the Expected and Holy Day,the One among the Sabbaths,the Sovereign and Lady of days,Feast of feasts, Celebration of celebrations,on which we praise Christ for all eternity!

    Every other religious festival in their calendar, including Christmas, is secondary in importance to the celebration of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. This is reflected in rich Paschal customs in the cultures of countries that have traditionally had an Orthodox Christian majority. Eastern Catholics have similar emphasis in their calendars, and many of their liturgical customs are very similar.

    This is not to say that Christmas and other elements of the Christian liturgical calendar are ignored. Instead, these events are all seen as necessary but preliminary to, and illuminated by, the full climax of the Resurrection, in which all that has come before reaches fulfillment and fruition. They shine only in the light of the Resurrection. Easter is the primary act that fulfills the purpose of Christ's ministry on earth—to defeat death by dying and to purify and exalt humanity by voluntarily assuming and overcoming human frailty. This is succinctly summarized by the Paschal troparion, sung repeatedly during Christian Passover until the Apodosis of Easter, which is the day before Ascension:

    Χριστὸς ἀνέστη ἐκ νεκρῶν,θανάτῳ θάνατον πατήσας,καὶ τοῖς ἐν τοῖς μνήμασιζωὴν χαρισάμενος.
    Christ is risen from the dead,Trampling down death by death,And upon those in the tombsBestowing life!
    Preparation for Easter begins with the season of Great Lent. In addition to fasting, almsgiving, and prayer, Orthodox Christians cut down on all entertainment and non-essential worldly activities, gradually eliminating them until Great and Holy Friday, the most austere day of the year. Traditionally, on the evening of Great and Holy Saturday, the Midnight Office is celebrated shortly after 11:00 pm (see Paschal Vigil).

    At its completion all light in the church building is extinguished, and all wait in darkness and silence for the stroke of midnight. Then, a new flame is struck in the altar, or the priest lights his candle from the perpetual lamp kept burning there, and he then lights candles held by deacons or other assistants, who then go to light candles held by the congregation (this practice has its origin in the reception of the Holy Fire at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem). Then the priest and congregation go in a Crucession (procession with the cross) around the temple (church building), holding lit candles, chanting:

    By Thy Resurrection O Christ our savior, the angels in Heaven sing, enable us who are on Earth, to glorify thee in purity of heart.

    This procession reenacts the journey of the Myrrhbearers to the Tomb of Jesus "very early in the morning" (Luke 24:1). After circling around the temple once or three times, the procession halts in front of the closed doors. In the Greek practice the priest reads a selection from the Gospel Book (Mark 16:1–Cool. Then, in all traditions, the priest makes the sign of the cross with the censer in front of the closed doors (which represent the sealed tomb).

    He and the people chant the Paschal Troparion, and all of the bells and semantra are sounded. Then all re-enter the temple and Paschal Matins begins immediately, followed by the Paschal Hours and then the Paschal Divine Liturgy. The high point of the liturgy is the delivery of Paschal Homily of St. John Chrysostom, for which the congregation stands.

    After the dismissal of the Liturgy, the priest may bless Paschal eggs and baskets brought by the faithful containing those foods which have been forbidden during the Great Fast. Immediately after the Liturgy it is customary for the congregation to share a meal, essentially an Agápē dinner (albeit at 2:00 am or later).

    In Greece the traditional meal is mageiritsa, a hearty stew of chopped lamb liver and wild greens seasoned with egg-and-lemon sauce. Traditionally, Easter eggs, hard-boiled eggs dyed bright red to symbolize the spilt Blood of Christ and the promise of eternal life, are cracked together to celebrate the opening of the Tomb of Christ.

    The next morning, Easter Sunday proper, there is no Divine Liturgy, since the Liturgy for that day has already been celebrated. Instead, in the afternoon, it is often traditional to celebrate "Agápē Vespers". In this service, it has become customary during the last few centuries for the priest and members of the congregation to read a portion of the Gospel of John 20:19–25 (in some places the reading is to include verses 19:26–31) in as many languages as they can manage, to show the universality of the Resurrection.

    For the remainder of the week, known as "Bright Week", all fasting is prohibited, and the customary Paschal greeting is: "Christ is risen!", to which the response is: "Truly He is risen!" This may also be done in many different languages. The services during Bright Week are nearly identical to those on Easter itself, except that they do not take place at midnight, but at their normal times during the day. The Crucession during Bright Week takes place either after Paschal Matins or the Paschal Divine Liturgy.

    Last edited by orthodoxymoron on Thu Feb 11, 2016 11:48 pm; edited 5 times in total

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    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  orthodoxymoron on Sun Apr 20, 2014 9:14 am

    Nonconformist Protestant Christians prefer to use a simple Christian cross, rather than a crucifix, to emphasis the Resurrection. Along with the celebration of Christmas and Advent, many Easter traditions were altered or even abandoned altogether by various offshoots of the Protestant Reformation, as they were deemed "pagan" or "Popish" (and therefore tainted) by many of the Reformation's Puritan movements.[83] However, some of the major Reformation Churches and movements (Lutheran, Methodist and Anglican for example), chose to retain a large proportion of the observances of the established Church Year along with many of its associated traditions. In Lutheran Churches, for example, not only were the days of Holy Week observed, but also Christmas, Easter and Pentecost were observed with three-day festivals (the day itself and the two following).

    Among many other Reformation and counter Counter-Reformation traditions, however, things were very different, with most Anabaptists, Quakers, Congregational and Presbyterian Puritans, regarding such festivals as an abomination.[84] The Puritan rejection of Easter traditions was (and is) based partly upon their interpretation of 2 Corinthians 6:14–16 and partly upon a more general belief that if a religious practice or celebration is not actually written in the Old and/or New Testaments of the Christian Bible then that practice/celebration must be a later development and cannot be considered an authentic part of Christian practice or belief—so at best simply unnecessary, at worst actually sinful.

    Some Christian groups reject the celebration of Easter due to perceived pagan roots and historical connections to the practices and permissions of the "Roman" Catholic Church.[85] While "Nonconformist" Christian groups that do still celebrate the event prefer to call it Resurrection Day (or Resurrection Sunday) for the same reasons as well as a rejection of secular or commercial aspects of the holiday in the 20th and 21st centuries.[86]

    Jehovah's Witnesses maintain a similar view, observing a yearly commemorative service of the Last Supper and subsequent execution of Christ on the evening of Nisan 14 (as they calculate the dates derived from the lunar Hebrew Calendar). It is commonly referred to by many Witnesses as simply "The Memorial".[87] Jehovah's Witnesses believe that such verses as Luke 22:19–20 and 1 Cor 11:26 constitute a commandment to remember the death of Christ though not the resurrection,[87] and they do so on a yearly basis just as Passover is celebrated annually by the Jews.

    Members of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers), as part of their historic testimony against times and seasons, do not celebrate or observe Easter or any other Christian holidays, believing instead that "every day is the Lord's day",[88] and that elevation of one day above others suggests that it is acceptable to do un-Christian acts on other days.[89] During the 17th and 18th centuries, Quakers were persecuted for this non-observance of Holy Days.[90]

    Some Christian groups feel that Easter is something to be regarded with great joy: not marking the day itself, but remembering and rejoicing in the event it commemorates—the miracle of Christ's resurrection. In this spirit, these Christians teach that each day and all Sabbaths should be kept holy, in Christ's teachings. Hebrew-Christian, Sacred Name, and Armstrong movement churches (such as the Living Church of God) usually reject Easter in favor of Nisan 14 observance and celebration of the Christian Passover. This is especially true of Christian groups that celebrate the New Moons or annual High Sabbaths in addition to seventh-day Sabbath. They support this textually with reference to the letter to the Colossians: "Let no one ... pass judgment on you in matters of food and drink or with regard to a festival or new moon or sabbath. These are shadows of things to come; the reality belongs to Christ." (Col. 2:16–17, NAB)

    In countries where Christianity is a state religion, or where the country has large Christian population, Easter is often a public holiday. As Easter is always a Sunday, many countries in the world also have Easter Monday as a public holiday. Some retail stores, shopping malls, and restaurants are closed on Easter Sunday. Good Friday, which occurs two days before Easter Sunday, is also a public holiday in many countries, as well as in 12 U.S. states. Even in states where Good Friday is not a holiday, many financial institutions, stock markets, and public schools are closed. Few banks that are normally open on regular Sundays are closed on Easter.

    In the Nordic countries Good Friday, Easter Sunday and Easter Monday are public holidays,[91] and Good Friday and Easter Monday are bank holidays.[92] It is a holiday for most workers except some shopping malls which keep open for a half-day. Many businesses give their employees almost a week off, called Easter break.[93]

    In the Netherlands both Easter Sunday and Easter Monday are national holidays. Like first and second Christmas Day, they are both considered Sundays, which results in a first and a second Easter Sunday, after which the week continues to a Tuesday.[94] Even though Good Friday is an official national holiday, it is not a mandatory day off for commercial companies.

    In Commonwealth nations Easter Day is rarely a public holiday, as is the case for celebrations which fall on a Sunday. In the United Kingdom both Good Friday and Easter Monday are bank holidays.[95] However, in Canada Easter Sunday is a public holiday, along with Easter Monday. In the Canadian province of Quebec, either Good Friday or Easter Monday are statutory holidays (although most companies give both). In some countries Good Friday is a public holiday as well.

    In the United States, because Easter falls on a Sunday, which is already a non-working day for federal and state employees, it has not been designated as a federal or state holiday. Easter parades are held in many American cities, involving festive strolling processions,[96] with the New York City parade being the best known.

    Easter eggs are specially decorated eggs given out to celebrate the Easter holiday. The oldest tradition is to use dyed and painted chicken eggs, but a modern custom is to substitute eggs made from chocolate, or plastic eggs filled with candy such as jellybeans.

    Many Americans follow the tradition of coloring hard-boiled eggs and giving baskets of candy. The Easter Bunny is a popular legendary anthropomorphic Easter gift-giving character analogous to Santa Claus in American culture. On Easter Monday, the President of the United States holds an annual Easter egg roll on the White House lawn for young children.[97]

    Easter eggs are a widely popular symbol of new life in Poland and other Slavic countries' folk traditions. A batik-like decorating process known as pisanka produces intricate, brilliantly-colored eggs. The celebrated House of Fabergé workshops created exquisite jewelled eggs for the Russian Imperial Court.


    1.Jump up ^ Traditional names for the feast in English are "Easter Day", as in the Book of Common Prayer, "Easter Sunday", used by James Ussher (The Whole Works of the Most Rev. James Ussher, Volume 4) and Samuel Pepys (The Diary of Samuel Pepys, Volume 2) and plain "Easter", as in books printed in 1575, 1584, 1586
    2.Jump up ^ IPA: [ˈæːɑstre, ˈeːostre]
    3.Jump up ^ See for example "Old English Eastre is ultimately the goddess of the dawn, corresponding to the Roman goddess Aurōra and the Greek goddess Eōs,[26] "The plainest example of the Dawn goddess's becoming attached to a single festival, and that in the spring, is that of the Anglo-Saxon Eostre and her postulated German counterpart Ôstara, who have given us Easter and the Ostertage. Our source does not connect Eostre with dawn, but that is undoubtedly the meaning of her name".[27] Finally, comparative material such as Old English Eostre "permits us to posit a PIE ...'goddess of the dawn' who was characterized as a "reluctant" bringer of light for which she is punished. In three of the IE stocks, Baltic, Greek and Indo-Iranian, the existence of a PIE 'goddess of the dawn' is given additional linguistic support in that she is designated the 'daughter of heaven'. This can be seen in [corresponding Lithuanian, Greek, and Old Indian terms] which all derive from a PIE ...'daughter of heaven'. The corresponding 'son of heaven' is not lexically reconstructible but is both semantically and mythologically associated with the 'Divine Twins'"[28]
    4.Jump up ^ Acts 2:1; 12:3; 20:6; 27:9, 1 Cor 16:8
    5.Jump up ^ Eusebius reports that Dionysius, Bishop of Alexandria, proposed an 8-year Easter cycle, and quotes a letter from Anatolius, Bishop of Laodicea, that refers to a 19-year cycle.[64] An 8-year cycle has been found inscribed on a statue unearthed in Rome in the 17th century, dated to the 3rd century.[65]


    1.Jump up ^ Vladimir Lossky, 1982 The Meaning of Icons ISBN 978-0-913836-99-6; p. 185
    2.Jump up ^ George P. Boza, "The Orthodox Iconographic Depiction of the Resurrection"
    3.Jump up ^ Metropolitan Hierotheos of Naupaktos. Οἱ Δεσποτικὲς Ἑορτές [The feasts of the Lord]. Lebadeia, Greece: Hiera Mone Genethliou tes Theotokou [Pelagias], 1995. pp.262,263
    4.Jump up ^ Lisa D. Maugans Driver, Christ at the Center (Westminster John Knox Press 2009 ISBN 978-0-664-22897-2), p. 151 Everett Ferguson, Baptism in the Early Church (Eerdmans 2009 ISBN 978-0-8028-2748-7), p. 351 or Pascha
    5.^ Jump up to: a b Norman Davies (20 January 1998). Europe: A History. HarperCollins. "In most European languages Easter is called by some variant of the late Latin word Pascha, which in turn derives from the Hebrew pesach, passover'."
    6.Jump up ^ Nelson, Thomas (28 February 2008). The Orthodox Study Bible: Ancient Christianity Speaks to Today's World (in English). Thomas Nelson Inc. p. 1408. ISBN 9781418576363. "Thus, Pascha is the primary term by which we refer to the death and Resurrection of Christ, known in the West as Easter."
    7.Jump up ^ Gamman, Andrew; Bindon, Caroline (2014-02-11). Stations for Lent and Easter. Kereru Publishing Limited. p. 7. ISBN 9780473276812. "Easter Day, also known as Resurrection Sunday, marks the high point of the Christian year. It is the day that we celebrate the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead."
    8.Jump up ^ Boda, Mark J.; Smith, Gordon T. (2006). Repentance in Christian Theology. Liturgical Press. p. 316. ISBN 9780814651759. Retrieved 19 April 2014. "It should be noted that Orthodox, Catholic, and all Reformed churches in the Middle East celebrate Easter according to the Eastern calendar, calling this holy day "Resurrection Sunday," not Easter."
    9.Jump up ^ Bernard Trawicky, Ruth Wilhelme Gregory (2000). Anniversaries and Holidays. American Library Association. "Easter is the central celebration of the Christian liturgical year. It is the oldest and most important Christian feast, celebrating the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. The date of Easter determines the dates of all movable feasts except those of Advent."
    10.Jump up ^ Aveni, Anthony (2004). "The Easter/Passover Season: Connecting Time's Broken Circle", The Book of the Year: A Brief History of Our Seasonal Holidays. Oxford University Press. pp. 64–78. ISBN 0-19-517154-3.
    11.Jump up ^ Peter C. Bower. The Companion to the Book of Common Worship. Geneva Press. Retrieved 11 April 2009. "Maundy Thursday (or le mandé; Thursday of the Mandatum, Latin, commandment). The name is taken from the first few words sung at the ceremony of the washing of the feet, "I give you a new commandment" (John 13:34); also from the commandment of Christ that we should imitate His loving humility in the washing of the feet (John 13:14–17). The term mandatum (maundy), therefore, was applied to the rite of foot-washing on this day."
    12.Jump up ^ Gail Ramshaw (2004). Three Day Feast: Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, and Easter. Augsburg Books. Retrieved 11 April 2009. "In the liturgies of the Three Days, the service for Maundy Thursday includes both, telling the story of Jesus' last supper and enacting the footwashing."
    13.Jump up ^ Leonard Stuart (1909). New century reference library of the world's most important knowledge: complete, thorough, practical, Volume 3. Syndicate Pub. Co. Retrieved 11 April 2009. "Holy Week, or Passion Week, the week which immediately precedes Easter, and is devoted especially to commemorating the passion of our Lord. The Days more especially solemnized during it are Holy Wednesday, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, and Holy Saturday."
    14.Jump up ^ Frequently asked questions about the date of Easter
    15.Jump up ^ Weiser, Francis X. (1958). Handbook of Christian Feasts and Customs. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. p. 214. ISBN 0-15-138435-5.
    16.Jump up ^ "clipping the church". Oxford Reference. Oxford University Press. Retrieved 30 March 2013.
    17.Jump up ^ Anne Jordan (5 April 2000). Christianity. Nelson Thornes. Retrieved 7 April 2012. "Easter eggs are used as a Christian symbol to represent the empty tomb. The outside of the egg looks dead but inside there is new life, which is going to break out. The Easter egg is a reminder that Jesus will rise from His tomb and bring new life. Orthodox Christians dye boiled eggs red to represent the blood of Christ shed for the sins of the world."
    18.Jump up ^ The Guardian, Volume 29. H. Harbaugh. 1878. Retrieved 7 April 2012. "Just so, on that first Easter morning, Jesus came to life and walked out of the tomb, and left it, as it were, an empty shell. Just so, too, when the Christian dies, the body is left in the grave, an empty shell, but the soul takes wings and flies away to be with God. Thus you see that though an egg seems to be as dead as a sone, yet it really has life in it; and also it is like Christ's dead body, which was raised to life again. This is the reason we use eggs on Easter. (In olden times they used to color the eggs red, so as to show the kind of death by which Christ died,-a bloody death.)"
    19.Jump up ^ Gordon Geddes, Jane Griffiths (22 January 2002). Christian belief and practice. Heinemann. Retrieved 7 April 2012. "Red eggs are given to Orthodox Christians after the Easter Liturgy. They crack their eggs against each other's. The cracking of the eggs symbolizes a wish to break away from the bonds of sin and misery and enter the new life issuing from Christ's resurrection."
    20.Jump up ^ Collins, Cynthia (19 April 2014). "Easter Lily Tradition and History" (in English). The Guardian. Retrieved 20 April 2014. "The Easter Lily is symbolic of the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Churches of all denominations, large and small, are filled with floral arrangements of these white flowers with their trumpet-like shape on Easter morning."
    21.Jump up ^ Schell, Stanley (1916). Easter Celebrations. Werner & Company. p. 84. "We associate the lily with Easter, as pre-eminently the symbol of the Resurrection."
    22.Jump up ^ Luther League Review: 1936-1937 (in English). Luther League of America. 1936.
    23.Jump up ^ Vicki K. Black (1 July 2004). The Church Standard, Volume 74. Church Publishing, Inc. Retrieved 7 April 2012. "In parts of Europe, the eggs were dyed red and were then cracked together when people exchanged Easter greetings. Many congregations today continue to have Easter egg hunts for the children after the services on Easter Day."
    24.Jump up ^ The Church Standard, Volume 74. Walter N. Hering. 1897. Retrieved 7 April 2012. "When the custom was carrierd over into Christian practice the Easter eggs were usually sent to the priests to be blessed and sprinked with holy water. In later times the coloring and decorating of eggs was introduced, and in a royal roll of the time of Edward I., which is preserved in the Tower of London, there is an entry of 18d. for 400 eggs, to be used for Easter gifts."
    25.Jump up ^ From Preparation to Passion. 2010. Retrieved 7 April 2012. "So what preparations do most Christians and non-Christians make? Shopping for new clothing often signifies the belief that Spring has arrived, and it is a time of renewal. Preparations for the Easter Egg Hunts and the Easter Ham for the Sunday dinner are high on the list too."
    26.Jump up ^ Barnhart, Robert K. The Barnhart Concise Dictionary of Etymology, p. 229. (1995) HarperCollins. ISBN 0-06-270084-7
    27.Jump up ^ West, M. L.. Indo-European Myth and Culture, p. 227, cf. 217–218. (2007). Oxford University Press
    28.Jump up ^ Mallory, J. P. and Adams, Douglas Q.. Encyclopedia of Indo-European Culture, pp. 148–149. (1997) Taylor & Francis.
    29.^ Jump up to: a b "History of Easter". The History Channel website. A&E Television Networks. Retrieved 9 March 2013.
    30.Jump up ^ Karl Gerlach (1998). The Antenicene Pascha: A Rhetorical History. Peeters Publishers. p. XVIII. "The second century equivalent of easter and the paschal Triduum was called by both Greek and Latin writers "Pascha (πάσχα)", a Greek transliteration of the Aramaic form of the Hebrew פֶּסַח, the Passover feast of Ex. 12."
    31.Jump up ^ 1 Corinthians 5:7
    32.Jump up ^ Karl Gerlach (1998). The Antenicene Pascha: A Rhetorical History. Peters Publishers. p. 21. "For while it is from Ephesus that Paul writes, "Christ our Pascha has been sacrificed for us," Ephesian Christians were not likely the first to hear that Ex 12 did not speak about the rituals of Pesach, but the death of Jesus of Nazareth."
    33.^ Jump up to: a b c d Vicki K. Black (1 July 2004). Welcome to the Church Year: An Introduction to the Seasons of the Episcopal Church. Church Publishing, Inc. "Easter is still called by its older Greek name, Pascha, which means "Passover", and it is this meaning as the Christian Passover-the celebration of Jesus' triumph over death and entrance into resurrected life-that is the heart of Easter in the church. For the early church, Jesus Christ was the fulfillment of the Jewish Passover feast: through Jesus, we have been freed from slavery of sin and granted to the Promised Land of everlasting life."
    34.Jump up ^ 1 Corinthians 15:12–20
    Torrey, Reuben Archer (1897). "The Resurrection of Christ". Torrey's New Topical Textbook. Retrieved 2013-03-31. (interprets primary source references in this section as applying to the Resurrection)
    "The Letter of Paul to the Corinthians". Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 10 March 2013.
    35.Jump up ^ Romans 1:4
    36.Jump up ^ Acts 17:31
    37.^ Jump up to: a b "Jesus Christ". Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 11 March 2013.
    38.Jump up ^ 1 Peter 1:3
    39.Jump up ^ Romans 6:4
    40.Jump up ^ 1 Corinthians 5:7
    41.Jump up ^ John 1:29, Revelation 5:6, 1 Peter 1:19, 1 Peter 1:2, and the associated notes and Passion Week table in Barker, Kenneth, ed. (2002). Zondervan NIV Study Bible. Grand Rapids: Zondervan. p. 1520. ISBN 0-310-92955-5.
    Karl Gerlach (1998). The Antenicene Pascha: A Rhetorical History. Peeters Publishers. pp. 32, 56.
    42.Jump up ^ Exodus 12:6
    43.Jump up ^ Exodus 12:18, John 13:2, John 18:28, John 19:14.
    Barker, Kenneth, ed. (2002). Zondervan NIV Study Bible. Grand Rapids: Zondervan. ISBN 0-310-92955-5.
    44.Jump up ^ John 18:28
    45.Jump up ^ Leviticus 23:8
    46.^ Jump up to: a b "Homily on the Pascha". Kerux (Northwest Theological Seminary). Retrieved 28 March 2007.
    47.Jump up ^ Cheslyn Jones, Geoffrey Wainwright, Edward Yarnold, and Paul Bradshaw, Eds., The Study of Liturgy, Revised Edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, p. 474.
    48.Jump up ^ Cheslyn Jones, Geoffrey Wainwright, Edward Yarnold, and Paul Bradshaw, Eds., The Study of Liturgy, Revised Edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, p. 459:"[Easter] is the only feast of the Christian Year that can plausibly claim to go back to apostolic times ... [It] must derive from a time when Jewish influence was effective ... because it depends on the lunar calendar (every other feast depends on the solar calendar)."
    49.Jump up ^ Socrates, Church History, 5.22, in Schaff, Philip (13 July 2005). "The Author's Views respecting the Celebration of Easter, Baptism, Fasting, Marriage, the Eucharist, and Other Ecclesiastical Rites.". Socrates and Sozomenus Ecclesiastical Histories. Calvin College Christian Classics Ethereal Library. Retrieved 28 March 2007.
    50.Jump up ^ Karl Gerlach (1998). The Antenicene Pascha: A Rhetorical History. Peeters Publishers. p. 21. "Long before this controversy, Ex 12 as a story of origins and its ritual expression had been firmly fixed in the Christian imagination. Though before the final decades of the 2nd century only accessible as an exegetical tradition, already in the Paulin letters the Exodus saga is deeply involved with the celebration of bath and meal. Even here, this relationship does not suddenly appear, but represents developments in ritual narrative that mus have begun at the very inception of the Christian message. Jesus of Nazareth was crucified during Pesach-Mazzot, an event that a new covenant people of Jews and Gentiles both saw as definitive and defining. Ex 12 is thus one of the few reliable guides for tracing the synergism among ritual, text, and kerygma before the Council of Nicaea."
    51.Jump up ^ The Date of Easter. Article from United States Naval Observatory (27 March 2007).
    52.Jump up ^ "The Church in Malankara switched entirely to the Gregorian calendar in 1953, following Encyclical No. 620 from Patriarch Mor Ignatius Aphrem I, dt. December 1952." Calendars of the Syriac Orthodox Church. Retrieved 22 April 2009
    53.Jump up ^ Bede: The reckoning of time, translated by Faith Wallis (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999) chapter 62, p. 148.
    54.Jump up ^ Paragraph 7 of Inter gravissimas to "the vernal equinox, which was fixed by the fathers of the [first] Nicene Council at XII calends April [21 March]". This definition can be traced at least back to chapters 6 & 59 of Bede's De temporum ratione (725).
    55.^ Jump up to: a b Montes, Marcos J. "Calculation of the Ecclesiastical Calendar". Retrieved 12 January 2008.
    56.Jump up ^ G Moyer (1983), "Aloisius Lilius and the 'Compendium novae rationis restituendi kalendarium'", pages 171–188 in G.V. Coyne (ed.).
    57.Jump up ^ Eusebius, Church History 5.23.
    58.Jump up ^ Socrates, Church History, 6.11, at Schaff, Philip (13 July 2005). "Of Severian and Antiochus: their Disagreement from John.". Socrates and Sozomenus Ecclesiastical Histories. Calvin College Christian Classics Ethereal Library. Retrieved 28 March 2009.
    59.Jump up ^ Socrates, Church History 7.29, at Schaff, Philip (13 July 2005). "Nestorius of Antioch promoted to the See of Constantinople. His Persecution of the Heretics.". Socrates and Sozomenus Ecclesiastical Histories. Calvin College Christian Classics Ethereal Librar. Retrieved 28 March 2009.
    60.Jump up ^ Eusebius, Church History, 7.32.
    61.Jump up ^ Peter of Alexandria, quoted in the Chronicon Paschale. In Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, eds., Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Volume 14: The Writings of Methodius, Alexander of Lycopolis, Peter of Alexandria, And Several Fragments, Edinburgh, 1869, p. 326, at Donaldson, Alexander (1 June 2005). "That Up to the Time of the Destruction of Jerusalem, the Jews Rightly Appointed the Fourteenth Day of the First Lunar Month.". Gregory Thaumaturgus, Dionysius the Great, Julius Africanus, Anatolius and Minor Writers, Methodius, Arnobius. Calvin College Christian Classics Ethereal Library. Retrieved 28 March 2009.
    62.Jump up ^ MS Verona, Biblioteca Capitolare LX(58) folios 79v–80v.
    63.Jump up ^ Sacha Stern, Calendar and Community: A History of the Jewish Calendar Second Century BCE – Tenth Century CE, Oxford, 2001, pp. 124–132.
    64.Jump up ^ Eusebius, Church History, 7.20, 7.31.
    65.Jump up ^ Allen Brent, Hippolytus and the Roman Church in the Third Century, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1995.
    66.Jump up ^ Epiphanius, Adversus Haereses, Heresy 69, 11,1, in Willams, F. (1994). The Panarion of Epiphianus of Salamis Books II and III. Leiden: E.J. Brill. p. 331.
    67.Jump up ^ Apostolic Canon 7: If any bishop, presbyter, or deacon shall celebrate the holy day of Easter before the vernal equinox with the Jews, let him be deposed. A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Second Series, Volume 14: The Seven Ecumenical Councils, Eerdmans, 1956, p. 594.
    68.Jump up ^ St. John Chrysostom, "Against those who keep the first Passover", in Saint John Chrysostom: Discourses against Judaizing Christians, translated by Paul W. Harkins, Washington, D.C., 1979, p. 47ff.
    69.Jump up ^ Mosshammer, Alden A. (2008). The Easter Computus and the Origins of the Christian Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 50–52. ISBN 978-0-19-954312-0.
    70.^ Jump up to: a b Mosshammer, Alden A. (2008). The Easter Computus and the Origins of the Christian Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 239–244. ISBN 978-0-19-954312-0.
    71.^ Jump up to: a b Holford-Strevens, Leofranc, and Blackburn, Bonnie (1999). The Oxford Companion to the Year. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 808–809. ISBN 0-19-214231-3.
    72.Jump up ^ Mosshammer, Alden A. (2008). The Easter Computus and the Origins of the Christian Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 223–224. ISBN 978-0-19-954312-0.
    73.Jump up ^ Holford-Strevens, Leofranc, and Blackburn, Bonnie (1999). The Oxford Companion to the Year. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 870–875. ISBN 0-19-214231-3.
    74.Jump up ^ "Easter: A date with God". The Economist. 20 April 2011. Retrieved 23 April 2011. "Only in a handful of places do Easter celebrants alter their own arrangements to take account of their neighbours. Finland's Orthodox Christians mark Easter on the Western date. And on the Greek island of Syros, a Papist stronghold, Catholics and Orthodox alike march to Orthodox time. The spectacular public commemorations, involving flower-strewn funeral biers on Good Friday and fireworks on Saturday night, bring the islanders together, rather than highlighting division."
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    76.^ Jump up to: a b Hieromonk Cassian, A Scientific Examination of the Orthodox Church Calendar, Center for Traditionalist Orthodox Studies, 1998, p.51–52, ISBN 0-911165-31-2.
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    94.Jump up ^ "Dutch Easter traditions – how the Dutch celebrate Easter". Dutch Community. Retrieved 10 April 2014.
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    96.Jump up ^ Duchak, Alicia (2002). An A-Z of Modern America. Rutledge.
    97.Jump up ^ "Easter Egg Roll". The White House. Retrieved 10 April 2014.

    Last edited by orthodoxymoron on Thu Feb 11, 2016 11:51 pm; edited 3 times in total

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    Re: The United States of the Solar System: A.D. 2133 (Book One)

    Post  B.B.Baghor on Sun Apr 20, 2014 9:32 am

    Quote by Orthodoxymoron
    "Whatever the case may be -- I am NOT in any condition to do much of anything (especially in public). It's a constant war -- just to maintain my mediocrity"

    Wow, I'm truly amazed by your capacity, orthodoxymoron, to present huge amounts of info here and to find your statement (in this quote).
    To be honest, I can't even begin to grasp all that you try to convey in them, it's simply to much of a good thing!
    If I would read them, I'm afraid I would feel the same, exactly as you do!

    Hope you don't feel offended!

      Current date/time is Tue Feb 20, 2018 5:25 pm